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Applications of Derandomization Theory in Coding

iAbstract
Randomized techniques play a fundamental role in theoretical computer
science and discrete mathematics, in particular for the design of efficient al-
gorithms and construction of combinatorial objects. The basic goal in deran-
domization theory is to eliminate or reduce the need for randomness in such
randomized constructions. Towards this goal, numerous fundamental notions
have been developed to provide a unified framework for approaching various
derandomization problems and to improve our general understanding of the
power of randomness in computation. Two important classes of such tools are
pseudorandom generators and randomness extractors. Pseudorandom genera-
tors transform a short, purely random, sequence into a much longer sequence
that looks random, while extractors transform a weak source of randomness
into a perfectly random one (or one with much better qualities, in which case
the transformation is called a randomness condenser).
In this thesis, we explore some applications of the fundamental notions
in derandomization theory to problems outside the core of theoretical com-
puter science, and in particular, certain problems related to coding theory.
First, we consider the wiretap channel problem which involves a communi-
cation system in which an intruder can eavesdrop a limited portion of the
transmissions. We utilize randomness extractors to construct efficient and
information-theoretically optimal communication protocols for this model.
Then we consider the combinatorial group testing problem. In this clas-
sical problem, one aims to determine a set of defective items within a large
population by asking a number of queries, where each query reveals whether
a defective item is present within a specified group of items. We use ran-
domness condensers to explicitly construct optimal, or nearly optimal, group
testing schemes for a setting where the query outcomes can be highly unre-
liable, as well as the threshold model where a query returns positive if the
number of defectives pass a certain threshold.
Next, we use randomness condensers and extractors to design ensembles
of error-correcting codes that achieve the information-theoretic capacity of a
large class of communication channels, and then use the obtained ensembles
for construction of explicit capacity achieving codes. Finally, we consider
the problem of explicit construction of error-correcting codes on the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound and extend the original idea of Nisan and Wigderson to
obtain a small ensemble of codes, mostly achieving the bound, under suitable
computational hardness assumptions.
Keywords: Derandomization theory, randomness extractors, pseudorandom-
ness, wiretap channels, group testing, error-correcting codes.
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Re´sume´
Les techniques de randomisation jouent un roˆle fondamental en informa-
tique the´orique et en mathe´matiques discre`tes, en particulier pour la concep-
tion d’algorithmes efficaces et pour la construction d’objets combinatoires.
L’objectif principal de la the´orie de de´randomisation est d’e´liminer ou de
re´duire le besoin d’ale´a pour de telles constructions. Dans ce but, de nom-
breuses notions fondamentales ont e´te´ de´veloppe´es, d’une part pour cre´er
un cadre unifie´ pour aborder diffe´rents proble`mes de de´randomisation, et
d’autre part pour mieux comprendre l’apport de l’ale´a en informatique. Les
ge´ne´rateurs pseudo-ale´atoires et les extracteurs sont deux classes importantes
de tels outils. Les ge´ne´rateurs pseudo-ale´atoires transforment une suite courte
et purement ale´atoire en une suite beaucoup plus longue qui parait ale´atoire.
Les extracteurs d’ale´a transforment une source faiblement ale´atoire en une
source parfaitement ale´atoire (ou en une source de meilleure qualite´. Dans ce
dernier cas, la transformation est appele´e un condenseur d’ale´a).
Dans cette the`se, nous explorons quelques applications des notions fon-
damentales de la the´orie de de´randomisation a` des proble`mes pe´riphe´riques
a` l’informatique the´orique et en particulier a` certains proble`mes relevant de
la the´orie des codes. Nous nous inte´ressons d’abord au proble`me du canal a`
jarretie`re, qui consiste en un syste`me de communication ou` un intrus peut in-
tercepter une portion limite´e des transmissions. Nous utilisons des extracteurs
pour construire pour ce mode`le des protocoles de communication efficaces et
optimaux du point de vue de la the´orie de l’information.
Nous e´tudions ensuite le proble`me du test en groupe combinatoire. Dans
ce proble`me classique, on se propose de de´terminer un ensemble d’objets
de´fectueux parmi une large population, a` travers un certain nombre de ques-
tions, ou` chaque re´ponse re´ve`le si un objet de´fectueux appartient a` un certain
ensemble d’objets. Nous utilisons des condenseurs pour construire explicite-
ment des tests de groupe optimaux ou quasi-optimaux, dans un contexte ou`
les re´ponses aux questions peuvent eˆtre tre`s peu fiables, et dans le mode`le de
seuil ou` le re´sultat d’une question est positif si le nombre d’objets de´fectueux
de´passe un certain seuil.
Ensuite, nous utilisons des condenseurs et des extracteurs pour concevoir
des ensembles de codes correcteurs d’erreurs qui atteignent la capacite´ (dans
le sens de la the´orie de l’information) d’un grand nombre de canaux de com-
munications. Puis, nous utilisons les ensembles obtenus pour la construction
de codes explicites qui atteignent la capacite´. Nous nous inte´ressons finale-
ment au proble`me de la construction explicite de codes correcteurs d’erreurs
qui atteignent la borne de Gilbert–Varshamov et reprenons l’ide´e originale de
Nisan et Wigderson pour obtenir un petit ensemble de codes dont la plupart
atteignent la borne, sous certaines hypothe`ses de difficulte´ computationnelle.
Mots-cle´s: The´orie de de´randomisation, extracteurs d’ale´a, pseudo-ale´a, ca-
naux a` jarretie`re, test en groupe, codes correcteurs d’erreurs.
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“You are at the wheel of your
car, waiting at a traffic light, you
take the book out of the bag, rip
off the transparent wrapping,
start reading the first lines. A
storm of honking breaks over
you; the light is green, you’re
blocking traffic.”
— Italo Calvino
Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the decades, the role of randomness in computation has proved to be one
of the most intriguing subjects of study in computer science. Considered as a
fundamental computational resource, randomness has been extensively used
as an indispensable tool in design and analysis of algorithms, combinatorial
constructions, cryptography, and computational complexity.
As an illustrative example on the power of randomness in algorithms, con-
sider a clustering problem, in which we wish to partition a collection of items
into two groups. Suppose that some pairs of items are marked as inconsistent,
meaning that they are best be avoided falling in the same group. Of course,
it might be simply impossible to group the items in such a way that no in-
consistencies occur within the two groups. For that reason, it makes sense
to consider the objective of minimizing the number of inconsistencies induced
by the chosen partitioning. Suppose that we are asked to color individual
items red or blue, where the items marked by the same color form each of
the two groups. How can we design a strategy that maximizes the number
of inconsistent pairs that fall in different groups? The basic rule of thumb in
randomized algorithm design suggests that
When unsure making decisions, try flipping coins!
Thus a naive strategy for assigning color to items would be to flip a fair coin
for each item. If the coin falls Heads, we mark the item blue, and otherwise
red.
How can the above strategy possibly be any reasonable? After all we are
defining the groups without giving the slightest thought on the given structure
of the inconsistent pairs! Remarkably, a simple analysis can prove that the
coin-flipping strategy is in fact a quite reasonable one. To see why, consider
any inconsistent pair. The chance that the two items are assigned the same
color is exactly one half. Thus, we expect that half of the inconsistent pairs
1
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end up falling in different groups. By repeating the algorithm a few times and
checking the outcomes, we can be sure that an assignment satisfying half of
the inconsistency constraints is found after a few trials.
We see that, a remarkably simple algorithm that does not even read its
input can attain an approximate solution to the clustering problem in which
the number of inconsistent pairs assigned to different groups is no less than
half the maximum possible. However, our algorithm used a valuable resource;
namely random coin flips, that greatly simplified its task. In this case, it is
not hard to come up with an efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithm that
does equally well without using any randomness. However, designing such an
algorithm and analyzing its performance is admittedly a substantially more
difficult task that what we demonstrated within a few paragraphs above.
As it turns out, finding an optimal solution to our clustering problem
above is an intractable problem (in technical terms, it is NP-hard), and even
obtaining an approximation ratio better than 16/17 ≈ .941 is so [79]. Thus
the trivial bit-flipping algorithm indeed obtains a reasonable solution. In a
celebrated work, Goemans and Williamson [69] improve the approximation
ratio to about .878, again using randomization1. A deterministic algorithm
achieving the same quality was later discovered [104], though it is much more
complicated to analyze.
Another interesting example demonstrating the power of randomness in
algorithms is the primality testing problem, in which the goal is to decide
whether a given n-digit integer is prime or composite. While efficient (poly-
nomial-time in n) randomized algorithms were discovered for this problem as
early as 1970’s (e.g., Solovay-Strassen’s [140] and Miller-Rabin’s algorithms
[107, 121]), a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for primality testing
was found decades later, with the breakthrough work of Agrawal, Kayal, and
Saxena [3], first published in 2002. Even though this algorithm provably works
in polynomial time, randomized methods still tend to be more favorable and
more efficient for practical applications.
The primality testing algorithm of Agrawal et al. can be regarded as a de-
randomization of a particular instance of the polynomial identity testing prob-
lem. Polynomial identity testing generalizes the high-school-favorite problem
of verifying whether a pair of polynomials expressed as closed form formulae
expand to identical polynomials. For example, the following is an 8-variate
identity
(x21 + x
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2 + x
2
3 + x
2
4)(y
2
1 + y
2
2 + y
2
3 + y
2
4)
?≡
(x1y1 − x2y2 − x3y3 − x4y4)2 + (x1y2 + x2y1 + x3y4 − x4y3)2+
(x1y3 − x2y4 + x3y1 + x4y2)2 + (x1y4 + x2y3 − x3y2 + x4y1)2
1 Improving upon the approximation ration obtained by this algorithm turns out to be
NP-hard under a well-known conjecture [90].
3which turns out to be valid. When the number of variables and the complexity
of the expressions grow, the task of verifying identities becomes much more
challenging using naive methods.
This is where the power of randomness comes into play again. A funda-
mental idea due to Schwartz and Zippel [131, 169] shows that the following
approach indeed works:
Evaluate the two polynomials at sufficiently many randomly cho-
sen points, and identify them as identical if and only if all evalua-
tions agree.
It turns out that the above simple idea leads to a randomized efficient algo-
rithm for testing identities that may err with an arbitrarily small probability.
Despite substantial progress, to this date no polynomial-time deterministic
algorithms for solving general identity testing problem is known, and a full
derandomization of Schwartz-Zippel’s algorithm remains a challenging open
problem in theoretical computer science.
The discussion above, among many other examples, makes the strange
power of randomness evident. Namely, in certain circumstances the power of
randomness makes algorithms more efficient, or simpler to design and analyze.
Moreover, it is not yet clear how to perform certain computational tasks (e.g.,
testing for general polynomial identities) without using randomness.
Apart from algorithms, randomness has been used as a fundamental tool
in various other areas, a notable example being combinatorial constructions.
Combinatorial objects are of fundamental significance for a vast range of the-
oretical and practical problems. Often solving a practical problem (e.g., a
real-world optimization problem) reduces to construction of suitable combi-
natorial objects that capture the inherent structure of the problem. Examples
of such combinatorial objects include graphs, set systems, codes, designs, ma-
trices, or even sets of integers. For these constructions, one has a certain
structural property of the combinatorial object in mind (e.g., mutual inter-
sections of a set system consisting of subsets of a universe) and seeks for an
instance of the object that optimizes the property in mind in the best possible
way (e.g., the largest possible set system with bounded mutual intersections).
The task of constructing suitable combinatorial objects turns out quite
challenging at times. Remarkably, in numerous situations the power of ran-
domness greatly simplifies the task of constructing the ideal object. A pow-
erful technique in combinatorics, dubbed as the probabilistic method (see [5])
is based on the following idea:
When out of ideas finding the right combinatorial object, try a
random one!
Surprisingly, in many cases this seemingly naive strategy significantly beats
the most brilliant constructions that do not use any randomness. An illumi-
nating example is the problem of constructing Ramsey graphs. It is well known
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that in a group of six or more people, either there are at least three people
who know each other or three who do not know each other. More generally,
Ramsey theory shows that for every positive integer K, there is an integer N
such that in a group of N or more people, either there are at least K peo-
ple who mutually know each other (called a clique of size K) or K who are
mutually unfamiliar with one another (called an independent set of size K).
Ramsey graphs capture the reverse direction:
For a given N , what is the smallest K such that there is a group
of N people with no cliques or independent sets of size K or more?
And how can an example of such a group be constructed?
In graph-theoretic terms (where mutual acquaintances are captured by
edges), an undirected graph with N := 2n vertices is called a Ramsey graph
with entropy k if it has no clique or independent set of size K := 2k (or
larger). The Ramsey graph construction problem is to efficiently construct a
graph with smallest possible entropy k.
Constructing a Ramsey graph with entropy k = (n+ 1)/2 is already non-
trivial. However, the following Hadamard graph does the job [35]: Each vertex
of the graph is associated with a binary vector of length n, and there is an
edge between two vertices if their corresponding vectors are orthogonal over
the binary field. A much more involved construction, due to Barak et al. [9]
(which remains the best deterministic construction to date) attain an entropy
k = no(1).
A brilliant, but quite simple, idea due to Erdo˝s [57] demonstrates the power
of randomness in combinatorial constructions: Construct the graph randomly,
by deciding whether to put an edge between every pair of vertices by flipping
a fair coin. It is easy to see that the resulting graph is, with overwhelming
probability, a Ramsey graph with entropy k = log n+2. It also turns out that
this is about the lowest entropy one can hope for! Note the significant gap
between what achieved by a simple, probabilistic construction versus what
achieved by the best known deterministic constructions.
Even though the examples discussed above clearly demonstrate the power
of randomness in algorithm design and combinatorics, a few issues are inher-
ently tied with the use of randomness as a computational resource, that may
seem unfavorable:
1. A randomized algorithm takes an abundance of fair, and independent,
coin flips for granted, and the analysis may fall apart if this assumption
is violated. For example, in the clustering example above, if the coin
flips are biased or correlated, the .5 approximation ratio can no longer
be guaranteed. This raises a fundamental question:
5Does “pure randomness” even exist? If so, how can we in-
struct a computer program to produce purely random coin
flips?
2. Even though the error probability of randomized algorithms (such as the
primality testing algorithms mentioned above) can be made arbitrarily
small, it remains nonzero. In certain cases where a randomized algorithm
never errs, its running time may vary depending on the random choices
being made. We can never be completely sure whether an error-prone
algorithm has really produced the right outcome, or whether one with
a varying running time is going to terminate in a reasonable amount of
time (even though we can be almost confident that it does).
3. As we saw for Ramsey graphs, the probabilistic method is a powerful tool
in showing that combinatorial objects with certain properties exist, and
it most cases it additionally shows that a random object almost surely
achieves the desired properties. Even though for certain applications a
randomly produced object is good enough, in general there might be no
easy way to certify whether a it indeed satisfies the properties sought
for. For the example of Ramsey graphs, while almost every graph is a
Ramsey graph with a logarithmically small entropy, it is not clear how
to certify whether a given graph satisfies this property. This might be an
issue for certain applications, when an object with guaranteed properties
is needed.
The basic goal of derandomization theory is to address the above-mentioned
and similar issues in a systematic way. A central question in derandomiza-
tion theory deals with efficient ways of simulating randomness, or relying on
weak randomness when perfect randomness (i.e., a steady stream of fair and
independent coin flips) is not available. A mathematical formulation of ran-
domness is captured by the notion of entropy, introduced by Shannon [136],
that quantifies randomness as the amount of uncertainty in the outcome of
a process. Various sources of “unpredictable” phenomena can be found in
nature. This can be in form of an electric noise, thermal noise, ambient sound
input, image captured by a video camera, or even a user’s input given to an
input device such as a keyboard. Even though it is conceivable to assume
that a bit-sequence generated by all such sources contains a certain amount of
entropy, the randomness being offered might be far from perfect. Randomness
extractors are fundamental combinatorial, as well as computational, objects
that aim to address this issue.
As an example to illustrate the concept of extractors, suppose that we
have obtained several independent bit-streams X1, X2, . . . , Xr from various
physically random sources. Being obtained from physical sources, not much is
known about the structure of these sources, and the only assumption that we
can be confident about is that they produce a substantial amount of entropy.
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An extractor is a function that combines these sources into one, perfectly
random, source. In symbols, we have
f(X1, X2, . . . , Xr) = Y,
where the output source Y is purely random provided that the input sources
are reasonably (but not fully) random. To be of any practical use, the ex-
tractor f must be efficiently computable as well. A more general class of
functions, dubbed condensers are those that do not necessarily transform im-
perfect randomness into perfect one, but nevertheless substantially purifies the
randomness being given. For instance, as a condenser, the function f may be
expected to produce an output sequence whose entropy is 90% of the optimal
entropy offered by perfect randomness.
Intuitively, there is a trade-off between structure and randomness. A se-
quence of fair coin flips is extremely unpredictable in that one cannot bet on
predicting the next coin flip and expect to gain any advantage out of it. On the
other extreme, a sequence such as what given by digits of pi = 3.14159265 . . .
may look random but is in fact perfectly structured. Indeed one can use
a computer program to perfectly predict the outcomes of this sequence. A
physical source, on the other hand, may have some inherent structure in it. In
particular, the outcome of a physical process at a certain point might be more
or less predictable, dictated by physical laws, from the outcomes observed
immediately prior to that time. However, the degree of predictability may of
course not be as high as in the case of pi.
From a combinatorial point of view, an extractor is a combinatorial object
that neutralizes any kind of structure that is inherent in a random source, and,
extracts the “random component” out (if there is any). On the other hand,
in order to be any useful, an extractor must be computationally efficient. At
a first sight, it may look somewhat surprising to learn that such objects may
even exist! In fact, as in the case of Ramsey graphs, the probabilistic method
can be used to show that a randomly chosen function is almost surely a decent
extractor. However, a random function is obviously not good enough as an
extractor since the whole purpose of an extractor is to eliminate the need
for pure randomness. Thus for most applications, an extractor (and more
generally, condenser) is required to be efficiently computable and utilize as
small amount of auxiliary pure randomness as possible.
While randomness extractors were originally studied for the main purpose
of eliminating the need for pure randomness in randomized algorithms, they
have found surprisingly diverse applications in different areas of combinatorics,
computer science, and related fields. Among many such developments, one can
mention construction of good expander graphs [161] and Ramsey graphs [9]
(in fact the best known construction of Ramsey graphs can be considered a
byproduct of several developments in extractor theory), communication com-
plexity [35], Algebraic complexity theory [124], distributed computing (e.g.,
7[73,128,171]), data structures (e.g., [147]), hardness of optimization problems
[111,170], cryptography (see, e.g., [45]), coding theory [149], signal processing
[86], and various results in structural complexity theory (e.g., [71]).
In this thesis we extend such connections to several fundamental problems
related to coding theory. In the following we present a brief summary of the
individual problems that are studied in each chapter.
The Wiretap Channel Problem
The wiretap channel problem studies reliable transmission of messages over a
communication channel which is partially observable by a wiretapper. As a
basic example, suppose that we wish to transmit a sensitive document over
the internet. Loosely speaking, the data is transmitted in form of packets,
consisting of blocks of information, through the network.
Packets may be transmitted along different paths over the network through
a cloud of intermediate transmitters, called routers, until delivered at the
destination. Now an adversary who has access to a set of the intermediate
routers may be able to learn a substantial amount of information about the
message being transmitted, and thereby render the communication system
insecure.
A natural solution for assuring secrecy in transmission is to use a standard
cryptographic scheme to encrypt the information at the source. However, the
information-theoretic limitation of the adversary in the above scenario (that is,
the fact that not all of the intermediate routers, but only a limited number of
them are being eavesdropped) makes it possible to provably guarantee secure
transmission by using a suitable encoding at the source. In particular, in
a wiretap scheme, the original data is encoded at the source to a slightly
redundant sequence, that is then transmitted to the recipient. As it turns
out, the scheme can be designed in such a way that no information is leaked
to the intruder and moreover no secrets (e.g., an encryption key) need to be
shared between the two parties prior to transmission.
We study this problem in Chapter 3. The main contribution of this chap-
ter is a construction of information-theoretically secure and optimal wiretap
schemes that guarantee secrecy in various settings of the problem. In partic-
ular the scheme can be applied to point-to-point communication models as
well as networks, even in presence of noise or active intrusion (i.e., when the
adversary not only eavesdrops, but also alters the information being trans-
mitted). The construction uses an explicit family of randomness extractors as
the main building block.
Combinatorial Group Testing
Group testing is a classical combinatorial problem that has applications in
surprisingly diverse and seemingly unrelated areas, from data structures to
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coding theory to biology.
Intuitively, the problem can be described as follows: Suppose that blood
tests are taken from a large population (say hundreds of thousands of people),
and it is suspected that a small number (e.g., up to one thousand) carry
a disease that can be diagnosed using costly blood tests. The idea is that,
instead of testing blood samples one by one, it might be possible to pool
them in fairly large groups, and then apply the tests on the groups without
affecting reliability of the tests. Once a group is tested negative, all the samples
participating in the group must be negative and this may save a large number
of tests. Otherwise, a positive test reveals that at least one of the individuals
in the group must be positive (though we do not learn which).
The main challenge in group testing is to design the pools in such a way to
allow identification of the exact set of infected population using as few tests as
possible, thereby economizing the identification process of the affected indi-
viduals. In Chapter 4 we study the group testing problem and its variations.
In particular, we consider a scenario where the tests can produce highly un-
reliable outcomes, in which case the scheme must be designed in such a way
that allows correction of errors caused by the presence of unreliable measure-
ments. Moreover, we study a more general threshold variation of the problem
in which a test returns positive if the number of positives participating in
the test surpasses a certain threshold. This is a more reasonable model than
the classical one, when the tests are not sufficiently sensitive and may be af-
fected by dilution of the samples pooled together. In both models, we will use
randomness condensers as combinatorial building blocks for construction of
optimal, or nearly optimal, explicit measurement schemes that also tolerate
erroneous outcomes.
Capacity Achieving Codes
The theory of error-correcting codes aims to guarantee reliable transmission
of information over an unreliable communication medium, known in technical
terms as a channel. In a classical model, messages are encoded into sequences
of bits at their source, which are subsequently transmitted through the chan-
nel. Each bit being transmitted through the channel may be flipped (from 0
to 1 or vice versa) with a small probability.
Using an error-correcting code, the encoded sequence can be designed in
such a way to allow correct recovery of the message at the destination with an
overwhelming probability (over the randomness of the channel). However, the
cost incurred by such an encoding scheme is a loss in the transmission rate,
that is, the ratio between the information content of the original message and
the length of the encoded sequence (or in other words, the effective number
of bits transmitted per channel use).
A capacity achieving code is an error correcting code that essentially max-
imizes the transmission rate, while keeping the error probability negligible.
9The maximum possible rate depends on the channel being considered, and is
a quantity given by the Shannon capacity of the channel.
In Chapter 5, we consider a general class of communication channels (in-
cluding the above example) and show how randomness condensers and extrac-
tors can be used to design capacity achieving ensembles of codes for them.
We will then use the obtained ensembles to obtain explicit constructions of
capacity achieving codes that allow efficient encoding and decoding as well.
Codes on the Gilbert-Varshamov Bound
While randomness extractors aim for eliminating the need for pure randomness
in algorithms, a related class of objects known as pseudorandom generators
aim for eliminating randomness altogether. This is made meaningful by a
fundamental idea saying that randomness should be defined relative to the
observer. The idea can be perhaps best described by an example due to
Goldreich [70, Chapter 8], quoted below:
“Alice and Bob play head or tail in one of the following four
ways. In all of them Alice flips a coin high in the air, and Bob
is asked to guess its outcome before the coin hits the floor. The
alternative ways differ by the knowledge Bob has before making
his guess.
In the first alternative, Bob has to announce his guess before Alice
flips the coin. Clearly, in this case Bob wins with probability 1/2.
In the second alternative, Bob has to announce his guess while the
coin is spinning in the air. Although the outcome is determined in
principle by the motion of the coin, Bob does not have accurate
information on the motion. Thus we believe that, also in this case
Bob wins with probability 1/2.
The third alternative is similar to the second, except that Bob
has at his disposal sophisticated equipment capable of providing
accurate information on the coin’s motion as well as on the envi-
ronment affecting the outcome. However, Bob cannot process this
information in time to improve his guess.
In the fourth alternative, Bob’s recording equipment is directly
connected to a powerful computer programmed to solve the motion
equations and output a prediction. It is conceivable that in such
a case Bob can improve substantially his guess of the outcome of
the coin.”
Following the above description, in principle the outcome of a coin flip may
well be deterministic. However, as long as the observer does not have enough
resources to gain any advantage predicting the outcome, the coin flip should be
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considered random for him. In this example, what makes the coin flip random
for the observer is the inherent hardness (and not necessarily impossibility)
of the prediction procedure. The theory of pseudorandom generators aim to
express this line of thought in rigorous ways, and study the circumstances
under which randomness can be simulated for a particular class of observers.
The advent of probabilistic algorithms that are unparalleled by determinis-
tic methods, such as randomized primality testing (before the AKS algorithm
[3]), polynomial identity testing and the like initially made researchers believe
that the class of problems solvable by randomized polynomial-time algorithms
(in symbols, BPP) might be strictly larger than those solvable in polynomial-
time without the need for randomness (namely, P) and conjecture P 6= BPP.
To this date, the “P vs. BPP” problem remains one of the most challenging
problems in theoretical computer science.
Despite the initial belief, more recent research has led most theoreticians
to believe otherwise, namely that P = BPP. This is supported by recent dis-
covery of deterministic algorithms such as the AKS primality test, and more
importantly, the advent of strong pseudorandom generators. In a seminal
work [115], Nisan and Wigderson showed that a “hard to compute” function
can be used to efficiently transform a short sequence of random bits into a
much longer sequence that looks indistinguishable from a purely random se-
quence to any efficient algorithm. In short, they showed how to construct
pseudorandomness from hardness. Though the underlying assumption (that
certain hard functions exists) is not yet proved, it is intuitively reasonable to
believe (just in the same way that, in the coin flipping game above, the hard-
ness of gathering sufficient information for timely prediction of the outcome
by Bob is reasonable to believe without proof).
In Chapter 6 we extend Nisan and Wigderson’s method (originally aimed
for probabilistic algorithms) to combinatorial constructions and show that,
under reasonable hardness assumptions, a wide range of probabilistic combi-
natorial constructions can be substantially derandomized.
The specific combinatorial problem that the chapter is based on is the con-
struction of error-correcting codes that attain the rate versus error-tolerance
trade-off shown possible using the probabilistic method (namely, construction
of codes on the so-called Gilbert-Varshamov bound). In particular, we demon-
strate a small ensemble of efficiently constructible error-correcting codes al-
most all of which being as good as random codes (under a reasonable assump-
tion). Even though the method is discussed for construction of error-correcting
codes, it can be equally applied to numerous other probabilistic constructions;
e.g., construction of optimal Ramsey graphs.
Reading Guidelines
The material presented in each of the technical chapters of this thesis (Chap-
ters 3–6) are presented independently so they can be read in any order. Since
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the theory of randomness extractors plays a central role in the technical con-
tent of this thesis, Chapter 2 is devoted to an introduction to this theory, and
covers some basic constructions of extractors and condenser that are used as
building blocks in the main chapters. Since the extractor theory is already
an extensively developed area, we will only touch upon basic topics that are
necessary for understanding the thesis.
Apart from extractors, we will extensively use fundamental notions of cod-
ing theory throughout the thesis. For that matter, we have provided a brief
review of such notions in Appendix A.
The additional mathematical background required for each chapter is pro-
vided when needed, to the extent of not losing focus. For a comprehensive
study of the basic tools being used, we refer the reader to [5,109,112] (probabil-
ity, randomness in algorithms, and probabilistic constructions), [82] (expander
graphs), [8, 70] (modern complexity theory), [98, 103,127] (coding theory and
basic algebra needed), [74] (list decoding), and [50, 51] (combinatorial group
testing).
Each chapter of the thesis is concluded by the opening notes of a piece of
music that I truly admire.
Allegro moderato e maestoso
Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750): The Art of Fugue BWV 1080,
Contrapunctus XIV.
“Art would be useless if the
world were perfect, as man
wouldn’t look for harmony but
would simply live in it.”
— Andrei Tarkovsky
Chapter 2
Extractor Theory
Suppose that you are given a possibly biased coin that falls heads some p
fraction of times (0 < p < 1) and are asked to use it to “simulate” fair
coin flips. A natural approach to solve this problem would be to first try to
“learn” the bias p by flipping the coin a large number of times and observing
the fraction of times it falls heads during the experiment, and then using this
knowledge to encode the sequence of biased flips to its information-theoretic
entropy.
Remarkably, back in 1951 John von Neumann [159] demonstrated a simple
way to solve this problem without knowing the bias p: flip the coin twice and
one of the following cases may occur:
1. The first flip shows Heads and the second Tails: output “H”.
2. The first flip shows Tails and the second Heads: output “T”.
3. Otherwise, repeat the experiment.
Note that the probability that the output symbol is “H” is precisely equal
to it being “T”, namely, p(1−p). Thus, the outcome of this process represents
a perfectly fair coin toss. This procedure might be somewhat wasteful; for
instance, it is expected to waste half of the coin flips even if p = 1/2 (that
is, if the coin is already fair) and that is the cost we pay for not knowing
p. But nevertheless, it transforms an imperfect, not fully known, source of
randomness into a perfect source of random bits.
This example, while simple, demonstrates the basic idea in what is known
as “extractor theory”. The basic goal in extractor theory is to improve ran-
domness, that is, to efficiently transform a “weak” source of randomness into
one with better qualities; in particular, having a higher entropy per symbol.
The procedure shown above, seen as a function from the sequence of coin flips
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to a Boolean function (over {H,T}) is known as an extractor. It is called so
since it “extracts” pure randomness from a weak source.
When the distribution of the weak source is known, it is possible to use
techniques from source coding (say Huffman or Arithmetic Coding) to com-
press the information to a number of bits very close to its actual entropy,
without losing any of the source information. What makes extractor theory
particularly challenging is the following issues:
1. An extractor knows little about the exact source distribution. Typically
nothing more than a lower bound on the source entropy, and no structure
is assumed on the source. In the above example, even though the source
distribution was unknown, it was known to be an i.i.d. sequence (i.e.,
a sequence of independent, identically distributed symbols). This need
not be the case in general.
2. The output of the extractor must “strongly” resemble a uniform distri-
bution (which is the distribution with maximum possible entropy), in
the sense that no statistical test (no matter how complex) should be
able to distinguish between the output distribution and a purely ran-
dom sequence. Note, for example, that a sequence of n− 1 uniform and
independent bits followed by the symbol “0” has n − 1 bits of entropy,
which is only slightly lower than that of n purely random bits (i.e., n).
However, a simple statistical test can trivially distinguish between the
two distributions by only looking at the last bit.
Since extractors and related objects (in particular, lossless condensers)
play a central role in the technical core of this thesis, we devote this chapter
to a formal treatment of extractor theory, introducing the basic ideas and
some fundamental constructions. In this chapter, we will only cover basic
notions and discuss a few of the results that will be used as building blocks in
the rest of thesis.
2.1 Probability Distributions
2.1.1 Distributions and Distance
In this thesis we will focus on probability distributions over finite domains.
Let (Ω,E,X ) be a probability space, where Ω is a finite sample space, E is the
set of events (that in our work, will always consist of the set of subsets of Ω),
and X is a probability measure. The probability assigned to each outcome
x ∈ Ω by X will be denoted by X (x), or PrX (x). Similarly, for an event T ∈ E,
we will denote the probability assigned to T by X (T ), or PrX [T ] (when clear
from the context, we may omit the subscript X ). The support of X is defined
as
supp(X ) := {x ∈ Ω: X (x) > 0}.
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A particularly important probability measure is defined by the uniform dis-
tribution, which assigns equal probabilities to each element of Ω. We will
denote the uniform distribution over Ω by UΩ, and use the shorthand Un, for
an interger n ≥ 1, for U{0,1}n . We will use the notation X ∼ X to denote that
the random variable X is drawn from the probability distribution X .
It is often convenient to think about the probability measure as a real
vector of dimension |Ω|, whose entries are indexed by the elements of Ω, such
that the value at the ith entry of the vector is X (i).
An important notion for our work is the distance between distributions.
There are several notions of distance in the literature, some stronger than
the others, and often the most suitable choice depends on the particular ap-
plication in hand. For our applications, the most important notion is the `p
distance:
Definition 2.1. Let X and Y be probability distributions on a finite domain
Ω. Then for every p ≥ 1, their `p distance, denoted by ‖X −Y‖p, is given by
‖X − Y‖p :=
(∑
x∈Ω
|X (x)− Y(y)|p
)1/p
.
We extend the distribution to the special case p =∞, to denote the point-wise
distance:
‖X − Y‖∞ := max
x∈Ω
|X (x)− Y(y)|.
The distributions X and Y are called -close with respect to the `p norm if
and only if ‖X − Y‖p ≤ .
We remark that, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the following relation-
ship between `1 and `2 distances holds:
‖X − Y‖2 ≤ ‖X − Y‖1 ≤
√
|Ω| · ‖X − Y‖2.
Of particular importance is the statistical (or total variation) distance.
This is defined as half the `1 distance between the distributions:
‖X − Y‖ := 12‖X − Y‖1.
We may also use the notation dist(X ,Y) to denote the statistical distance. We
call two distributions -close if and only if their statistical distance is at most
. When there is no risk of confusion, we may extend such notions as distance
to the random variables they are sampled from, and, for instance, talk about
two random variables being -close.
This is in a sense, a very strong notion of distance since, as the following
proposition suggests, it captures the worst-case difference between the proba-
bility assigned by the two distributions to any event:
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Proposition 2.2. Let X and Y be distributions on a finite domain Ω. Then X
and Y are -close if and only if for every event T ⊆ Ω, |PrX [T ]−PrY [T ]| ≤ .
Proof. Denote by ΩX and ΩY the following partition of Ω:
ΩX := {x ∈ Ω: X (x) ≥ Y(x)}, ΩY := Ω \ TX .
Thus, ‖X − Y‖ = 2(PrX (ΩX ) − PrY(ΩX )) = 2(PrY(ΩY) − PrX (ΩY)). Let
p1 := PrX [T ∩ΩX ]−PrY [T ∩ΩX ], and p2 := PrY [T ∩ΩY ]−PrX [T ∩ΩY ]. Both
p1 and p2 are positive numbers, each no more than . Therefore,
|Pr
X
[T ]− Pr
Y
[T ]| = |p1 − p2| ≤ .
For the reverse direction, suppose that for every event T ⊆ Ω, |PrX [T ]−
PrY [T ]| ≤ . Then,
‖X − Y‖1 = |PrX [ΩX ]− PrY [ΩX ]|+ |PrX [ΩY ]− PrY [ΩY ]| ≤ 2.
An equivalent way of looking at an event T ⊆ Ω is by defining a predicate
P : Ω → {0, 1} whose set of accepting inputs is T ; namely, P (x) = 1 if and
only if x ∈ T . In this view, Proposition 2.2 can be written in the following
equivalent form.
Proposition 2.3. Let X and Y be distributions on the same finite domain Ω.
Then X and Y are -close if and only if, for every distinguisher P : Ω→ {0, 1},
we have ∣∣∣∣ PrX∼X [P (X) = 1]− PrY∼Y[P (Y ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ .
The notion of convex combination of distributions is defined as follows:
Definition 2.4. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be probability distributions over a finite
space Ω and α1, α2, . . . , αn be nonnegative real values that sum up to 1. Then
the convex combination
α1X1 + α2X2 + · · ·+ αnXn
is a distribution X over Ω given by the probability measure
Pr
X
(x) :=
n∑
i=1
αi PrXi
(x),
for every x ∈ Ω.
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When regarding probability distributions as vectors of probabilities (with
coordinates indexed by the elements of the sample space), convex combina-
tion of distributions is merely a linear combination (specifically, a point-wise
average) of their vector forms. Thus intuitively, one expects that if a proba-
bility distribution is close to a collection of distributions, it must be close to
any convex combination of them as well. This is made more precise in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be probability distributions, all defined
over the same finite set Ω, that are all -close to some distribution Y. Then
any convex combination
X := α1X1 + α2X2 + · · ·+ αnXn
is -close to Y.
Proof. We give a proof for the case n = 2, which generalizes to any larger
number of distributions by induction. Let T ⊆ Ω be any nonempty subset of
Ω. Then we have
|Pr
X
[T ]− Pr
Y
[T ]| = |α1 PrX1 [T ] + (1− α1) PrX2 [T ]− PrY [T ]|
= |α1(PrY [T ] + 1) + (1− α1)(PrY [T ] + 2)− PrY [T ]|,
where |1|, |2| ≤  by the assumption that X1 and X2 are -close to Y. Hence
the distance simplifies to
|α11 + (1− α1)2|,
and this is at most .
In a similar manner, it is straightforward to see that a convex combination
(1− )X + Y is -close to X .
Sometimes, in order to show a claim for a probability distribution it may be
easier, and yet sufficient, to write the distribution as a convex combination of
“simpler” distributions and then prove the claim for the simpler components.
We will examples of this technique when we analyze constructions of extractors
and condensers.
2.1.2 Entropy
A central notion in the study of randomness is related to the information
content of a probability distribution. Shannon formalized this notion in the
following form:
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Definition 2.6. Let X be a distribution on a finite domain Ω. The Shannon
entropy of X (in bits) is defined as
H(X ) :=
∑
x∈supp(X )
−X (x) log2X (x) = EX∼X [− log2X (X)].
Intuitively, Shannon entropy quantifies the number of bits required to spec-
ify a sample drawn from X on average. This intuition is made more precise, for
example by Huffman coding that suggest an efficient algorithm for encoding a
random variable to a binary sequence whose expected length is almost equal
to the Shannon entropy of the random variable’s distribution (cf. [40]). For
numerous applications in computer science and cryptography, however, the
notion of Shannon entropy–which is an average-case notion–is not well suit-
able and a worst-case notion of entropy is required. Such a notion is captured
by min-entropy, defined below.
Definition 2.7. Let X be a distribution on a finite domain Ω. The min-
entropy of X (in bits) is defined as
H∞(X ) := min
x∈supp(X )
− log2X (x).
Therefore, the min-entropy of a distribution is at least k if and only if the
distribution assigns a probability of at most 2−k to any point of the sample
space (such a distribution is called a k-source). It also immediately follows by
definitions that a distribution having min-entropy at least k must also have a
Shannon entropy of at least k. When Ω = {0, 1}n, we define the entropy rate
of a distribution X on Ω as H∞(X )/n.
A particular class of probability distributions for which the notions of
Shannon entropy an min-entropy coincide is flat distributions. A distribution
on Ω is called flat if it is uniformly supported on a set T ⊆ Ω; that is, if
it assigns probability 1/|T | to all the points on T and zeros elsewhere. The
Shannon- and min-entropies of such a distribution are both log2 |T | bits.
An interesting feature of flat distributions is that their convex combina-
tions can define any arbitrary probability distribution with a nice preservence
of the min-entropy, as shown below.
Proposition 2.8. Let K be an integer. Then any distribution X with min-
entropy at least logK can be described as a convex combination of flat distri-
butions with min-entropy logK.
Proof. Suppose that X is distributed on a finite domain Ω. Any probability
distribution on Ω can be regarded as a real vector with coordinates indexed by
the elements of Ω, encoding its probability measure. The set of distributions
(pi)i∈Ω with min-entropy at least logK form a simplex
(∀i ∈ Ω) 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1/K,∑
i∈Ω pi = 1,
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whose corner points are flat distributions. The claim follows since every point
in the simplex can be written as a convex combination of the corner points.
2.2 Extractors and Condensers
2.2.1 Definitions
Intuitively, an extractor is a function that transforms impure randomness; i.e.,
a random source containing a sufficient amount of entropy, to an almost uni-
form distribution (with respect to a suitable distance measure; e.g., statistical
distance).
Suppose that a source X is distributed on a sample space Ω := {0, 1}n
with a distribution containing at least k bits of min-entropy. The goal is
to construct a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m such that f(X ) is -close to
the uniform distribution Um, for a negligible distance  (e.g.,  = 2−Ω(n)).
Unfortunately, without having any further knowledge on X , this task becomes
impossible. To see why, consider the simplest nontrivial case where k = n− 1
and m = 1, and suppose that we have come up with a function f that extracts
one almost unbiased coin flip from any k-source. Observe that among the set
of pre-images of 0 and 1 under f ; namely, f−1(0) and f−1(1), at least one must
have size 2n−1 or more. Let X be the flat source uniformly distributed on this
set. The distribution X constructed this way has min-entropy at least n − 1
yet f(X ) is always constant. In order to alleviate this obvious impossibility,
one of the following two solutions is typically considered:
1. Assume some additional structure on the source: In the counterexample
above, we constructed an opportunistic choice of the source X from the
function f . However, in general the source obtained this way may turn
out to be exceedingly complex and unstructured, and the fact that f
is unable to extract any randomness from this particular choice of the
source might be of little concern. A suitable way to model this obser-
vation is to require a function f that is expected to extract randomness
only from a restricted class of randomness sources.
The appropriate restriction in question may depend on the context for
which the extractor is being used. A few examples that have been con-
sidered in the literature include:
• Independent sources: In this case, the source X is restricted to be a
product distribution with two or more components. In particular,
one may assume the source to be the product distribution of r ≥ 2
independent random variables X1, . . . , Xr ∈ {0, 1}n′ that are each
sampled from an arbitrary k′-source (assuming n = rn′ and k =
rk′).
2.2. EXTRACTORS AND CONDENSERS 19
• Affine sources: We assume that the source X is uniformly supported
on an arbitrary translation of an unknown k-dimensional vector
subspace of1 Fn2 . A further restriction of this class is known as bit-
fixing sources. A bit-fixing source is a product distribution of n bits
(X1, . . . , Xn) where for some unknown set of coordinates positions
S ⊆ [n] of size k, the variables Xi for i ∈ S are independent and
uniform bits, but the rest of the Xi’s are fixed to unknown binary
values. In Chapter 3, we will discuss these classes of sources in
more detail.
• Samplable sources: This is a class of sources first studied by Tre-
visan and Vadhan [153]. In broad terms, a samplable source is a
source X such that a sample from X can produced out of a sequence
of random and independent coin flips by a restricted computational
model. For example, one may consider the class of sources of min-
entropy k such that for any source X in the class, there is a func-
tion f : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n, for some r ≥ k, that is computable by
polynomial-size Boolean circuits and satisfies f(Ur) ∼ X .
For restricted classes of sources such as the above examples, there are
deterministic functions that are good extractors for all the sources in the
family. Such deterministic functions are known as seedless extractors for
the corresponding family of sources. For instance, an affine extractor for
entropy k and error  (in symbols, an affine (k, )-extractor) is a mapping
f : Fn2 → Fm2 such that for every affine k-source X , the distribution f(X )
is -close to the uniform distribution Um.
In fact, it is not hard to see that for any family of not “too many” sources,
there is a function that extracts almost the entire source entropy of the
sources (examples include affine k-sources, samplable k-sources, and two
independent sources2). This can be shown by a probabilistic argument
that considers a random function and shows that it achieves the desired
properties with overwhelming probability.
2. Allow a short random seed : The second solution is to allow extractor
to use a small amount of pure randomnness as a “catalyst”. Namely,
the extractor is allowed to require two inputs: a sample from the un-
known source and a short sequence of random and independent bits that
is called the seed. In this case, it turns out that extracting almost the
entire entropy of the weak source becomes possible, without any struc-
tural assumptions on the source and using a very short independent seed.
Extractors that require an auxiliary random input are called seeded ex-
tractors. In fact, an equivalent of looking at seeded extractors is to see
1Throughout the thesis, for a prime power q, we will use the notation Fq to denote the
finite field with q elements.
2For this case, it suffices to count the number of independent flat sources.
20 CHAPTER 2. EXTRACTOR THEORY
them as seedless extractors that assume the source to be structured as
a product distribution of two sources: an arbitrary k-source and the
uniform distribution.
For the rest of this chapter, we will focus on seeded extractors. Seedless
extractors (especially affine extractors) are treated in Chapter 3. A formal
definition of (seeded) extractors is as follows.
Definition 2.9. A function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, )-extractor
if, for every k-source X on {0, 1}n, the distribution f(X ,Ud) is -close (in
statistical distance) to the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m. The parameters
n, d, k, m, and  are respectively called the input length, seed length, entropy
requirement, output length, and error of the extractor.
An important aspect of randomness extractors is their computational com-
plexity. For most applications, extractors are required to be efficiently com-
putable functions. We call an extractor explicit if it is computable in polyno-
mial time (in its input length). Though it is rather straightforward to show
existence of good extractors using probabilistic arguments, coming up with a
nontrivial explicit construction can turn out a much more challenging task.
We will discuss and analyze several important explicit constructions of seeded
extractors in Section 2.3.
Note that, in the above definition of extractors, achieving an output length
of up to d is trivial: the extractor can merely output its seed, which is guaran-
teed to have a uniform distribution! Ideally the output of an extractor must
be “almost independent” of its seed, so that the extra randomness given in
the seed can be “recycled”. This idea is made precise in the notion of strong
extractors given below.
Definition 2.10. A function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a strong (k, )-
extractor if, for every k-source X on {0, 1}n, and random variables X ∼ X ,
Z ∼ Ud, the distribution of the random variable (X, f(X,Z)) is -close (in
statistical distance) to Ud+m.
A fundamental property of strong extractors that is essential for certain
applications is that, the extractor’s output remains close to uniform for almost
all fixings of the random seed. This is made clear by an “averaging argument”
stated formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 2.11. Consider joint distributions X˜ := (Z,X ) and Y˜ := (Z,Y)
that are -close, where X and Y are distributions on a finite domain Ω, and
Z is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}d. For every z ∈ {0, 1}d, denote by Xz the
distribution of the second coordinate of X˜ conditioned on the first coordinate
being equal to z, and similarly define Yz for the distribution Y˜. Then, for
every δ > 0, at least (1− δ)2d choices of z ∈ {0, 1}d must satisfy
‖Xz − Yz‖ ≤ /δ.
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Proof. Clearly, for every ω ∈ Ω and z ∈ {0, 1}d, we have Xz(ω) = 2dX (z, ω)
and similarly, Yz(ω) = 2dY(z, ω). Moreover from the definition of statistical
distance, ∑
z∈{0,1}d
∑
ω∈Ω
|X (z, ω)− Y(z, ω)| ≤ 2.
Therefore, ∑
z∈{0,1}d
∑
ω∈Ω
|Xz(ω)− Yz(ω)| ≤ 2d+1,
which can be true only if for at least (1 − δ) fraction of the choices of z, we
have ∑
ω∈Ω
|Xz(ω)− Yz(ω)| ≤ 2/δ,
or in other words,
‖Xz − Yz‖ ≤ /δ.
This shows the claim.
Thus, according to Proposition 2.11, for a strong (k, )-extractor
f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
and a k-source X , for 1−√ fraction of the choices of z ∈ {0, 1}d, the distri-
bution f(X , z) must be -close to uniform.
Extractors are specializations of the more general notion of randomness
condensers. Intuitively, a condenser transforms a given weak source of ran-
domness into a “more purified” but possibly imperfect source. In general, the
output entropy of a condenser might be substantially less than the input en-
tropy but nevertheless, the output is generally required to have a substantially
higher entropy rate. For the extremal case of extractors, the output entropy
rate is required to be 1 (since the output is required to be an almost uni-
form distribution). Same as extractors, condensers can be seeded or seedless,
and also seeded condensers can be required to be strong (similar to strong
extractors). Below we define the general notion of strong, seeded condensers.
Definition 2.12. A function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a strong k → k′
condenser if for every distribution X on {0, 1}n with min-entropy at least k,
random variable X ∼ X and a seed Y ∼ Ud, the distribution of (Y, f(X,Y )) is
-close to a distribution (Ud,Z) with min-entropy at least d+ k′. The param-
eters k, k′, , k − k′, and m− k′ are called the input entropy, output entropy,
error, the entropy loss and the overhead of the condenser, respectively. A
condenser is explicit if it is polynomial-time computable.
Similar to strong extractors, strong condensers remain effective under al-
most all fixings of the seed. This follows immediately from Proposition 2.11
and is made explicit by the following corollary:
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Corollary 2.13. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a strong k → k′
condenser. Consider an arbitrary parameter δ > 0 and a k-source X . Then,
for all but at most a δ fraction of the choices of z ∈ {0, 1}d, the distribution
f(X , z) is (/δ)-close to a k′-source.
Typically, a condenser is only interesting if the output entropy rate k′/m
is considerably larger than the input entropy rate k/n. From the above defi-
nition, an extractor is a condenser with zero overhead. Another extremal case
corresponds to the case where the entropy loss of the condenser is zero. Such a
condenser is called lossless. We will use the abbreviated term (k, )-condenser
for a lossless condenser with input entropy k (equal to the output entropy)
and error . Moreover, if a function is a (k0, )-condenser for every k0 ≤ k, it is
called a (≤ k, )-condenser. Most known constructions of lossless condensers
(and in particular, all constructions used in this thesis) are (≤ k, )-condensers
for their entropy requirement k.
Traditionally, lossless condensers have been used as intermediate building
blocks for construction of extractors. Having a good lossless condenser avail-
able, for construction of extractors it would suffice to focus on the case where
the input entropy is large. Nevertheless, lossless condensers have been proved
to be useful for a variety of applications, some of which we will discuss in this
thesis.
2.2.2 Almost-Injectivity of Lossless Condensers
Intuitively, an extractor is an almost “uniformly surjective” mapping. That
is, the extractor mapping distributes the probability mass of the input source
almost evenly among the elements of its range.
On the other hand, a lossless condenser preserves the entire source entropy
on its output and intuitively, must be an almost injective function when re-
stricted to the domain defined by the input distribution. In other words, in the
mapping defined by the condenser “collisions” rarely occur and in this view,
lossless condensers are useful “hashing” tools. In this section we formalize this
intuition through a simple practical application.
Given a source X and a function f , if f(X ) has the same entropy as that
of X (or in other words, if f is a perfectly lossless condenser for X ) we expect
that from the outcome of the function, its input when sampled from X must
be reconstructible. For flat distributions (that is, those that are uniform on
their support) and considering an error for the condenser, this is shown in the
following proposition. We will use this simple fact several times throughout
the thesis.
Proposition 2.14. Let X be a flat distribution with min-entropy logK over
a finite sample space Ω and f : Ω→ Γ be a mapping to a finite set Γ.
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1. If f(X ) is -close to having min-entropy logK, then there is a set T ⊆ Γ
of size at least (1− 2)K such that
(∀y ∈ T and ∀x, x′ ∈ supp(X )) f(x) = y ∧ f(x′) = y ⇒ x = x′.
2. Suppose |Γ| ≥ K. If f(X ) has a support of size at least (1− )K, then
it is -close to having min-entropy logK.
Proof. Suppose that X is uniformly supported on a set S ⊆ Ω of size K, and
denote by µ the distribution f(X ) over Γ. For each y ∈ Γ, define
ny := |{x ∈ supp(X ) : f(x) = y}|.
Moreover, define T := {y ∈ Γ: ny = 1}, and similarly, T ′ := {y ∈ Γ: ny ≥ 2}.
Observe that for each y ∈ Γ we have µ(y) = ni/K, and also supp(µ) = T ∪T ′.
Thus,
(2.1) |T |+
∑
y∈T ′
ny = K.
Now we show the first assertion. Denote by µ′ a distribution on Γ with min-
entropy K that is -close to µ, which is guaranteed to exist by the assumption.
The fact that µ and µ′ are -close implies that∑
y∈T ′
|µ(y)− µ′(y)| ≤ ⇒
∑
y∈T ′
(ny − 1) ≤ K.
In particular, this means that |T ′| ≤ K (since by the choice of T ′, for each
y ∈ T ′ we have ny ≥ 2). Furthermore,∑
y∈T ′
(ny − 1) ≤ K ⇒
∑
y∈T ′
ny ≤ K + |T ′| ≤ 2K.
This combined with (2.1) gives
|T | = K −
∑
y∈T ′
ny ≥ (1− 2)K
as desired.
For the second part, observe that |T ′| ≤ K. Let µ′ be any flat distribution
with a support of size K that contains the support of µ. The statistical
distance between µ and µ′ is equal to the difference between the probability
mass of the two distributions on those elements of Γ to which µ′ assigns a
bigger probability, namely,
1
K
(supp(µ′)−supp(µ)) =
∑
y∈T ′(ny − 1)
K
=
∑
y∈T ′ ny − |T ′|
K
=
K − |T | − |T ′|
K
,
where we have used (2.1) for the last equality. But |T | + |T ′| = |supp(µ)| ≥
(1− )K, giving the required bound.
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As a simple application of this fact, consider the following “source coding”
problem. Suppose that Alice wants to send a message x to Bob through a
noiseless communication channel, and that the message is randomly sampled
from a distribution X . Shannon’s source coding theorem roughly states that,
there is a compression scheme that encodes x to a binary sequence y of length
H(X) bits on average, where H(·) denotes the Shannon entropy, such that Bob
can perfectly reconstruct y from x (cf. [40, Chapter 5]). If the distribution X
is known to both Alice and Bob, they can use an efficient coding scheme such
as Huffman codes or Arithmetic coding to achieve this bound (up to a small
constant bits of redundancy).
On the other hand, certain universal compression schemes are known that
guarantee an optimal compression provided that X satisfies certain statisti-
cal properties. For instance, Lempel-Ziv coding achieves the optimum com-
pression rate without exact knowledge of X provided that is defined by a
stationary, ergodic process (cf. [40, Chapter 13]).
Now consider a situation where the distribution X is arbitrary but only
known to the receiver Bob. In this case, it is known that there is no way
for Alice to substantially compress her information without interaction with
Bob [2]. On the other hand, if we allow interaction, Bob may simply send a
description of the probability distribution X to Alice so she can use a classical
source coding scheme to compress her information at the entropy.
Interestingly, it turns out that this task is still possible if the amount of in-
formation sent to Alice is substantially lower than what needed to fully encode
the probability distribution X . This is particularly useful if the bandwidth
from Alice to Bob is substantially lower than that of the reverse direction
(consider, for example, an ADSL connection) and for this reason, the problem
is dubbed as the asymmetric communication channel problem. In particular,
Watkinson et al. [160] obtain a universal scheme with H(X ) + 2 bits of com-
munication from Alice to Bob and n(H(X ) + 2) bits from Bob to Alice, where
n is the bit-length of the message. Moreover, Adler et al. [1] obtain strong
lower bounds on the number of rounds of communication between Alice and
Bob.
Now let us impose a further restriction on X that it is uniformly sup-
ported on a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n, and Alice knows nothing about S but its size.
If we disallow interaction between Alice and Bob, there would still be no de-
terministic way for Alice to deterministically compress her message. This is
easy to observe by noting that any deterministic, and compressing, function
ϕ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where m < n, has an output value with as many as
2n−m pre-images, and an adversarial choice of S that concentrates on the set
of such pre-images would force the compression scheme to fail.
However, let us allow the encoding scheme to be randomized, and err with
a small probability over the randomness of the scheme and the message. In this
case, Alice can take a strong lossless condenser f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
for input entropy k := log |S|, choose a uniformly random seed z ∈ {0, 1}d,
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and transmit y := (z, f(x, z)) to Bob. Now we argue that Bob will be able to
recover x from y.
Let  denote the error of the condenser. Since f is a lossless condenser for
X , we know that, for Z ∼ Ud and X ∼ X , the distribution of (Z, f(X,Z)) is
-close to some distribution (Ud,Y), with min-entropy at least d + k. Thus
by Corollary 2.13 it follows that, for at least 1 − √ fraction of the choices
of z ∈ {0, 1}d, the distribution Yz := f(X , z) is
√
-close to having min-
entropy k. For any such “good seed” z, Proposition 2.14 implies that only
for at most 2
√
 fraction of the message realizations x ∈ S can the encoding
f(x, z) be confused with a different encoding f(x′, z) for some x′ ∈ S, x′ 6= x.
Altogether we conclude that, from the encoding y, Bob can uniquely deduce
x with probability at least 1 − 3√, where the probability is taken over the
randomness of the seed and the message distribution X .
The amount of communication in this encoding scheme is m+d bits. Using
an optimal lossless condenser for f , the encoding length becomes k+O(log n)
with a polynomially small (in n) error probability (where the exponent of
the polynomial is arbitrary and affects the constant in the logarithmic term).
On the other hand, with the same error probability, the explict condenser of
Theorem 4.19 would give an encoding length k + O(log3 n). Moreover, the
explicit condenser of Theorem 2.22 results in length k(1 + α) +Oα(log n) for
any arbitrary constant α > 0.
2.3 Constructions
We now turn to explicit constructions of strong extractors and lossless con-
densers.
Using probabilistic arguments, Radhakrishan and Ta-Shma [122] showed
that, for every k, n, , there is a strong (k, )-extractor with seed length d =
log(n − k) + 2 log(1/) + O(1) and output length m = k − 2 log(1/) − O(1).
In particular, a random function achieves these parameters with probability
1−o(1). Moreover, their result show that this trade-off is almost the best one
can hope for.
Similar trade-offs are known for lossless condensers as well. Specifically, the
probabilistic construction of Radhakrishan and Ta-Shma has been extended
to the case of lossless condensers by Capalbo et al. [23], where they show that
a random function is with high probability a strong lossless (k, )-condenser
with seed length d = log n + log(1/) + O(1) and output length m = k +
log(1/) +O(1). Moreover, this tradeoff is almost optimal as well.
In this section, we introduce some important explicit constructions of both
extractors and lossless condensers that are used as building blocks of various
constructions in the thesis. In particular, we will discuss extractors and lossless
condensers obtained by the Leftover Hash Lemma, Trevisan’s extractor, and
a lossless condenser due to Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan.
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2.3.1 The Leftover Hash Lemma
One of the foremost explicit constructions of extractors is given by the Left-
over Hash Lemma first stated by Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [84]. This
extractor achieves an optimal output length m = k − 2 log(1/) albeit with
a substantially large seed length d = n. Moreover, the extractor is a linear
function for every fixing of the seed. In its general form, the lemma states
that any universal family of hash functions can be transformed into an ex-
plicit extractor. The universality property required by the hash functions is
captured by the following definition.
Definition 2.15. A family of functionsH = {h1, . . . , hD} where hi : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m for i = 1, . . . , D is called universal if, for every fixed choice of x, x′ ∈
{0, 1}n such that x 6= x′ and a uniformly random i ∈ [D] := {1, . . . , D} we
have
Pr
i
[hi(x) = hi(x
′)] ≤ 2−m.
One of the basic examples of universal hash families is what we call the
linear family, defined as follows. Consider an arbitrary isomorphism ϕ : Fn2 →
F2n between the vector space F
n
2 and the extension field F2n , and let 0 < m ≤
n be an arbitrary integer. The linear family Hlin is the set {hα : α ∈ F2n} of
size 2n that contains a function for each element of the extension field F2n .
For each α, the mapping hα is given by
hα(x) := (y1, . . . , ym), where (y1, . . . , yn) := ϕ
−1(α · ϕ(x)).
Observe that each function hα can be expressed as a linear mapping from F
n
2
to Fm2 . Below we show that this family is pairwise independent.
Proposition 2.16. The linear family Hlin defined above is universal.
Proof. Let x, x′ be different elements of F2n . Consider the mapping f : F2n →
Fm2 defined as
f(x) := (y1, . . . , ym), where (y1, . . . , yn) := ϕ
−1(x),
which truncates the binary representation of a field element from F2n to m
bits. The probability we are trying to estimate in Definition 2.15 is, for a
uniformly random α ∈ F2n ,
Pr
α∈F2n
[f(α · x) = f(α · x′)] = Pr
α∈F2n
[f(α · (x− x′)) = 0].
But note that x − x′ is a nonzero element of F2n , and thus, for a uniformly
random α, the random variable αx is uniformly distributed on F2n . It follows
that
Pr
α∈F2n
[f(α · (x− x′)) = 0] = 2−m,
implying that Hlin is a universal family.
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Now we are ready to state and prove the Leftover Hash Lemma. We prove
a straightforward generalization of the lemma which shows that universal hash
families can be used to construct not only strong extractors, but also lossless
condensers.
Theorem 2.17. (Leftover Hash Lemma) Let H = {hi : Fn2 → Fm2 }i∈Fd2 be a
universal family of hash functions with 2d elements indexed by binary vectors
of length d, and define the function f : Fn2 × Fd2 → Fm2 as f(x, z) := hz(x).
Then
1. For every k,  such that m ≤ k − 2 log(1/), the function f is a strong
(k, )-extractor, and
2. For every k,  such that m ≥ k + 2 log(1/), the function f is a strong
lossless (k, )-condenser.
In particular, by choosing H = Hlin, it is possible to get explicit extractors
and lossless condensers with seed length d = n.
Proof. Considering Proposition 2.8, it suffices to show the claim when X is a
flat distribution on a support of size K := 2k. Define M := 2m, D := 2d, and
let µ be any flat distribution over Fd+m2 such that supp(X ) ⊆ supp(µ), and
denote by Y the distribution of (Z, f(X,Z)) over Fd+m2 where X ∼ X and
Z ∼ Ud. We will first upper bound the `2 distance of the two distributions Y
and µ, that can be expressed as follows:
‖Y − µ‖22 =
∑
x∈Fd+m2
(Y(x)− µ(x))2
=
∑
x
Y(x)2 +
∑
x
µ(x)2 − 2
∑
x
Y(x)µ(x)
(a)
=
∑
x
Y(x)2 + 1|supp(µ)| −
2
|supp(µ)|
∑
x
Y(x)
=
∑
x
Y(x)2 − 1|supp(µ)| ,(2.2)
where (a) uses the fact that µ assigns probability 1/|supp(µ)| to exactly
|supp(µ)| elements of Fd+m2 and zeros elsewhere.
Now observe that Y(x)2 is the probability that two independent samples
drawn from Y turn out to be equal to x, and thus, ∑x Y(x)2 is the collision
probability of two independent samples from Y, which can be written as∑
x
Y(x)2 = Pr
Z,Z′,X,X′
[(Z, f(X,Z)) = (Z ′, f(X ′, Z ′))],
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where Z,Z ′ ∼ Fd2 and X,X ′ ∼ X are independent random variables. We can
rewrite the collision probability as∑
x
Y(x)2 = Pr[Z = Z ′] · Pr[f(X,Z) = f(X ′, Z ′) | Z = Z ′]
=
1
D
· Pr
Z,X,X′
[hZ(X) = hZ(X
′)]
=
1
D
· (Pr[X = X ′] + 1
K2
∑
x,x′∈supp(X )
x 6=x′
Pr
Z
[hZ(x) = hZ(x
′)])
(b)
≤ 1
D
· ( 1
K
+
1
K2
∑
x,x′∈supp(X )
x 6=x′
1
M
) ≤ 1
DM
· (1 + M
K
)
,
where (b) uses the assumption that H is a universal hash family. Plugging
the bound in (2.2) implies that
‖Y − µ‖2 ≤ 1√
DM
·
√
1− DM|supp(µ)| +
M
K
.
Observe that both Y and µ assign zero probabilities to elements of {0, 1}d+m
outside the support of µ. Thus using Cauchy-Schwarz on a domain of size
supp(µ), the above bound implies that the statistical distance between Y and
µ is at most
(2.3)
1
2
·
√
|supp(µ)|
DM
·
√
1− DM|supp(µ)| +
M
K
.
Now, for the first part of the theorem, we specialize µ to the uniform distri-
bution on {0, 1}d+m, which has a support of size DM , and note that by the
assumption that m ≤ k − 2 log(1/) we will have M ≤ 2K. Using (2.3), it
follows that Y and µ are (/2)-close.
On the other hand, for the second part of the theorem, we specialize µ to
any flat distribution on a support of size DK containing supp(Y) (note that,
since X is assumed to be a flat distribution, Y must have a support of size
at most DK). Since m ≥ k + 2 log(1/), we have K = 2M , and again (2.3)
implies that Y and µ are (/2)-close.
2.3.2 Trevisan’s Extractor
One of the most important explicit constructions of extractors is due to Tre-
visan [152]. Since we will use this extractor at several points in the thesis, we
dedicate this section to sketch the main ideas behind this important construc-
tion.
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Trevisan’s extractor can be thought of as an “information-theoretic” vari-
ation of Nisan-Wigderson’s pseudorandom generator that will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 6. For the purpose of this exposition, we will informally
demonstrate how Nisan-Wigderson’s generator works and then discuss Tre-
visan’s extractor from a coding-theoretic perspective.
Loosely speaking, a pseudorandom generator is an efficient and determin-
istic function (where the exact meaning of “efficient” may vary depending on
the context) that transforms a statistically uniform distribution on d bits to
a distribution on m bits, for some m  d, that “looks random” to any “re-
stricted” distinguisher. Again the precise meaning of “looking random” and
the exact restriction of the distinguisher may vary. In particular, we require
the output distribution X of the pseudorandom generator to be such that, for
every restricted distinguisher D : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}, we have∣∣∣∣ PrX∼X [D(X) = 1]− PrY∼Um[D(Y ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ,
where  is a negligible bias. Recall that, in in light of Proposition 2.3, this
is very close to what we expect from the output distribution of an extrac-
tor, except that for the case of pseudorandom generators the distinguisher D
cannot be an arbitrary function. Indeed, when m > d, the output distribu-
tion of a pseudorandom generator cannot be close to uniform and is always
distinguishable by some distinguisher. The main challenge in construction
of a pseudorandom gnerator is to exclude the possibility of such a distin-
guisher to be included in the restricted class of functions into consideration.
As a concrete example, one may require a pseudorandom generator to be a
polynomial-time computable function whose output is a sequence of length
d2 that is indistinguishable by linear-sized Boolean circuits with a bias better
than d−2.
Nisan and Wigderson observed that the hardness of distinguishing the
output distribution from uniform can be derived from a hardness assumption
that is inherent in the way the pseudorandom generator itself is computed.
In a way, their construction shows how to “trade” computational hardness
with pseudorandomness. In a simplified manner, a special instantiation of
this generator can be described as follows: Suppose that a Boolean predicate
f : {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is hard to compute on average by “small” Boolean circuits;
meaning that no circuit consisting of a sufficiently small number of gates (as
determined by a security parameter) is able to compute f substantially better
than a trivial circuit that always outputs a constant value. Then, given a
random seed Z ∈ {0, 1}d, the sequence (Z, f(Z)) is pseudorandom for small
circuits. The reason can be seen by contradiction. Let us suppose that for
some distinguisher D, we have∣∣∣∣ PrX∼X [D(X) = 1]− PrY∼Um[D(Y ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > .
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By the following simple proposition, such a distinguisher can be transformed
into a predictor for the hard function f .
Proposition 2.18. Consider predicates f : Fd2 → F2 and D : Fd+12 → F2 and
suppose that ∣∣∣∣ PrX∼Ud[D(X, f(X)) = 1]− PrY∼Ud+1[D(Y ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > .
Then, there are fixed choices of a0, a1 ∈ F2 such that
Pr
X∼Ud
[D(X, a0) + a1 = f(X)] >
1
2
+ .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the quantity inside the absolute
value is non-negative (otherwise, one can reason about the negation of D).
Consider the following randomized algorithm A that, given x ∈ Fd2, tries to
predict f(X): Flip a random coin r ∈ F2. If r = 1, output r and otherwise
output r¯.
Intuitively, the algorithm A tries to make a random guess for f(X), and
then feeds it to the distinguisher. As D is more likely to output 1 when the
correct value of f(X) is supplied, A takes the acceptance of x as an evidence
that the random guess r has been correct (and vice versa). The precise analysis
can be however done as follows.
Pr
X,r
[A(X) = f(X)] =
1
2
Pr
X,r
[A(X) = f(X) | r = f(X)] +
1
2
Pr
X,r
[A(X) = f(X) | r 6= f(X)]
=
1
2
Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1 | r = f(X)] +
1
2
Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 0 | r 6= f(X)]
=
1
2
Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1 | r = f(X)] +
1
2
(1− Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1 | r 6= f(X)])
=
1
2
+ Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1 | r = f(X)]−
1
2
(
Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1 | r = f(X)]+
Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1 | r 6= f(X)]
)
=
1
2
+ Pr
X
[D(X, f(X)) = 1]− Pr
X,r
[D(X, r) = 1]
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>
1
2
+ .
Therefore, by averaging, for some fixed choice of r the probability must
remain above 12 + , implying that one of the functions D(X, 0), D(X, 1) or
their negations must be as good a predictor for f(X) as A is.
Since the complexity of the predictor is about the same as that of the
distinguisher D, and by assumption f cannot be computed by small circuits,
we conclude that the outcome of the generator must be indistinguishable from
uniform by small circuits. Nisan and Wigderson generalized this idea to ob-
tain generators that output a long sequence of bits that is indistinguishable
from having a uniform distribution. In order to obtain more than one pseu-
dorandom bit from the random seed, they evaluate the hard function f on
carefully chosen subsequences of the seed (for this to work, the input length
of f is assumed to be substantially smaller than the seed length d).
An important observation in Trevisan’s work is that Nisan-Wigderson’s
pseudorandom generator is a black-box construction. Namely, the generator
merely computes the hard function f at suitably chosen points without caring
much about how this computation is implemented. Similarly, the analysis uses
the distinguisher D as a black-box. If f is computable in polynomial time,
then so is the generator (assuming that it outputs polynomially many bits),
and if f is hard against small circuits, the class of circuits of about the same
size must be fooled by the generator.
How can we obtain an extractor from Nisan-Wigderson’s construction? Re-
call that the output distribution of an extractor must be indistinguishable from
uniform by all circuits, and not only small ones. Adapting Nisan-Wigderson’s
generator for this requirement means that we will need a function f that is
hard for all circuits, something which is obviously impossible. However, this
problem can be resolved if we take many hard functions instead of one, and
enforce the predictor to simultaneously predict all functions with a reason-
able bias. More precisely, statistical indistinguishability can be obtained if
the function f is sampled from a random distribution, and that is exactly how
Trevisan’s extractor uses the supplied weak source. In particular, the extrac-
tor regards the sequence obtained from the weak source as the truth table of
a randomly chosen function, and then applies Nisan-Wigderson’s construction
relative to that function.
The exact description of the extractor is given in Construction 2.1. The
extractor assumes the existence of a suitable list-decodable code (see Ap-
pendix A for the terminology) as well as a combinatorial design. Intuitively,
a combinatorial design is a collection of subsets of a universe such that their
pairwise intersections are small. We will study designs more closely in Chap-
ter 4. In order to obtain a polynomial-time computable extractor, we need an
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• Given: A random sample X ∼ X , where X is a distribution on
{0, 1}n with min-entropy at least k, and a uniformly distributed
random seed Z ∼ Ud of length d. Moreover, the extractor assumes a
(12 − δ, `) list-decodable binary code C of length N (a power of two)
and size 2n, and a combinatorial design S := {S1, . . . , Sm}, where
– For all i ∈ [m], Si ⊆ [d], |Si| = log2N , and
– For all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, |Si ∩ Sj | ≤ r.
• Output: A binary string E(X,Z) of length m.
• Construction: Denote the encoding of X under C by C(X). For each
i ∈ [m], the subsequence of Z picked by the coordinate positions in
Si (denoted by Z|i) is a string of length log2N and can be regarded
as an integer in [N ]. Let Ci(X) denote the bit at the (Z|i)th position
of the encoding C(X). Then,
E(X,Z) := (C1(X), . . . , Cm(X)).
Construction 2.1: Trevisan’s extractor E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m.
efficient construction of the underlying list-decodable code and combinatorial
design.
An analysis of Trevisan’s construction is given by the following theorem,
which is based on the original analysis of [152].
Theorem 2.19. Trevisan’s extractor (as described in Construction 2.1) is a
strong (k, )-extractor provided that  ≥ 2mδ and k > d+m2r+1+log(`/)+3.
Proof. In light of Proposition 2.8, it suffices to show the claim when X is a
flat distribution. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the distribution of
(Z,E(X,Z)) is not -close to uniform. Without loss of generality, and using
Proposition 2.3, this means that there is a distinguisher D : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}
such that
(2.4) Pr
X,Z
[D(Z,E(X,Z)) = 1]− Pr
Z,U∼Um
[D(Z,U) = 1] > ,
where U = (U1, . . . , Um) is a sequence of uniform and independent random
bits. Let X ′ ⊆ supp(X ) denote the set of inputs on the support of X that
satisfy
(2.5) Pr
Z
[D(Z,E(x, Z)) = 1]− Pr
Z,U
[D(Z,U) = 1] >

2
,
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Observe that the size of X ′ must be at least 2 |supp(X )| = 2k−1, since other-
wise (2.4) cannot be satisfied. In the sequel, fix any x ∈ X ′.
For i = 0, . . . ,m, define a hybrid sequence Hi as the random variable
Hi := (Z,C1(x), . . . , Ci(x), Ui+1, . . . , Um). Thus, H0 is a uniformly random
bit sequence and Hm has the same distribution as (Z,E(x, Z)). For i ∈ [m],
define
δi := Pr[D(Hi) = 1]− Pr[D(Hi−1) = 1],
where the probability is taken over the randomness of Z and U . Now we can
rewrite (2.5) as
Pr[D(Hm) = 1]− Pr[D(H0) = 1] > 
2
,
or equivalently,
m∑
i=1
δi >

2
.
Therefore, for some i ∈ [m], we must have δi > /(2m) =: ′. Fix such an i,
and recall that we have
(2.6) Pr[D(Z,C1(x), . . . , Ci(x), Ui+1, . . . , Um) = 1]−
Pr[D(Z,C1(x), . . . , Ci−1(x), Ui, . . . , Um) = 1] > ′.
Now observe that there is a fixing Ui+1 = ui+1, . . . , Um = um of the random
bits Ui+1, . . . , Um that preserves the above bias. In a similar way as we defined
the subsequence Z|i, denote by Z |¯i the subsequence of Z obtained by removing
the coordinate positions of Z picked by Si. Now we note that Ci(x) depends
only on x and Z|i and is in particular independent of Z |¯i. Furthermore, one
can fix Z |¯i (namely, the portion of the random seed outside Si) such that the
bias in (2.6) is preserved. In other words, there is a string z′ ∈ {0, 1}d−|Si|
such that
Pr[D(Z,C1(x), . . . , Ci(x), ui+1, . . . , um) = 1 | (Z |¯i) = z′]−
Pr[D(Z,C1(x), . . . , Ci−1(x), Ui, ui+1, . . . , um) = 1 | (Z |¯i) = z′] > ′,
where the randomness is now only over Ui and Z|i, and all other random
variables are fixed to their appropriate values. Now, Proposition 2.18 can
be used to show that, under the above fixings, there is a fixed choice of bits
a0, a1 ∈ F2 such that D can be transformed into a predictor for Ci(x); namely,
so that
Pr
Z
[D(Z,C1(x), . . . , Ci−1(x), a0, ui+1, . . . , um)+a1 = Ci(x) | (Z |¯i) = z′] >
1
2
+′.
Since Z|i is a uniformly distributed random variable, the above probability can
be interpreted in coding-theoretic ways as follows: By running through all the
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N possibilities of Z|i, the predictor constructed from D can correctly recover
the encoding C(x) at more than 12 + 
′ fraction of the positions. Therefore,
the distinguisher D can be transformed into a word w ∈ FN2 that has an
agreement above 12 +

2m with C(x).
Now a crucial observation is that the word w can be obtained from D
without any knowledge of x, as long a correct “advice” string consisting of
the appropriate fixings of i, ui+1, . . . , um, a0, a1, z
′, and the truth tables of
C1(x), . . . , Ci−1(x) as functions of Z|i are available. Here is where the small
intersection property of the design S comes to play: Each Cj(x) (when j 6= i)
depends on at most r of the bits in Z|i, and therefore, Cj(x) as a function of
Z|i can be fully described by its evaluation on at most 2r points (that can be
much smaller than 2|Si| = N). This means that the number of possibilities for
the advice string is at most
m · 2m · 4 · 2d−logN · 2m2r = m
N
· 2d+m(2r+1)+2 ≤ 2d+m(2r+1)+2 =: T.
Therefore, regardless of the choice of x ∈ X ′, there are words w1, . . . , wT ∈ FN2
(one for each possibility of the advice string) such that at least one (corre-
sponding to the “correct” advice) has an agreement better than 12 + 
′ with
C(x). This, in turn, implies that there is a set X ′′ ⊆ X ′ of size at least
|X ′|/T ≥ 2k−1/T and a fixed j ∈ [T ] such that, for every x ∈ X ′′, the code-
word C(x) has an agreement better than 12 + 
′ with wj . As long as δ ≤ ′,
the number of such codewords can be at most ` (by the list-decodability of
C), and we will reach to the desired contradiction (completing the proof) if
the list size ` is small enough; specifically, if
` <
2k−1
T
,
which holds by the assumption of the theorem.
By an appropriate choice of the underlying combinatorial design S and
the list-decodable code C (namely, concatenation of the Reed-Solomon code
and the Hadamard code as described in Section A.5), Trevisan [152] obtained
a strong extractor with output length k1−α, for any fixed constant α > 0,
and seed length d = O(log2(n/)/ logk). In a subsequent work, Raz, Reingold
and Vadhan observed that a weaker notion of combinatorial designs suffice
for this construction to work. Using this idea and a careful choice of the list-
decodable code C, they managed to improve Trevisan’s extractor so that it
extracts almost the entire source entropy. Specifically, their imrpovement can
be summarized as follows.
Theorem 2.20. [123] For every n, k,m ∈ N, (m ≤ k ≤ n) and  > 0, there
is an explicit strong (k, )-extractor Tre : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with
d = O(log2(n/) · log(1/α)), where α := k/(m − 1) − 1 must be less than
1/2.
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• Given: A random sample X ∼ X , where X is a distribution on Fnq
with min-entropy at least k, and a uniformly distributed random
seed Z ∼ UFq over Fq.
• Output: A vector C(X,Z) of length ` over Fq.
• Construction: Take any irreducible univariate polynomial g of de-
gree n over Fq, and interpret the input X as the coefficient vector
of a random univariate polynomial F of degree n−1 over Fq. Then,
for an integer parameter h, the output is given by
C(X,Z) := (F (Z), F1(Z), . . . , F`−1(Z)),
where we have used the shorthand Fi := F
hi mod g.
Construction 2.2: Guruswami-Umans-Vadhan’s Condenser C : Fnq ×Fq → Fmq .
Observe that, as long as the list-decodable code C is linear, Trevisan’s
extractor (as well as its improvement above) becomes linear as well, meaning
that it can be described as a linear function of the weak source for every fixed
choice of the seed. We will make crucial use of this observation at several
points in the thesis.
2.3.3 Guruswami-Umans-Vadhan’s Condenser
One of the important constructions of lossless condensers that we will use
in this thesis is the coding-theoretic construction of Guruswami, Umans and
Vadhan [78]. In this section, we discuss the construction (Construction 2.2)
and its analysis (Theorem 2.22).
We remark that this construction is inspired by a variation of Reed-
Solomon codes due to Parvaresh and Vardy [118]. Specifically, for a given
x ∈ Fnq , arranging the outcomes of the condenser C(x, z) for all possibilities
of the seed z ∈ Fq results in the encoding of the input x using a Parvaresh-
Vardy code. Moreover, Parvaresh-Vardy codes are equipped with an efficient
list-decoding algorithm that is implicit in the analysis of the condenser. The
main technical part of the analysis is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.21. [78] The mapping defined in Construction 2.2 is a strong
(k, ) lossless condenser with error  := (n − 1)(h − 1)`/q, provided that ` ≥
k/ log h (thus, under the above conditions the mapping becomes a strong
(≤ k, )-condenser as well).
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Proof. Without loss of generality (using Proposition 2.8), assume that X is
uniformly distributed on a subset of Fnq of size K := 2
k. Let D := q − (n −
1)(h− 1)`. Define the random variable
Y := (Z,F (Z), F1(Z), . . . , F`−1(Z)),
and denote by T ⊆ F`+1q the set that supports the distribution of Y ; i.e., the
set of vectors in F`+1q for which Y has a nonzero probability of being assigned
to. Our goal is to show that |T | ≥ DK. Combined with the second part
of Proposition 2.14, this will prove the theorem, since we will know that the
distribution of (Z,C(X,Z)) has a support of size at least (1− )q2k.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that |T | < DK. Then the set of
points in T can be interpolated by a nonzero multivaraite low-degree polyno-
mial of the form
Q(z, z1, . . . , z`) =
D−1∑
i=0
ziQ′i(z1, . . . , z`),
where each monomial zj11 · · · zj`` in every Q′i has weighted degree j1 + hj2 +
h2j3 + · · ·+h`−1j` at most K−1 < h` and individual degrees less than h (this
condition can be assured by taking j1, . . . , j` to be the integer representation
of an integer between 0 and K − 1). Note that Q can be described by its DK
coefficients, and each point on T specifies a linear constraint on their choice.
Since the number of constraints is less than the number of unknowns, we know
that a nonzero polynomial Q vanishes on the set T . Fix a nonzero choice of
Q that has the lowest degree in the first variable z. This assures that if we
write down Q as
Q(z, z1, . . . , z`) =
∑
j=(j1,...,j`)
Qj(z)z
j1
1 · · · zj`` ,
the polynomials Qj(z) do not have common irreducible factors (otherwise we
could divide by the common factor and contradict minimality of the degree).
In particular at least one of the Qj ’s must be nonzero modulo the irreducible
polynomial g.
Now consider the set S of univariate polynomials of degree less than n
chosen so that
f ∈ S ⇔ (∀z ∈ Fq) : (z, f(z), f1(z), . . . , f`−1(z)) ∈ T,
where, similarly as before, we have used the shorthand fi for (f
hi mod g).
Note that, if we regard supp(X ) as a set of low-degree univariate polynomials,
by construction of the condenser this set must be contained in S. Therefore,
to reach the desired contradiction, it suffices to show that |S| < K.
Let f be any polynomial in S. By the definition of S, the univariate
polynomial Q(z, f(z), f1(z), . . . , f`−1(z)) must have q zeros (namely, all the
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elements of Fq). But the total degree of this polynomial is at most D − 1 +
(n − 1)(h − 1)` = q − 1, and thus, the polynomial must be identically zero,
and in particular, identically zero modulo g. Thus, we have the polynomial
identity
Q(z, f(z), f2(z), . . . , fh
`−1
(z)) ≡ 0 mod g(z),
and by expanding the identity, that∑
j=(j1,...,j`)
(Qj(z) mod g(z)) · (f(z))j1(fh(z))j2 · · · (fh`−1(z))j` ≡ 0,
which simplifies to the identity
(2.7)
∑
j=(j1,...,j`)
(Qj(z) mod g(z)) · (f(z))j1+j2h+···+j`h`−1 ≡ 0.
Consider the degree n field extension F = Fq[z]/g(z) of Fq, that is iso-
morphic to the set of Fq-polynomials of degree smaller than n. Under this
notation, for every j let αj ∈ F to be the extension field element corresponding
to the Fq-polynomial (Qj(z) mod g(z)). Recall that, by our choice of Q, at
least one of the αj ’s is nonzero, and (2.7) implies that the nonzero univariate
F-polynomial ∑
j=(j1,...,j`)
αjz
j1+j2h+···+j`h`−1
has f , regarded as an element of F, as one of its zeros. The degree of this
polynomial is less than K and thus it can have less than K zeros. Thus we
conclude that |S| < K and get the desired contradiction.
By a careful choice of the parameters h and q in the above construction
(roughly, h ≈ (2nk/)1/α and q ≈ h1+α for arbitrary constant α > 0 and error
), Guruswami et al. derived the following corollary of the above theorem:
Theorem 2.22. [78] For all constants α ∈ (0, 1) and every k ≤ n ∈ N,
 > 0 there is an explicit strong (k, ) lossless condenser with seed length
d = (1 + 1/α) log(nk/) +O(1) and output length m = d+ (1 + α)k.
Using a straightforward observation, we slightly strengthen this result and
show that in fact the parameters can be set up in such a way that the resulting
lossless condenser becomes linear. Linearity of the condenser is a property that
is particularly useful for the results obtained in Chapter 5.
Corollary 2.23. Let p be a fixed prime power and α > 0 be an arbitrary
constant. Then, for parameters n ∈ N, k ≤ n log p, and  > 0, there is
an explicit strong (≤ k, ) lossless condenser f : Fnp × {0, 1}d → Fmp with
seed length d ≤ (1 + 1/α)(log(nk/) + O(1)) and output length satisfying3
m log p ≤ d + (1 + α)k. Moreover, f is a linear function (over Fp) for every
fixed choice of the seed.
3All unsubscripted logarithms are to the base 2.
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Proof. We set up the parameters of the condenser C given by Construction 2.2
and apply Theorem 2.21. The range of the parameters is mostly similar to
what chosen in the original result of Guruswami et al. [78].
Letting h0 := (2p
2nk/)1/α, we take h to be an integer power of p in range
[h0, ph0]. Also, let ` := dk/ log he so that the condition ` ≥ k/ log h required
by Theorem 2.21 is satisfied. Finally, let q0 := nh`/ and choose the field size
q to be an integer power of p in range [q0, pq0].
We choose the input length of the condenser C to be equal to n. Note
that C is defined over Fq, and we need a condenser over Fp. Since q is a fixed
parameter, we can ensure that q ≥ p (for large enough n), so that Fp is a
subfield of Fq. For x ∈ Fnp and z ∈ {0, 1}d, let y := C(x, y) ∈ F`q, where x is
regarded as a vector over the extension Fq of Fp. We define the output of the
condenser f(x, z) to be the vector y regarded as a vector of length ` logp q over
Fp (by expanding each element of Fq as a vector of length logp q over Fp). It
can be clearly seen that f is a strong (≤ k, )-condenser if C is.
By Theorem 2.21, C is a strong lossless condenser with error upper bounded
by
(n− 1)(h− 1)`
q
≤ nh`
q0
= .
It remains to analyze the seed length and the output length of the condenser.
For the output length of the condenser, we have
m log p = ` log q ≤ (1 + k/ log h) log q ≤ d+ k(log q)/(log h),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that we have d = dlog qe. Thus
in order to show the desired upper bound on the output length, it suffices to
show that log q ≤ (1 + α) log h0. We have
log q ≤ log(pq0) = log(pnh`/) ≤ log h0 + log(p2n`/)
and our task is reduced to showing that p2n`/ ≤ hα0 = 2p2nk/. But this
bound is obviously valid by the choice of ` ≤ 1 + k/ log h.
The seed length is d = dlog qe for which we have
d ≤ log q + 1 ≤ log q0 +O(1)
≤ log(nh0`/) +O(1)
≤ log(nh0k/) +O(1)
≤ log(nk/) + 1
α
log(2p2nk/)
≤ (1 + 1
α
)
(log(nk/) +O(1))
as desired.
Since Fq has a fixed characteristic, an efficient deterministic algorithm for
representation and manipulation of the field elements is available [138] which
implies that the condenser is polynomial-time computable and is thus explicit.
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Moreover, since h is taken as an integer power of p and Fq is an extension of
Fp, for any choice of polynomials F, F
′, G ∈ Fq[X], subfield elements a, b ∈ Fp,
and integer i ≥ 0, we have
(aF + bF ′)h
i ≡ aF hi + bF ′hi mod G,
meaning that raising a polynomial to power hi is an Fp-linear operation.
Therefore, the mapping C that defines the condenser (Construction 2.2) is
Fp-linear for every fixed seed. This in turn implies that the final condenser f
is linear, as claimed.
Guruswami et al. used the lossless condenser above as an intermediate
building block for construction of an extractor that is optimal up to constant
factors and extracts almost the entire source entropy. Namely, they proved
the following result that will be useful for us in later chapters.
Theorem 2.24. [78] For all positive integers n ≥ k and all  > 0, there
is an explicit strong (k, )-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → Fm2 with m =
k − 2 log(1/)−O(1) and d = log n+O(log k · log(k/)).
Andante 3 3 3
Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750): Chorale Prelude in F minor
BWV 639 “Ich ruf zu dir, Herr Jesu Christ”. Piano transcription by
Ferruccio Busoni (1866–1924).
“Music is meaningless noise
unless it touches a receiving
mind.”
— Paul Hindemith
Chapter 3
The Wiretap Channel Problem
Suppose that Alice wants to send a message to Bob through a communication
channel, and that the message is partially observable by an intruder. This sce-
nario arises in various practical situations. For instance, in a packet network,
the sequence transmitted by Alice through the channel can be fragmented
into small packets at the source and/or along the way and different packets
might be routed through different paths in the network in which an intruder
may have compromised some of the intermediate routers. An example that
is similar in spirit is furnished by transmission of a piece of information from
multiple senders to one receiver, across different delivery media, such as satel-
lite, wireless, and/or wired networks. Due to limited resources, a potential
intruder may be able to observe only a fraction of the lines of transmission,
and hence only partially observe the message. As another example, one can
consider secure storage of data on a distributed medium that is physically
accessible in parts by an intruder, or a sensitive file on a hard drive that
is erased from the file system but is only partially overwritten with new or
random information, and hence, is partially exposed to a malicious party.
An obvious approach to solve this problem is to use a secret key to encrypt
the information at the source. However, almost all practical cryptographic
techniques are shown to be secure only under unproven hardness assumptions
and the assumption that the intruder possesses bounded computational power.
This might be undesirable in certain situations. Moreover, the key agreement
problem has its own challenges.
In the problem that we consider in this chapter, we assume the intruder
to be information theoretically limited, and our goal will be to employ this
limitation and construct a protocol that provides unconditional, information-
theoretic security, even in the presence of a computationally unbounded ad-
versary.
The problem described above was first formalized by Wyner [165] and
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Figure 3.1: The Wiretap II Problem.
subsequently by Ozarow and Wyner [116] as an information-theoretic problem.
In its most basic setting, this problem is known as the wiretap II problem (the
description given here follows from [116]):
Consider a communication system with a source which outputs
a sequence X = (X1, . . . , Xm) in {0, 1}m uniformly at random.
A randomized algorithm, called the encoder, maps the output of
the source to a binary string Y ∈ {0, 1}n. The output of the
encoder is then sent through a noiseless channel (called the direct
channel) and is eventually delivered to a decoder1 D which maps Y
back to X. Along the way, an intruder arbitrarily picks a subset
S ⊆ [n] := {1, . . . , n} of size t ≤ n, and is allowed to observe2
Z := Y |S (through a so-called wiretap channel), i.e., Y on the
coordinate positions corresponding to the set S. The goal is to
make sure that the intruder learns as little as possible about X,
regardless of the choice of S.
The system defined above is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The security of the
system is defined by the following conditional entropy, known as “equivoca-
tion”:
∆ := min
S : |S|=t
H(X|Z).
When ∆ = H(X) = m, the intruder obtains no information about the trans-
mitted message and we have perfect privacy in the system. Moreover, when
∆ → m as m → ∞, we call the system asymptotically perfectly private.
These two cases correspond to what is known in the literature as “strong se-
crecy”. A weaker requirement (known as “weak secrecy”) would be to have
m−∆ = o(m).
1Ozarow and Wyner also consider the case in which the decoder errs with negligible
probability, but we are going to consider only error-free decoders.
2 For a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and a subset S ⊆ [n], we denote by x|S the vector of
length |S| that is obtained from x by removing all the coordinates xi, i /∈ S.
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Remark 3.1. The assumption that X is sampled from a uniformly random
source should not be confused with the fact that Alice is transmitting one
particular message to Bob that is fixed and known to her before the trans-
mission. In this case, the randomness of X in the model captures the a priori
uncertainty about X for the outside world, and in particular the intruder, but
not the transmitter.
As an intuitive example, suppose that a random key is agreed upon be-
tween Alice and a trusted third party, and now Alice wishes to securely send
her particular key to Bob over a wiretapped channel. Or, assume that Alice
wishes to send an audio stream to Bob that is encoded and compressed using
a conventional audio encoding method.
Furthermore, the particular choice of the distribution on X as a uniformly
random sequence will cause no loss of generality. If the distribution of X is
publicly known to be non-uniform, the transmitter can use a suitable source-
coding scheme to compress the source to its entropy prior to the transmission,
and ensure that from the intruder’s point of view, X is uniformly distributed.
On the other hand, it is also easy to see that if a protocol achieves perfect
privacy under uniform message distribution, it achieves perfect privacy under
any other distribution as well.
3.1 The Formal Model
The model that we will be considering in this chapter is motivated by the
original wiretap channel problem but is more stringent in terms of its security
requirements. In particular, instead of using Shannon entropy as a measure of
uncertainty, we will rely on statistical indistinguishability which is a stronger
measure that is more widely used in cryptography.
Definition 3.2. Let Σ be a set of size q, m and n be positive integers, and
, γ > 0. A (t, , γ)q-resilient wiretap protocol of block length n and message
length m is a pair of functions E : Σm × {0, 1}r → Σn (the encoder) and
D : Σn → Σm (the decoder) that are computable in time polynomial in m,
such that
(a) (Decodability) For all x ∈ Σm and all z ∈ {0, 1}r we have D(E(x, z)) =
x,
(b) (Resiliency) Let X ∼ UΣm , R ∼ Ur, and Y = E(X,R). For a set S ⊆ [n]
and w ∈ Σ|S|, let XS,w denote the distribution of X conditioned on the
event Y |S = w. Define the set of bad observations as
BS := {w ∈ Σ|S| | dist(XS,w,UΣm) > },
where dist(·, ·) denotes the statistical distance between two distributions.
Then we require that for every S ⊆ [n] of size at most t, Pr[Y |S ∈ BS ] ≤
γ, where the probability is over the randomness of X and R.
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The encoding of a vector x ∈ Σk is accomplished by choosing a vector
Z ∈ {0, 1}r uniformly at random, and calculating E(x, Z). The quantities
R := m/n, , and γ are called the rate, the error, and the leakage of the
protocol, respectively. Moreover, we call δ := t/n the (relative) resilience of
the protocol.
The decodability condition ensures that the functions E and D are a
matching encoder/decoder pair, while the resiliency conditions ensures that
the intruder learns almost nothing about the message from his observation.
In our definition, the imperfection of the protocol is captured by the two
parameters  and γ. When  = γ = 0, the above definition coincides with the
original wiretap channel problem for the case of perfect privacy.
When γ = 0, we will have a worst-case guarantee, namely, that the in-
truder’s views of the message before and after his observation are statistically
close, regardless of the outcome of the observation.
The protocol remains interesting even when γ is positive but sufficiently
small. When γ > 0, a particular observation might potentially reveal to the
intruder a lot of information about the message. However, a negligible γ
will ensure that such a bad event (or leakage) happens only with negligible
probability.
All the constructions that we will study in this chapter achieve zero leakage
(i.e., γ = 0), except for the general result in Section 3.7.3 for which a nonzero
leakage is inevitable.
The significance of zero-leakage protocols is that they assure adaptive re-
siliency in the weak sense introduced in [47] for exposure-resilient functions: if
the intruder is given the encoded sequence as an oracle that he can adaptively
query at up to t coordinates (that is, the choice of each query may depend on
the outcome of the previous queries), and is afterwards presented with a chal-
lenge which is either the original message or an independent uniformly chosen
random string, he will not be able to distinguish between the two cases.
In general, it is straightforward to verify that our model can be used to
solve the original wiretap II problem, with ∆ ≥ m(1− − γ):
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that (E,D) is an encoder/decoder pair as in Defini-
tion 3.2. Then using E and D in the wiretap II problem attains an equivoca-
tion
∆ ≥ m(1− − γ).
Proof. Let W := Y |S be the intruder’s observation, and denote by W ′ the set
of good observations, namely,
W ′ := {w ∈ Σt : dist(XS,w,UΣm) ≤ }.
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Denote by H(·) the Shannon entropy in d-ary symbols. Then we will have
H(X|W ) =
∑
w∈Σt
Pr(W = w)H(X|W = w)
≥
∑
w∈W ′
Pr(W = w)H(X|W = w)
(a)
≥
∑
w∈W ′
Pr(W = w)(1− )m
(b)
≥ (1− γ)(1− )m ≥ (1− γ − )m.
The inequality (a) follows from the definition of W ′ combined with Proposi-
tion 3.30 in the appendix, and (b) by the definition of leakage parameter.
Hence, we will achieve asymptotically perfect privacy when +γ = o(1/m).
For all the protocols that we present in this chapter this quantity will be
superpolynomially small; that is, smaller than 1/mc for every positive constant
c (provided that m is large enough).
3.2 Review of the Related Notions in
Cryptography
There are several interrelated notions in the literature on Cryptography and
Theoretical Computer Science that are also closely related to our definition of
the wiretap protocol (Definition 3.2). These are resilient functions (RF) and
almost perfect resilient functions (APRF), exposure-resilient functions (ERF),
and all-or-nothing transforms (AONT) (cf. [22,36,61,62,96,126,143] and [45]
for a comprehensive account of several important results in this area).
The notion of resilient functions was introduced in [11] (and also [158]
as the bit-extraction problem). A deterministic polynomial-time computable
function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is called t-resilient if whenever any t bits of
the its input are arbitrarily chosen by an adversary and the rest of the bits
are chosen uniformly at random, then the output distribution of the function
is (close to) uniform. APRF is a stronger variation where the criterion for
uniformity of the output distribution is defined with respect to the `∞ (i.e.,
point-wise distance of distributions) rather than `1. This stronger requirement
allows for an “adaptive security” of APRFs.
ERFs, introduced in [22], are similar to resilient functions except that the
entire input is chosen uniformly at random, and the view of the adversary
from the output remains (close to) uniform even after observing any t input
bits of his choice.
ERFs and resilient functions are known to be useful in a scenario similar to
the wiretap channel problem where the two parties aim to agree on any random
string, for example a session key (Alice generates x uniformly at random which
she sends to Bob, and then they agree on the string f(x)). Here no control
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on the content of the message is required, and the only goal is that at the end
of the protocol the two parties agree on any random string that is uniform
even conditioned on the observations of the intruder. Hence, Definition 3.2 of
a wiretap protocol is more stringent than that of resilient functions, since it
requires the existence and efficient computability of the encoding function E
that provides a control over the content of the message.
Another closely related notion is that of all-or-nothing transforms, which
was suggested in [126] for protection of block ciphers. A randomized poly-
nomial-time computable function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, (m ≤ n), is called a
(statistical, non-adaptive, and secret-only) t-AONT with error  if it is effi-
ciently invertible and for every S ⊆ [n] such that |S| ≤ t, and all x1, x2 ∈
{0, 1}m we have that the two distributions f(x1)|S and f(x2)|S are -close.
An AONT with  = 0 is called perfect. It is easy to see that perfectly
private wiretap protocols are equivalent to perfect adaptive AONTs. It was
shown in [47] that such functions can not exist (with positive, constant rate)
when the adversary is allowed to observe more than half of the encoded bits.
A similar result was obtained in [36] for the case of perfect linear RFs.
As pointed out in [47], AONTs can be used in the original scenario of
Ozarow and Wyner’s wiretap channel problem. However, the best known
constructions of AONTs can achieve rate-resilience trade-offs that are far from
the information-theoretic optimum (see Figure 3.2).
While an AONT requires indistinguishability of intruder’s view for every
fixed pair (x1, x2) of messages, the relaxed notion of average-case AONT re-
quires the expected distance of f(x1)|S and f(x2)|S to be at most  for a
uniform random message pair. Hence, for a negligible , the distance will be
negligible for all but a negligible fraction of message pairs. Up to a loss in
parameters, wiretap protocols are equivalent to average case AONTs:
Lemma 3.4. Let (E,D) be an encoding/decoding pair for a (t, , γ)2-resilient
wiretap protocol. Then E is an average-case t-AONT with error at most
2(+ γ).
Conversely, an average-case t-AONT with error η2 can be used as a (t, η, η)-
resilient wiretap encoder.
Proof. Consider a (t, , γ)2-resilient wiretap protocol as in Definition 3.2, and
accordingly, let the random variable Y = E(X,R) denote the encoding of X
with a random seed R. For a set S ⊆ [n] of size at most t, denote by W := Y |S
the intruder’s observation.
The resiliency condition implies that, the set of bad observations BS has a
probability mass of at most γ and hence, the expected distance dist(X|W,X)
taken over the distribution of W is at most + γ. Now we can apply Propo-
sition 3.31 to the jointly distributed pair of random variables (W,X), and
conclude that the expected distance dist(W |X,W ) over the distribution of
X (which is uniform) is at most  + γ. This implies that the encoder is an
average-case t-AONT with error at most 2(+ γ).
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Conversely, the same argument combined with Markov’s bound shows that
an average-case t-AONT with error η2 can be seen as (t, η, η)-resilient wiretap
protocol.
Note that the converse direction does not guarantee zero leakage, and
hence, zero leakage wiretap protocols are in general stronger than average-
case AONTs. An average-case to worst-case reduction for AONTs was shown
in [22] which, combined with the above lemma, can be used to show that any
wiretap protocol can be used to construct an AONT (at the cost of a rate
loss).
A simple universal transformation was proposed in [22] to obtain an AONT
from any ERF, by one-time padding the message with a random string ob-
tained from the ERF. In particular, given an ERF f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m,
the AONT g : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m+n is defined as g(x) := (r, x + f(r)), where
r ∈ {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly at random. Hence, the ERF is used to one-time
pad the message with a random secret string.
This construction can also yield a wiretap protocol with zero leakage. How-
ever, it has the drawback of significantly weakening the rate-resilience trade-
off. Namely, even if an information theoretically optimal ERF is used in this
reduction, the resulting wiretap protocol will only achieve half the optimal
rate (see Figure 3.2). This is because the one-time padding strategy necessar-
ily requires a random seed that is at least as long as the message itself, even
if the intruder is restricted to observe only a small fraction of the transmitted
sequence. Hence the rate of the resulting AONT cannot exceed 1/2, and it is
not clear how to improve this universal transformation to obtain a worst-case
AONT using a shorter seed.
The main focus of this chapter is on asymptotic trade-offs between the rate
R and the resilience δ of an asymptotically perfectly private wiretap protocol.
For applications in cryptography, e.g., the context of ERFs or AONTs, it is
typically assumed that the adversary learns all but a small number of the
bits in the encoded sequence, and the incurred blow-up in the encoding is not
as crucially important, as long as it remains within a reasonable range. On
the other hand, as in this chapter we are motivated by the wiretap channel
problem which is a communication problem, optimizing the transmission rate
will be the most important concern for us. We will focus on the case where
the fraction δ of the symbols observed by the intruder is an arbitrary constant
below 1, which is the most interesting range in our context. However, some
of our constructions work for sub-constant 1− δ as well.
Following [116], it is easy to see that, for resilience δ, an information-
theoretic bound R ≤ 1− δ + o(1) must hold. Lower bounds for R in terms of
δ have been studied by a number of researchers.
For the case of perfect privacy (where the equivocation ∆ is equal to the
message length m), Ozarow and Wyner [116] give a construction of a wiretap
protocol using linear error-correcting codes, and show that the existence of an
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Figure 3.2: A comparison of the rate vs. resilience trade-offs achieved by the
wiretap protocols for the binary alphabet (left) and larger alphabets (right,
in this example of size 64). (1) Information-theoretic bound, attained by
Theorem 3.25; (2) The bound approached by [96]; (3) Protocol based on
best non-explicit binary linear codes [68,157]; (4) AONT construction of [22],
assuming that the underlying ERF is optimal; (5) Random walk protocol of
Corollary 3.19; (6) Protocol based on the best known explicit [154] and non-
explicit [68, 157] linear codes.
[n, k, d]q-code implies the existence of a perfectly private, (d−1, 0, 0)q-resilient
wiretap protocol with message length k and block length n (thus, rate k/n).
As a result, the so-called Gilbert-Varshamov bound on the rate-distance
trade-offs of linear codes (see Chapter 6) implies that, asymptotically, R ≥
1− hq(δ), where hq is the q-ary entropy function defined as
hq(x) := x logq(q − 1)− x logq(x)− (1− x) logq(1− x).
If q ≥ 49 is a square, the bound can be further improved to R ≥ 1−δ−1/(√q−
1) using Goppa’s algebraic-geometric codes [72, 154]. In these protocols, the
encoder can be seen as an adaptively secure, perfect AONTs and the decoder
is an adaptive perfect RF.
Moving away from perfect to asymptotically perfect privacy, it was shown
in [96] that for any γ > 0 there exist binary asymptotically perfectly private
wiretap protocols with R ≥ 1 − 2δ − γ and exponentially small error3. This
bound strictly improves the coding-theoretic bound of Ozarow and Wyner for
the binary alphabet.
3Actually, what is proved in this paper is the existence of t-resilient functions which
correspond to decoders in our wiretap setting; however, it can be shown that these functions
also possess efficient encoders, so that it is possible to construct wiretap protocols from
them.
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3.3 Symbol-Fixing and Affine Extractors
Two central notions for our constructions of wiretap protocols in this chapter
are symbol-fixing and affine extractors. In this section, we introduce these
notions, and study some basic constructions.
Definition 3.5. A d-ary symbol-fixing source is an imperfect source of random
symbols from an alphabet of size d, that may fix some bounded number of the
symbols to unknown values. More precisely, an (n, k)d symbol-fixing source is
the distribution of a random variable X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) ∈ Σn, for some
set Σ of size d, in which at least k of the coordinates (chosen arbitrarily) are
uniformly and independently distributed on Σ and the rest take deterministic
values.
When d = 2, we will have a binary symbol-fixing source, or simply a bit-
fixing source. In this case Σ = {0, 1}, and the subscript d is dropped from the
notation.
The min-entropy of a (n, k)d symbol-fixing source is k log2 d bits. For a
d-ary source with d 6= 2, it is more convenient to talk about the d-ary entropy
of the source, which is k (in d-ary symbols).
Affine sources are natural generalizations of symbol-fixing sources when
the alphabet size is a prime power.
Definition 3.6. For a prime power q, an (n, k)q affine source is a distri-
bution on Fnq that is uniformly supported on an affine translation of some
k-dimensional subspace of Fnq .
It is easy to see that the q-ary min-entropy of a k-dimensional affine source
is k. Due to the restricted structure of symbol-fixing and affine sources, it is
possible to construct seedless extractors for such sources:
Definition 3.7. Let Σ be a finite alphabet of size d > 1. A function f : Σn →
Σm is a (seedless) (k, )-extractor for symbol-fixing (resp., affine) sources on Σn
if for every (n, k)d symbol-fixing (resp., affine) source X , the distribution E(X )
is -close to the uniform distribution UΣm . The extractor is called explicit if
it is deterministic and polynomial-time computable.
We will shortly see simple constructions of zero-error, symbol-fixing and
affine extractors using linear functions arising from good error-correcting codes.
These extractors achieve the lowest possible error, but however are unable to
extract the entire source entropy. Moreover, the affine extractor only works for
a “restricted” class of affine sources. For unrestricted affine sources, there are
by now various constructions of extractors in the literature. Here we review
some notable examples that are most useful for the construction of wiretap
protocols that we will discuss in this chapter.
Over large fields, the following affine extractor due to Gabizon and Raz
extract almost the entire source entropy:
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Theorem 3.8. [65] There is a constant q0 such that for any prime power field
size q and integers n, k such that q > max{q0, n20}, there is an explicit affine
(k, )-extractor f : Fnq → Fk−1q , where  < q−1/21.
In this construction, the field size has to be polynomially large in n. When
the field size is small (in particular, constant), the task becomes much more
challenging. The most challenging case thus corresponds to the binary field
F2, for which an explicit affine extractor was obtained, when the input entropy
is a constant fraction of the input length, by Bourgain:
Theorem 3.9. [16] For every constant 0 < δ ≤ 1, there is an explicit affine
extractor AExt : Fn2 → Fm2 for min-entropy δn with output length m = Ω(n)
and error at most 2−Ω(m).
Bourgain’s construction was recently simplified, improved, and extended
to work for arbitrary prime fields by Yehudayoff [167].
An “intermediate” trade-off is recently obtained by DeVos and Gabizon
[44], albeit with a short output length. This explicit construction extracts one
unbiased bit from any (n, k)q affine source provided that, for d := 5n/k, we
have q > 2d2 and the characteristic of the field is larger than d.
3.3.1 Symbol-Fixing Extractors from Linear Codes
The simple theorem below states that linear error-correcting codes can be used
to obtain symbol-fixing extractors with zero error.
Theorem 3.10. Let C be an [n, k˜, d]q code over Fq and G be a k˜×n generator
matrix of C. Then, the function E : Fnq → Fk˜q defined as4 E(x) := Gx> is an
(n− d+ 1, 0)-extractor for symbol-fixing sources over Fq.
Conversely, if a linear function E : Fnq → Fk˜q is an (n− d+ 1, 0)-extractor
for symbol-fixing sources over Fq, it corresponds to a generator matrix of an
[n, k˜, d]q code.
Proof. Let X be a symbol-fixing source with a set S ⊆ [n] of fixed coordinates,
where5 |S| = d − 1, and define S¯ := [n] \ S. Observe that, by the Singleton
bound, we must have |S¯| = n− d+ 1 ≥ k˜.
The submatrix of G obtained by removing the columns picked by S must
have rank k˜. Since otherwise, the left kernel of this submatrix would be
nonzero, meaning that C has a nonzero codeword that consists of entirely
zeros at the d−1 positions picked by S, contradicting the assumption that the
minimum distance of C is d. Therefore, the distribution E(X ) is supported on
a k˜-dimensional affine space on Fk˜q , meaning that this distribution is uniform.
4We typically consider vectors be represented in row form, and use the transpose operator
(x>) to represent column vectors.
5If the set of fixed symbols if of size smaller than d− 1, the argument still goes through
by taking S as an arbitrary set of size d− 1 containing all the fixed coordinates.
50 CHAPTER 3. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL PROBLEM
The converse is straightforward by following the same argument.
If the field size is large enough; e.g., q ≥ n, then one can pick C in the above
theorem to be an MDS code (in particular, a Reed-Solomon code) to obtain a
(k, 0)-extractor for all symbol-fixing sources of entropy k with optimal output
length k. However, for a fixed q, negative results on the rate-distance trade-
offs of codes (e.g., Hamming, MRRW, and Plotkin bounds) assert that this
construction of extractors must inevitably lose some fraction of the entropy of
the source. Moreover, the construction would at best be able to extract some
constant fraction of the source entropy only if the entropy of the source (in
q-ary symbols) is above n/q.
3.3.2 Restricted Affine Extractors from Rank-Metric Codes
In Section 3.7, we will see that affine extractors can be used to construct
wiretap schemes for models that are more general than the original Wiretap II
problem, e.g., when the direct channel is noisy. For these applications, the
extractor needs to additionally have a nice structure that is in particular
offered by linear functions.
An obvious observation is that a nontrivial affine extractor cannot be a
linear function. Indeed, a linear function f(x) := 〈α, x〉 + β, where α, β, x ∈
Fnq , is constant on the (n−1)-dimensional orthogonal subspace of α, and thus,
fails to be an extractor for even (n − 1)-dimensional affine spaces. However,
in this section we will see that linear affine extractors can be constructed if
the affine source is known to be described by a set of linear constraints whose
coefficients lie on a small sub-field of the underlying field. Such restricted
extractors turn out to be sufficient for some of the applications that we will
consider.
Let Q be a prime power. Same as linear codes, an affine subspace on
FnQ can be represented by a generator matrix, or parity-check matrix and
a constant shift. That is, a k-dimensional affine subspace A ⊆ FnQ can be
described as the image of a linear mapping
A := {xG+ β : x ∈ FkQ},
where G is a k × n generator matrix of rank k over FQ, and β ∈ FnQ is a
fixed vector. Alternatively, A can be expressed as the translated null-space of
a linear mapping
A := {x+ β ∈ FnQ : Hx> = 0},
for an (n− k)× n parity check matrix of rank n− k over FQ.
Observe that a symbol-fixing source over Fq with q-ary min-entropy k can
be seen as a k-dimensional affine source with a generator matrix of the form
[I | 0] · P , where I is the k × k identity matrix, 0 denotes the k × (n− k) all-
zeros matrix, and P is a permutation matrix. Recall that from Theorem 3.10
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we know that for this restricted type of affine sources linear extractors exist.
In this section we generalize this idea.
Suppose that Q = qm for a prime power q so that FQ can be regarded
as a degree m extension of Fq (and isomorphic to Fqm). Let A be an affine
source over FnQ. We will call the affine source Fq-restricted if its support can
be represented by a generator matrix (or equivalently, a parity check matrix)
over Fq.
In this section we introduce an affine extractor that is FQ-linear and,
assuming that m is sufficiently large, extracts from Fq-restricted affine sources.
The construction of the extractor is similar to Theorem 3.10, except that
instead of an error-correcting code defined over the Hamming metric, we will
use rank-metric codes.
Consider the function rdist : Fm×nq ×Fm×nq → Z, where Fm×nq denotes the
set of m× n matrices over Fq, defined as rdist(A,B) := rankq(A− B), where
rankq is the matrix rank over Fq. It is straightforward to see that rdist is a
metric.
The usual notion of error-correcting codes defined under the Hamming
metric can be naturally extended to the rank metric. In particular, a rank-
metric code C can be defined as a set of m×n matrices (known as codewords),
whose minimum distance is the minimum rank distance between pairs of code-
words.
ForQ := qm, there is a natural correspondence betweenm×nmatrices over
Fq and vectors of length n over FQ. Consider an isomorphism ϕ : FQ → Fmq
between FQ and F
m
q which maps elements of FQ to column vectors of length
m over Fq. Then one can define a mapping Φ: F
n
Q → Fm×nq defined as
Φ(x1, . . . , xn) := [ϕ(x1) | · · · | ϕ(xn)]
to put the elements of FnQ in one-to-one correspondence with m× n matrices
over Fq.
A particular class of rank-metric codes are linear ones. Suppose that C
is a linear [n, k˜, d˜]Q code over FQ. Then, using Φ(·), C can be regarded as a
rank-metric code of dimension k˜ over Fm×nq . In symbols, we will denote such
a linear k˜-dimensional rank-metric code as an [[n, k˜, d]]qm code, where d is the
minimum rank-distance of the code. The rank-distance of a linear rank-metric
code turns out to be equal to the minimum rank of its nonzero codewords and
obviously, one must have d ≤ d˜. However, the Hamming distance of C might
turn out to be much larger than its rank distance when regarded as a rank-
metric code. In particular, d ≤ m, and thus, d must be strictly smaller than
d˜ when the degree m of the field extension is less than d˜.
A counterpart of the Singleton bound in the rank-metric states that, for
any [[n, k˜, d]]qm code, one must have d ≤ n − k˜ + 1. Rank-metric codes that
attain equality exist and are called maximum rank distance (MRD) codes.
A class of linear rank-metric codes known as Gabidulin codes [64] are MRD
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and can be thought of as the counterpart of Reed-Solomon codes in the rank
metric. In particular, the codewords of a Gabidulin code, seen as vectors
over the extension field, are evaluation vectors of bounded-degree linearized
polynomials rather than arbitrary polynomials as in the case of Reed-Solomon
codes. These codes are defined for any choice of n, k˜, q,m as long as m ≥ n
and k˜ ≤ n.
The following is an extension of Theorem 3.10 to restricted affine sources.
Theorem 3.11. Let C be an [[n, k˜, d]]qm code defined from a code over FQ
(where Q := qm) with a generator matrix G ∈ Fk˜×nQ . Then the function
E : FnQ → Fk˜Q defined as E(x) := Gx> is an (n − d + 1, 0)-extractor for Fq-
restricted affine sources over FQ.
Conversely, if a linear function E : FnQ → Fk˜Q is an (n−d+1, 0)-extractor for
all Fq-restricted affine sources over FQ, it corresponds to a generator matrix
of an [[n, k˜, d]]qm code.
Proof. Consider a restricted affine source X uniformly supported on an affine
subspace of dimension6 n− d+ 1
X := {xA+ β : x ∈ Fn−d+1Q },
where A ∈ F(n−d+1)×nq has rank n− d+ 1, and β ∈ FnQ is a fixed translation.
Note that k˜ ≤ n− d+ 1 by the Singleton bound for rank-metric codes.
The output of the extractor is thus uniformly supported on the affine
subspace
B := {GA>x> +Gβ> : x ∈ Fn−d+1Q } ⊆ Fk˜Q.
Note that GA> ∈ Fk˜×(n−d+1)Q . Our goal is to show that the dimension
of B is equal to k˜. Suppose not, then we must have rankQ(GA
>) < k˜. In
particular, there is a nonzero y ∈ Fk˜Q such that yGA> = 0.
Let Y := Φ(yG) ∈ Fm×nq , where Φ(·) is the isomorphism that maps code-
words of C to their matrix form over Fq. By the distance of C, we know that
rankq(Y ) ≥ d. Since m ≥ d, this means that Y has at least d linearly indepen-
dent rows. On the other hand, we know that the matrix Y A> ∈ Fk˜×(n−d+1)q
is the zero matrix. Therefore, Y has d independent rows (each in Fnq ) that are
all orthogonal to the n−d+1 independent rows of A. Since d+(n−d+1) > n,
this is a contradiction.
Therefore, the dimension of B is exactly k˜, meaning that the output dis-
tribution of the extractor is indeed uniform. The converse is straightforward
by following a similar line of argument.
6 The argument still holds if the dimension of X is more than n− d+ 1.
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Thus, in particular, we see that generator matrices of MRD codes can be
used to construct linear extractors for restricted affine sources that extract
the entire source entropy with zero error. This is possible provided that the
field size is large enough compared to the field size required to describe the
generator matrix of the affine source. Using Gabidulin’s rank metric codes,
we immediately obtain the following corollary of Theorem 3.11:
Corollary 3.12. Let q be a prime power. Then for every positive integer
n, k ≤ n, and Q := qn, there is a linear function f : FnQ → FkQ that is a
(k, 0)-extractor for Fq-restricted affine sources over FQ.
It can be shown using similar proofs that if, in Theorems 3.10 and 3.11,
a parity check matrix of the code is used instead of a generator matrix, the
resulting linear function would become a lossless (d − 1, 0)-condenser rather
than an extractor. This is in fact part of a more general “duality” phenomenon
that is discussed in Section 5.5.
3.4 Inverting Extractors
In this section we will introduce the notion of invertible extractors and its con-
nection with wiretap protocols7. Later we will use this connection to construct
wiretap protocols with good rate-resilience trade-offs.
Definition 3.13. Let Σ be a finite alphabet and f be a mapping from Σn to
Σm. For γ ≥ 0, a function A : Σm × {0, 1}r → Σn is called a γ-inverter for f
if the following conditions hold:
(a) (Inversion) Given x ∈ Σm such that f−1(x) is nonempty, for every z ∈
{0, 1}r we have f(A(x, z)) = x.
(b) (Uniformity) A(UΣm ,Ur) ∼γ UΣn .
A γ-inverter is called efficient if there is a randomized algorithm that runs
in worst case polynomial time and, given x ∈ Σm and z as a random seed,
computes A(x, z). We call a mapping γ-invertible if it has an efficient γ-
inverter, and drop the prefix γ from the notation when it is zero.
The parameter r in the above definition captures the amount of random
bits that the inverter (seen as a randomized algorithm) needs to receive. For
7 Another notion of invertible extractors was introduced in [46] and used in [48] for
a different application (entropic security) that should not be confused with the one we
use. Their notion applies to seeded extractors with long seeds that are efficiently invertible
bijections for every fixed seed. Such extractors can be seen as a single-step walk on highly
expanding graphs that mix in one step. This is in a way similar to the multiple-step random
walk used in the seedless extractor of section 3.5, that can be regarded as a single-step walk
on the expander graph raised to a certain power.
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our applications, no particular care is needed to optimize this parameter and,
as long as r is polynomially bounded in n, it is generally ignored.
Remark 3.14. If a function f maps the uniform distribution to a distribu-
tion that is -close to uniform (as is the case for all extractors), then any
randomized mapping that maps its input x to a distribution that is γ-close to
the uniform distribution on f−1(x) is easily seen to be an (+ γ)-inverter for
f . In some situations designing such a function might be easier than directly
following the above definition.
The idea of random pre-image sampling was proposed in [47] for construc-
tion of adaptive AONTs from APRFs. However, they ignored the efficiency
of the inversion, as their goal was to show the existence of (not necessarily
efficient) information-theoretically optimal adaptive AONTs. Moreover, the
strong notion of APRF and a perfectly uniform sampler is necessary for their
construction of AONTs. As wiretap protocols are weaker than (worst-case)
AONTs, they can be constructed from slightly imperfect inverters as shown
by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.15. Let Σ be an alphabet of size q > 1 and f : Σn → Σm be a
(γ2/2)-invertible q-ary (k, ) symbol-fixing extractor. Then, f and its inverter
can be seen as a decoder/encoder pair for an (n−k, +γ, γ)q-resilient wiretap
protocol with block length n and message length m.
Proof. Let E and D denote the wiretap encoder and decoder, respectively.
Hence, E is the (γ2/2)-inverter for f , and D is the extractor f itself. From
the definition of the inverter, for every x ∈ Σm and every random seed r, we
have D(E(x, r)) = x. Hence it is sufficient to show that the pair satisfies the
resiliency condition.
Let the random variable X be uniformly distributed on Σm and the seed
R ∈ {0, 1}r be chosen uniformly at random. Denote the encoding of X by
Y := E(X,R). Fix any S ⊆ [n] of size at most n− k.
For every w ∈ Σ|S|, let Yw denote the set {y ∈ Σn : (y|S) = w}. Note that
the sets Yw partition the space Σ
n into |Σ||S| disjoint sets.
Let Y and YS denote the distribution of Y and Y |S , respectively. The
inverter guarantees that Y is (γ2/2)-close to uniform. Applying Proposi-
tion 3.32, we get that∑
w∈Σ|S|
Pr[(Y |S) = w] · dist((Y|Yw),UYw) ≤ γ2.
The left hand side is the expectation of dist((Y|Yw),UYw). Denote by W the
set of all bad outcomes of Y |S , i.e.,
W := {w ∈ Σ|S| | dist((Y|Yw),UYw) > γ}.
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By Markov’s inequality, we conclude that
Pr[(Y |S) ∈W ] ≤ γ.
For every w ∈ W , the distribution of Y conditioned on the event (Y |S) = w
is γ-close to a symbol-fixing source with n − |S| ≥ k random symbols. The
fact that D is a symbol-fixing extractor for this entropy and Proposition 3.33
imply that, for any such w, the conditional distribution of D(Y )|(Y |S = w) is
(γ+ )-close to uniform. Hence with probability at least 1−γ the distribution
of X conditioned on the outcome of Y |S is (γ + )-close to uniform. This
ensures the resiliency of the protocol.
By combining Lemma 3.15 and Theorem 3.10 using a Reed-Solomon code,
we can obtain a perfectly private, rate-optimal, wiretap protocol for the Wire-
tap II problem over large alphabets (namely, q ≥ n), and recover the original
result of Ozarow and Wyner8 [116]:
Corollary 3.16. For every positive integer n, prime power q ≥ n, and δ ∈
[0, 1), there is a (δn, 0, 0)q-resilient wiretap protocol with block length n and
rate 1− δ that attains perfect privacy.
3.5 A Wiretap Protocol Based on Random Walks
In this section we describe a wiretap protocol that achieves a rate R within
a constant fraction of the information theoretically optimal value 1 − δ (the
constant depending on the alphabet size).
To achieve our result, we will modify the symbol-fixing extractor of Kamp
and Zuckerman [88], that is based on random walks on expander graphs, to
make it efficiently invertible without affecting its extraction properties, and
then apply Lemma 3.15 above to obtain the desired wiretap protocol.
Before we proceed, let us briefly review some basic notions and facts related
to expander graphs. For a detailed review of the theory of expander graphs,
refer to the excellent survey by Hoory, Linial and Wigderson [82], and books
[109,112].
We will be working with directed regular expander graphs that are ob-
tained from undirected graphs by replacing each undirected edge with two
directed edges in opposite directions. Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular graph.
Then a labeling of the edges of G is a function L : V × [d]→ V such that for
every u ∈ V and t ∈ [d], the edge (u, L(u, t)) is in E. The labeling is consistent
if whenever L(u, t) = L(v, t), then u = v. Note that the natural labeling of a
Cayley graph (cf. [82]) is in fact consistent.
A family of d-regular graphs is an infinite set of d-regular graphs such that
for every N ∈ N, the set contains a graph with at least N vertices. For a
8In fact, Ozarow and Wyner use a parity check matrix of an MDS code in their con-
struction, which is indeed a generator matrix for the dual code which is itself MDS.
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parameter c ≥ 1, we will call a family c-dense if there is an N0 ∈ N such that,
for every N ≥ N0, the family has a graph with at least N and at most cN
vertices. We call a family of graphs constructible if all the graphs in the family
have a consistent labeling that is efficiently computable. That is, there is a
uniform, polynomial-time algorithm that, given N ∈ N and i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [d],
outputs the label of the jth neighbor of the ith vertex, under a consistent
labeling, in the graph in the family that has N vertices (provided that it
exists).
Let A denote the normalized adjacency matrix of a d-regular graph G
(that is, the adjacency matrix with all the entries divided by d). We denote
by λG the second largest eigenvalue of A in absolute value. The spectral
gap of G is given by 1 − λG. Starting from a probability distribution p on
the set of vertices, represented as a real vector with coordinates index by the
vertex set, performing a single-step random walk on G leads to the distribution
defined by pA. The following is a well known lemma on the convergence of
the distributions resulting from random walks (see [99] for a proof):
Lemma 3.17. Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular undirected graph, and A be its
normalized adjacency matrix. Then for any probability vector p, we have
‖pA− UV ‖2 ≤ λG‖p− UV ‖2,
where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the `2 norm.
The extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman [88] starts with a fixed vertex in
a large expander graph and interprets the input as the description of a walk
on the graph. Then it outputs the label of the vertex reached at the end of
the walk. Notice that a direct approach to invert this function will amount to
sampling a path of a particular length between a pair of vertices in the graph,
uniformly among all the possibilities, which might be a difficult problem for
good families of expander graphs9. We work around this problem by choosing
the starting point of the walk from the input10. The price that we pay by doing
so is a slightly larger error compared to the original construction of Kamp and
Zuckerman that is, asymptotically, of little significance. In particular we show
the following:
Theorem 3.18. Let G be a constructible d-regular graph with dm vertices and
second largest eigenvalue λG ≥ 1/
√
d. Then there exists an explicit invertible
9In fact intractability of the easier problem of finding a loop in certain families of ex-
pander graphs forms the underlying basis for a class of cryptographic hash functions (cf.
[25]). Even though this easier problem has been solved in [151], uniform sampling of paths
seems to be much more difficult.
10 The idea of choosing the starting point of the walk from the input sequence has been
used before in extractor constructions [172], but in the context of seeded extractors for
general sources with high entropy.
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Figure 3.3: The random-walk symbol-fixing extractor.
(k, 2s/2)d symbol-fixing extractor SFExt : [d]
n → [d]m, such that
s :=
{
m log d+ k log λ2G if k ≤ n−m,
(n− k) log d+ (n−m) log λ2G if k > n−m.
Proof. We first describe the extractor and its inverse. Given an input (v, w) ∈
[d]m × [d]n−m, the function SFExt interprets v as a vertex of G and w as the
description of a walk starting from v. The output is the index of the vertex
reached at the end of the walk. Figure 3.3 depicts the procedure. The 4-regular
graph shown in this toy example has 8 vertices labeled with binary sequences
of length 3. Edges of the graph are consistently labeled at both endpoints
with the set of labels {1, 2, 3, 4}. The input sequence (0, 1, 0 | 2, 3, 4, 2, 4)
shown below the graph describes a walk starting from the vertex 010 and
following the path shown by the solid arrows. The output of the extractor is
the label of the final vertex 011.
The inverter Inv works as follows: Given x ∈ [d]m, x is interpreted as a
vertex of G. Then Inv picks W ∈ [d]n−m uniformly at random. Let V be
the vertex starting from which the walk described by W ends up in x. The
inverter outputs (V,W ). It is easy to verify that Inv satisfies the properties of
a 0-inverter.
Now we show that SFExt is an extractor with the given parameters. We
will follow the same line of argument as in the original proof of Kamp and
Zuckerman. Let (x,w) ∈ [d]m × [d]n−m be a vector sampled from an (n, k)d
symbol-fixing source, and let u := SFExt(x,w). Recall that u can be seen as
the vertex of G reached at the end of the walk described by w starting from
x. Let pi denote the probability vector corresponding to the walk right after
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the ith step, for i = 0, . . . , n − m, and denote by p the uniform probability
vector on the vertices of G. Our goal is to bound the error  of the extractor,
which is half the `1 norm of pn−m − p.
Suppose that x contains k1 random symbols and the remaining k2 := k−k1
random symbols are in w. Then p0 has the value d
−k1 at dk1 of the coordinates
and zeros elsewhere, hence
‖p0 − p‖22 = dk1(d−k1 − d−m)2 + (dm − dk1)d−2m = d−k1 − d−m ≤ d−k1 .
Now for each i ∈ [n − m], if the ith step of the walk corresponds to a
random symbol in w the `2 distance is multiplied by λG by Lemma 3.17.
Otherwise the distance remains the same due to the fact that the labeling of
G is consistent. Hence we obtain ‖pn−m − p‖22 ≤ d−k1λ2k2G . Translating this
into the `1 norm by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain , namely,
 ≤ 1
2
d(m−k1)/2λk2G < 2
((m−k1) log d+k2 log λ2G)/2.
By our assumption, λG ≥ 1/
√
d. Hence, everything but k1 and k2 being fixed,
the above bound is maximized when k1 is minimized. When k ≤ n−m, this
corresponds to the case k1 = 0, and otherwise to the case k1 = k − n + m.
This gives us the desired upper bound on .
Combining this with Lemma 3.15 and setting up the the right asymptotic
parameters, we obtain our protocol for the wiretap channel problem.
Corollary 3.19. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and γ > 0 be arbitrary constants, and suppose
that there is a constructible family of d-regular expander graphs with spectral
gap at least 1− λ that is c-dense, for constants λ < 1 and c ≥ 1.
Then, for every large enough n, there is a (δn, 2−Ω(n), 0)d-resilient wiretap
protocol with block length n and rate
R = max{α(1− δ), 1− δ/α} − γ,
where α := − logd λ2.
Proof. For the case c = 1 we use Lemma 3.15 with the extractor SFExt of
Theorem 3.18 and its inverse. Every infinite family of graphs must satisfy
λ ≥ 2√d− 1/d [114], and in particular we have λ ≥ 1/√d, as required by
Theorem 3.18. We choose the parameters k := (1−δ)n and m := n(max{α(1−
δ), 1 − δ/α} − γ), which gives s = −Ω(n), and hence, exponentially small
error. The case c > 1 is similar, but involves technicalities for dealing with
lack of graphs of arbitrary size in the family. We will elaborate on this in
Appendix 3.A.
Using explicit constructions of Ramanujan graphs that achieve
λ ≤ 2√d− 1/d
3.6. INVERTIBLE AFFINE EXTRACTORS 59
when d − 1 is a prime power [100, 110, 119], one can obtain α ≥ 1 − 2/ log d,
which can be made arbitrarily close to one (hence, making the protocol arbi-
trarily close to the optimal bound) by choosing a suitable alphabet size that
does not depend on n. Namely, we have the following result:
Corollary 3.20. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and γ > 0 be arbitrary constants. Then, there
is a positive integer d only depending on γ such that the following holds: For
every large enough n, there is a (δn, 2−Ω(n), 0)d-resilient wiretap protocol with
block length n and rate at least 1− δ − γ.
3.6 Invertible Affine Extractors and
Asymptotically Optimal Wiretap Protocols
In this section we will construct a black box transformation for making certain
seedless extractors invertible. The method is described in detail for affine
extractors, and leads to wiretap protocols with asymptotically optimal rate-
resilience trade-offs. Being based on affine extractors, these protocols are only
defined for prime power alphabet sizes. On the other hand, the random-
walk based protocol discussed in Section 3.5 can be potentially instantiated
for an arbitrary alphabet size, though achieving asymptotically sub-optimal
parameters (and a positive rate only for an alphabet of size 3 or more).
Modulo some minor differences, the construction can be simply described
as follows: A seedless affine extractor is first used to extract a small number
of uniform random bits from the source, and the resulting sequence is then
used as the seed for a seeded extractor that extracts almost the entire entropy
of the source.
Of course, seeded extractors in general are not guaranteed to work if (as
in the above construction) their seed is not independent from the source.
However, as observed by Gabizon and Raz [65], a linear seeded extractor can
extract from an affine source if the seed is the outcome of an affine extractor on
the source. This idea was formalized in a more general setting by Shaltiel [132].
Shaltiel’s result gives a general framework for transforming any seedless
extractor (for a family of sources satisfying a certain closedness condition)
with short output length to one with an almost optimal output length. The
construction uses the imperfect seedless extractor to extract a small number of
uniform random bits from the source, and will then use the resulting sequence
as the seed for a seeded extractor to extract more random bits from the source.
For a suitable choice of the seeded extractor, one can use this construction to
extract almost all min-entropy of the source.
The closedness condition needed for this result to work for a family C
of sources is that, letting E(x, s) denote the seeded extractor with seed s, for
every X ∈ C and every fixed s and y, the distribution (X|E(X , s) = y) belongs
to C. If E is a linear function for every fixed s, the result will be available for
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affine sources (since we are imposing a linear constraint on an affine source, it
remains an affine source). A more precise statement of Shaltiel’s main result
is the following:
Theorem 3.21. [132] Let C be a class of distributions on Fn2 and F : Fn2 → Ft2
be an extractor for C with error . Let E : Fn2 × Ft2 → Fm2 be a function for
which C satisfies the closedness condition above. Then for every X ∈ C,
E(X , F (X )) ∼·2t+3 E(X ,Ut).
Recall that a seeded extractor is called linear if it is a linear function for
every fixed choice of the seed, and that this condition is satisfied by Trevisan’s
extractor [152]. For our construction, we will use the following theorem im-
plied by the improvement of this extractor due to Raz, Reingold and Vadhan
(Theorem 2.20):
Theorem 3.22. [123] There is an explicit strong linear seeded (k, )-extractor
Ext : Fn2 × Fd2 → Fm2 with d = O(log3(n/)) and m = k −O(d).
Remark 3.23. We note that our arguments would identically work for any
other linear seeded extractor as well, for instance those constructed in [134,
150]. However, the most crucial parameter in our application is the output
length of the extractor, being closely related to the rate of the wiretap proto-
cols we obtain. Among the constructions we are aware of, the result quoted in
Theorem 3.22 is the best in this regard. Moreover, an affine seeded extractor
with better parameters is constructed by Gabizon and Raz [65], but it requires
a large alphabet size to work.
Now, having the right tools in hand, we are ready to formally describe
our construction of invertible affine extractors with nearly optimal output
length. Broadly speaking, the construction follows the abovementioned idea
of Shaltiel, Gabizon, and Raz [65,132] on enlarging the output length of affine
extractors, with an additional “twist” for making the extractor invertible. For
concreteness, the description is given over the binary field F2:
Theorem 3.24. For every constant δ ∈ (0, 1] and every α ∈ (0, 1), there is
an explicit invertible affine extractor D : Fn2 → Fm2 for min-entropy δn with
output length m = δn−O(nα) and error at most O(2−nα/3).
Proof. Let  := 2−nα/3 , and t := O(log3(n/)) = O(nα) be the seed length
required by the extractor Ext in Theorem 3.22 for input length n and error
, and further, let n′ := n − t. Set up Ext for input length n′, min-entropy
δn − t, seed length t and error . Also set up Bourgain’s extractor AExt for
input length n′ and entropy rate δ′, for an arbitrary constant δ′ < δ. Then
the function F will view the n-bit input sequence as a tuple (s, x), s ∈ Ft2 and
x ∈ Fn′2 , and outputs Ext(x, s+ AExt(x)|[t]). This is depicted in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Construction of the invertible affine extractor.
First we show that this is an affine extractor. Suppose that (S,X) ∈
Ft2 × Fn
′
2 is a random variable sampled from an affine distribution with min-
entropy δn. The variable S can have an affine dependency on X. Hence, for
every fixed s ∈ Ft2, the distribution of X conditioned on the event S = s is
affine with min-entropy at least δn−t, which is at least δ′n′ for large enough n.
Hence AExt(X) will be 2−Ω(n)-close to uniform by Theorem 3.9. This implies
that AExt(X)|[t]+S can extract t random bits from the affine source with error
2−Ω(n). Combining this with Theorem 3.21, noticing the fact that the class of
affine extractors is closed with respect to linear seeded extractors, we conclude
that D is an affine extractor with error at most + 2−Ω(n) · 2t+3 = O(2−nα/3).
Now the inverter works as follows: Given y ∈ Fm2 , first it picks Z ∈
Ft2 uniformly at random. The seeded extractor Ext, given the seed Z is a
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linear function ExtZ : F
n′
2 → Fm2 . Without loss of generality, assume that this
function is surjective11. Then the inverter picks X ∈ Fn′2 uniformly at random
from the affine subspace defined by the linear constraint ExtZ(X) = y, and
outputs (Z + AExt(X)|[t], X). It is easy to verify that the output is indeed
a valid preimage of y. To see the uniformity of the inverter, note that if y
is chosen uniformly at random, the distribution of (Z,X) will be uniform on
Fn2 . Hence (Z + AExt(X)|[t], X), which is the output of the inverter, will be
uniform.
In the above construction we are using an affine and a linear seeded extrac-
tor as black boxes, and hence, they can be replaced by any other extractors as
well (the construction will achieve an optimal rate provided that the seeded
extractor extracts almost the entire source entropy). In particular, over large
fields one can use the affine and seeded extractors given by Gabizon and Raz
[65] that work for sub-constant entropy rates as well.
Moreover, for concreteness we described and instantiated our construction
over the binary field. Observe that Shaltiel’s result, for the special case of
affine sources, holds regardless of the alphabet size. Moreover, Trevisan’s lin-
ear seeded extractor can be naturally extended to handle arbitrary alphabets.
Hence, in order to extend our result to non-binary alphabets, it suffices to
ensure that a suitable seedless affine extractor that supports the desired al-
phabet size is available. Bourgain’s original result [16] is stated and proved
for the binary alphabet; however, it seems that this result can be adapted
to work for larger fields as well [17]. Such an extension (along with some
improvements and simplifications) is made explicit by Yehudayoff [167].
An affine extractor is in particular, a symbol-fixing extractor. Hence The-
orem 3.24, combined with Lemma 3.15 gives us a wiretap protocol with almost
optimal parameters:
Theorem 3.25. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) be constants. Then for a
prime power q > 1 and every large enough n there is a (δn,O(2−nα), 0)q-
resilient wiretap protocol with block length n and rate 1− δ − o(1).
3.7 Further Applications
In this section we will sketch some important applications of our technique to
more general wiretap problems.
11Because the seeded extractor is strong and linear, for most choices of the seed it is a
good extractor (by Proposition 2.11), and hence necessarily surjective (if not, one of the
output symbols would linearly depend on the others and obviously the output distribution
would not be close to uniform). Hence if Ext is not surjective for some seed z, one can
replace it by a trivial surjective linear mapping without affecting its extraction properties.
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3.7.1 Noisy Channels and Active Intruders
Suppose that Alice wants to transmit a particular sequence to Bob through a
noisy channel. She can use various techniques from coding theory to encode
her information and protect it against noise. Now what if there is an intruder
who can partially observe the transmitted sequence and even manipulate it?
Modification of the sequence by the intruder can be regarded in the same
way as the channel noise; thus one gets security against active intrusion as
a “bonus” by constructing a code that is resilient against noise and passive
eavesdropping. There are two natural and modular approaches to construct
such a code.
A possible attempt would be to first encode the message using a good error-
correcting code and then applying a wiretap encoder to protect the encoded
sequence against the wiretapper. However, this will not necessarily keep the
information protected against the channel noise, as the combination of the
wiretap encoder and decoder does not have to be resistant to noise.
Another attempt is to first use a wiretap encoder and then apply an error-
correcting code on the resulting sequence. Here it is not necessarily the case
that the information will be kept secure against intrusion anymore, as the
wiretapper now gets to observe the bits from the channel-encoded sequence
that may reveal information about the original sequence. However, the wire-
tap protocol given in Theorem 3.25 is constructed from an invertible affine
extractor, and guarantees resiliency even if the intruder is allowed to observe
arbitrary linear combinations of the transmitted sequence (in this case, the
distribution of the encoded sequence subject to the intruder’s observation be-
comes an affine source and thus, the arguments of the proof of Lemma 3.15
remain valid). In particular, Theorem 3.25 holds even if the intruder’s obser-
vation is allowed to be obtained after applying any arbitrary linear mapping
on the output of the wiretap encoder. Hence, we can use the wiretap scheme
as an outer code and still ensure privacy against an active intruder and relia-
bility in presence of a noisy channel, provided that the error-correcting code
being used as the inner code is linear. This immediately gives us the following
result:
Theorem 3.26. Suppose that there is a q-ary linear error-correcting code
with rate r that is able to correct up to a τ fraction of errors (via unique or
list decoding). Then for every constant δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) and large
enough n, there is a (δn,O(2−nα), 0)q-resilient wiretap protocol with block
length n and rate r − δ − o(1) that can also correct up to a τ fraction of
errors.
The setting discussed above is shown in Figure 3.5. The same idea can be
used to protect fountain codes, e.g., LT- [101] and Raptor Codes [137], against
wiretappers without affecting the error correction capabilities of the code.
64 CHAPTER 3. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL PROBLEM
Linear
Channel Encoder
X = (X1, . . . ,Xk)
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
Direct 
Channel
message
redundant encoding receiver’s sequence
Yˆ = (Yˆ1, . . . , Yˆn)
Channel 
Decoder
estimate
Xˆ = (Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆk)randomness
intruder’s
sequence
(Z1, . . . , Zt).
Arbitrary Linear 
Transformation
Wiretap
Encoder
Wiretap
Decoder
active intrusion
Figure 3.5: Wiretap scheme composed with channel coding. If the wiretap
scheme is constructed by an invertible affine extractor, it can guarantee secrecy
even in presence of arbitrary linear manipulation of the information. Active
intrusion can be defied using an error-correcting inner code.
Obviously this simple composition idea can be used for any type of channel
so long as the inner code is linear, at the cost of reducing the total rate by
almost δ. Hence, if the inner code achieves the Shannon capacity of the direct
channel (in the absence of the wiretapper), the composed code will achieve the
capacity of the wiretapped channel, which is less than the original capacity
by δ [41].
3.7.2 Network Coding
Our wiretap protocol from invertible affine extractors is also applicable in the
more general setting of transmission over networks. A communication network
can be modeled as a directed graph, in which nodes represent the network
devices and information is transmitted along the edges. One particular node
is identified as the source and m nodes are identified as receivers. The main
problem in network coding is to have the source reliably transmit information
to the receivers at the highest possible rate, while allowing the intermediate
nodes arbitrarily process the information along the way.
Suppose that, in the graph that defines the topology of the network, the
min-cut between the source to each receiver is n. It was shown in [4] that the
source can transmit information up to rate n (symbols per transmission) to
all receivers (which is optimal), and in [94, 97] that linear network coding is
in fact sufficient to achieve this rate. That is, the transmission at rate n is
possible when the intermediate nodes are allowed to forward packets that are
(as symbols over a finite field) linear combinations of the packets that they
receive (See [168] for a comprehensive account of these and other relevant
results).
A basic example is shown by the butterfly network in Figure 3.6. This
network consists of a source on the top and two receivers on the bottom,
where the min-cut to each receiver is 2. Without processing the incoming
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Figure 3.6: Network coding (right), versus unprocessed forwarding (left).
data, as in the left figure, one of the two receivers may receive information
at the optimal rate of 2 symbols per transmission (namely, receiver 1 in the
figure). However, due to the bottleneck existing in the middle (shown by the
thick edge a→ b), the other receiver will be forced to receive at an inferior rate
of 1 symbol per transmission. However, if linear processing of the information
is allowed, node a may combine its incoming information by treating packets
as symbols over a finite field and adding them up, as in the right figure. Both
receivers may then solve a full-rank system of linear equations to retrieve the
original source symbols x1 and x2, and thereby achieve the optimal min-cut
rate.
Designing wiretap protocols for networks is an important question in net-
work coding, which was first posed by Cai and Yeung [21]. In this problem,
an intruder can choose a bounded number, say t, of the edges and eavesdrop
all the packets going through those edges. They designed a network code
that could provide the optimal multicast rate of n − t with perfect privacy.
However this code requires an alphabet size of order
(|E|
t
)
, where E is the set
of edges. Their result was later improved in [59] who showed that a random
linear coding scheme can provide privacy with a much smaller alphabet size
if one is willing to achieve a slightly sub-optimal rate. Namely, they obtain
rate n − t(1 + ) with an alphabet of size roughly Θ(|E|1/), and show that
achieving the exact optimal rate is not possible with small alphabet size.
El Rouayheb and Soljanin [55] suggested to use the original code of Ozarow
and Wyner [116] as an outer code at the source and showed that a careful
choice of the network code can provide optimal rate with perfect privacy.
However, their code eventually needs an alphabet of size at least
(|E|−1
t−1
)
+m.
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Figure 3.7: Linear network coding with an outer layer of wiretap encoding
added for providing secrecy.
Building upon this work, Silva and Kschischang [95] constructed an outer
code that provides similar results while leaving the underlying network code
unchanged. However, their result comes at the cost of increasing the packet
size by a multiplicative factor of at least the min-cut bound, n (or in math-
ematical terms, the original alphabet size q of the network is enlarged to at
least qn). For practical purposes, this is an acceptable solution provided that
an estimate on the min-cut size of the network is available at the wiretap
encoder.
By the discussion presented in Section 3.7.1, the rate-optimal wiretap pro-
tocol given in Theorem 3.25 stays resilient even in presence of any linear
post-processing of the encoded information. Thus, using the wiretap encoder
given by this result as an outer-code in the source node, one can construct an
asymptotically optimal wiretap protocol for networks that is completely un-
aware of the network and eliminates all the restrictions in the above results.
This is schematically shown in Figure 3.7. Hence, extending our notion of
(t, , γ)q-resilient wiretap protocols naturally to communication networks, we
obtain the following:
Theorem 3.27. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1/3) be constants, and consider
a network that uses a linear coding scheme over a finite field Fq for reliably
transmitting information at rate R. Suppose that, at each transmission, an
intruder can arbitrarily observe up to δR intermediate links in the network.
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Then the source and the receiver nodes can use an outer code of rate 1−δ−o(1)
(obtaining a total rate of R(1− δ)− o(1)) which is completely independent of
the network, leaves the network code unchanged, and provides almost perfect
privacy with error O(2−Rα) and zero leakage over a q-ary alphabet.
In addition to the above result that uses the invertible affine extractor of
Theorem 3.24, it is possible to use other rate-optimal invertiable affine extrac-
tors. In particular, observe that the restricted affine extractor of Theorem 3.11
(and in particular, Corollary 3.12) is a linear function (over the extension field)
and is thus, obviously has an efficient 0-inverter (since inverting the extractor
amounts to solving a system of linear equations). By using this extractor (in-
stantiated with Gabidulin’s MRD codes as in Corollary 3.12), we may recover
the result of Silva and Kschischang [95] in our framework. More precisely, we
have the following result:
Corollary 3.28. Let q be any prime power, and consider a network with
minimum cut of size n that uses a linear coding scheme over Fq for reliably
transmitting information at rate R. Suppose that, at each transmission, an
intruder can arbitrarily observe up to δR intermediate links in the network,
for some δ ∈ [0, 1). Then the source and the receiver nodes can use an outer
code of rate 1− δ over Fqn (obtaining a total rate of R(1− δ)) that provides
perfect privacy over a qn-ary alphabet.
3.7.3 Arbitrary Processing
In this section we consider the erasure wiretap problem in its most general
setting, which is still of practical importance. Suppose that the information
emitted by the source goes through an arbitrary communication medium and
is arbitrarily processed on the way to provide protection against noise, to
obtain better throughput, or for other reasons. Now consider an intruder who
is able to eavesdrop a bounded amount of information at various points of
the channel. One can model this scenario in the same way as the original
point-to-point wiretap channel problem, with the difference that instead of
observing t arbitrarily chosen bits, the intruder now gets to choose an arbitrary
Boolean circuit C with t output bits (which captures the accumulation of all the
intermediate processing) and observes the output of the circuit when applied
to the transmitted sequence12.
Obviously there is no way to guarantee resiliency in this setting, since the
intruder can simply choose C to compute t output bits of the wiretap decoder.
However, suppose that in addition there is an auxiliary communication channel
between the source and the receiver (that we call the side channel) that is
separated from the main channel, and hence, the information passed through
the two channel do not blend together by the intermediate processing.
12 In fact this models a “harder” problem, as in our problem the circuit C is given by the
communication scheme and not the intruder. Nevertheless, we consider the harder problem.
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Figure 3.8: The wiretap channel problem in presence of arbitrary intermediate
processing. In this example, data is transmitted over a packet network (shown
as a cloud) in which some intermediate links (showed by the dashed arrows)
are accessible to an intruder.
We call this scenario the general wiretap problem, and extend our notion
of (t, , γ)-resilient protocol to this problem, with the slight modification that
now the output of the encoder (and the input of the decoder) is a pair of
strings (y1, y2) ∈ Fn2 ×Fd2, where y1 (resp., y2) is sent through the main (resp.,
side) channel. Now we call n+ d the block length and let the intruder choose
an arbitrary pair of circuits (C1, C2), one for each channel, that output a total
of t bits, and observe (C1(y1), C2(y2)).
The information-theoretic upper bounds for the achievable rates in the
original wiretap problem obviously extend to the general wiretap problem as
well. Below we show that for the general problem, secure transmission is pos-
sible at asymptotically optimal rates even if the intruder intercepts the entire
communication passing through the side channel (as shown in Figure 3.8).
Similar as before, our idea is to use invertible extractors to construct gen-
eral wiretap protocols, but this time we use invertible strong seeded extractors.
Strong seeded extractors were used in [22] to construct ERFs, and this is ex-
actly what we use as the decoder in our protocol. As the encoder we will use
the corresponding inverter, which outputs a pair of strings, one for the extrac-
tor’s input which is sent through the main channel and another as the seed
which is sent through the side channel. Hence we will obtain the following
result:
Theorem 3.29. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) be a constant. Then for every α,  > 0, there
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is a (δn, , 2−αn + )-resilient wiretap protocol for the general wiretap channel
problem that sends n bits through the main channel and d := O(log3(n/2))
bits through the side channel and achieves rate 1 − δ − α − O(d/(n + d)).
The protocol is secure even when the entire communication through the side
channel is observable by the intruder.
Proof. We will need the following claim in our proof, which is easy to verify
using an averaging argument:
Claim. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}δn be a Boolean function. Then for every
α > 0, and X ∼ Un, the probability that f(X) has fewer than 2n(1−δ−α)
preimages is at most 2−αn.
Now, let Ext be the linear seeded extractor of Theorem 3.22, set up for
input length n, seed length d = O(log3(n/2)), min-entropy n(1− δ−α), and
output length m = n(1−δ−α)−O(d), and error 2. Then the encoder chooses
a seed Z for the extractor uniformly at random and sends it through the side
channel.
For the chosen value of Z, the extractor is a linear function, and as before,
given a message x ∈ {0, 1}m, the encoder picks a random vector in the affine
subspace that is mapped by this linear function to x and sends it through the
public channel.
The decoder, in turn, applies the extractor to the seed received from the
secure channel and the transmitted string. The resiliency of the protocol
can be shown in a similar manner as in Lemma 3.15. Specifically, note that
by the above claim, with probability at least 1− 2−αn, the string transmitted
through the main channel, conditioned on the observation of the intruder from
the main channel, has a distribution Y with min-entropy at least n(1− δ−α).
Now in addition suppose that the seed z is entirely revealed to the intruder.
As the extractor is strong, with probability at least 1− , z is a good seed for
Y, meaning that the output of the extractor applied to Y and seed z is -close
to uniform (by Proposition 2.11), and hence the view of the intruder on the
original message remains -close to uniform.
We observe that it is not possible to guarantee zero leakage for the gen-
eral wiretap problem above. Specifically, suppose that (C1, C2) are chosen
in a way that they have a single preimage for a particular output (w1, w2).
With nonzero probability the observation of the intruder may turn out to be
(w1, w2), in which case the entire message is revealed. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to guarantee negligible leakage as the above theorem does. Moreover,
when the general protocol above is used for the original wiretap II problem
(where there is no intermediate processing involved), there is no need for a
separate side channel and the entire encoding can be transmitted through a
single channel. Contrary to Theorem 3.25 however, the general protocol will
not guarantee zero leakage even for this special case.
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3.A Some Technical Details
This appendix is devoted to some technical details that are omitted in the
main text of the chapter.
The following proposition quantifies the Shannon entropy of a distribution
that is close to uniform:
Proposition 3.30. Let X be a probability distribution on a finite set S,
|S| > 4, that is -close to the uniform distribution on S, for some  ≤ 1/4.
Then H(X ) ≥ log2 |S|(1− )
Proof. Let n := |S|, and let f(x) := −x log2 x. The function f(x) is concave,
passes through the origin and is strictly increasing in the range [0, 1/e]. From
the definition, we have H(X ) = ∑s∈S f(PrX (s)). For each term s in this
summation, the probability that X assigns to s is either at least 1/n, which
makes the corresponding term at least log2 n/n (due to the particular range
of |S| and ), or is equal to 1/n − s, for some s > 0, in which case the
term corresponding to s is less than log2 n/n by at most s log2 n (this follows
by observing that the slope of the line connecting the origin to the point
(1/n, f(1/n)) is log2 n). The bound on the statistical distance implies that
the differences s add up to at most . Hence, the Shannon entropy of X can
be less than log2 n by at most  log2 n.
Proposition 3.31. Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables jointly dis-
tributed on a finite set Ω× Γ. Then13 EY [dist(X|Y,X)] = EX [dist(Y |X,Y )].
Proof. For x ∈ Ω and y ∈ Γ, we will use shorthands px, py, pxy to denote
Pr[X = x],Pr[Y = y],Pr[X = x, Y = y], respectively. Then we have
EY [dist(X|Y,X)] =
∑
y∈Γ
pydist(X|(Y = y), X) = 1
2
∑
y∈Γ
py
∑
x∈Ω
|pxy/py − px|
=
1
2
∑
y∈Γ
∑
x∈Ω
|pxy − pxpy| = 1
2
∑
x∈Ω
px
∑
y∈Γ
|pxy/px − py|
=
∑
x∈Ω
pxdist(Y |(X = x), Y ) = EX [dist(Y |X,Y )].
Proposition 3.32. Let Ω be a finite set that is partitioned into subsets
S1, . . . , Sk and suppose that X is a distribution on Ω that is γ-close to uni-
form. Denote by pi, i = 1, . . . k, the probability assigned to the event Si by
13Here we are abusing the notation and denote by Y the marginal distribution of the
random variable Y , and by Y |(X = a) the distribution of the random variable Y conditioned
on the event X = a.
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X . Then ∑
i∈[k]
pi · dist(X|Si,USi) ≤ 2γ.
Proof. Let N := |Ω|, and define for each i, γi :=
∑
s∈Si
∣∣PrX (s)− 1N ∣∣ , so that
γ1 + · · ·+ γk ≤ 2γ. Observe that by triangle’s inequality, for every i we must
have |pi − |Si|/N | ≤ γi. To conclude the claim, it is enough to show that for
every i, we have dist(X|Si,USi) ≤ γi/pi. This is shown in the following.
pi · dist(X|Si,USi) =
pi
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣PrX (s)pi − 1|Si|
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣PrX (s)− pi|Si|
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣(PrX (s)− 1N
)
+
1
|Si|
( |Si|
N
− pi
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣PrX (s)− 1N
∣∣∣∣+ 12|Si|∑
s∈Si
∣∣∣∣ |Si|N − pi
∣∣∣∣
≤ γi
2
+
1
2|Si| · |Si|γi = γi.
The following proposition shows that any function maps close distributions
to close distributions:
Proposition 3.33. Let Ω and Γ be finite sets and f be a function from Ω to Γ.
Suppose that X and Y are probability distributions on Ω and Γ, respectively,
and let X ′ be a probability distribution on Ω which is δ-close to X . Then if
f(X ) ∼ Y, then f(X ′) ∼+δ Y.
Proof. Let X, X ′ and Y be random variables distributed according to X , X ′,
and Y, respectively. We want to upperbound∣∣Pr[f(X ′) ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ]∣∣
for every T ⊆ Γ. By the triangle inequality, this is no more than∣∣Pr[f(X ′) ∈ T ]− Pr[f(X) ∈ T ]∣∣+ |Pr[f(X) ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ]| .
Here the summand on the right hand side is upperbounded by the distance of
f(X ) and Y, that is assumed to be at most . Let T ′ := {x ∈ Ω | f(x) ∈ T}.
Then the summand on the left can be written as∣∣Pr[X ′ ∈ T ′]− Pr[X ∈ T ′]∣∣
which is at most δ by the assumption that X ∼δ X ′.
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Omitted Details of the Proof of Corollary 3.19
Here we prove Corollary 3.19 for the case c > 1. The construction is similar to
the case c = 1, and in particular the choice of m and k will remain the same.
However, a subtle complication is that the expander family may not have a
graph with dm vertices and we need to adapt the extractor of Theorem 3.18
to support our parameters, still with exponentially small error. To do so, we
pick a graph G in the family with N vertices, such that
cηmdm ≤ N ≤ cηm+1dm,
for a small absolute constant η > 0 that we are free to choose. The assumption
on the expander family guarantees that such a graph exists. Let m′ be the
smallest integer such that dm
′ ≥ cηmN . Index the vertices of G by integers in
[N ]. Note that m′ will be larger than m by a constant multiplicative factor
that approaches 1 as η → 0.
For positive integers q and p ≤ q, define the function Modq,p : [q]→ [p] by
Modq,p(x) := 1 + (x mod p).
The extractor SFExt interprets the firstm′ symbols of the input as an integer u,
0 ≤ u < dm′ and performs a walk on G starting from the vertex Moddm′ ,N (u+
1), the walk being defined by the remaining input symbols. If the walk reaches
a vertex v at the end, the extractor outputs ModN,dm(v)−1, encoded as a d-ary
string of length m. A similar argument as in Theorem 3.18 can show that with
our choice of the parameters, the extractor has an exponentially small error,
where the error exponent is now inferior to that of Theorem 3.18 by O(m),
but the constant behind O(·) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a
sufficiently small η.
The real difficulty lies with the inverter because Mod is not a balanced
function (that is, all images do not have the same number of preimages), thus
we will not be able to obtain a perfect inverter. Nevertheless, it is possible to
construct an inverter with a close-to-uniform output in `∞ norm. This turns
out to be as good as having a perfect inverter, and thanks to the following
lemma, we will still be able to use it to construct a wiretap protocol with zero
leakage:
Lemma 3.34. Suppose that f : [d]n → [d]m is a (k, 2−Ω(m))d symbol-fixing
extractor and that X is a distribution on [d]n such that ‖X − U[d]n‖∞ ≤
2−Ω(m)/dn. Denote by X ′ the distribution X conditioned on any fixing of at
most n− k coordinates. Then f(X ′) ∼2−Ω(m) U[d]m .
Proof. By Proposition 3.33, it suffices to show that X ′ is 2−Ω(m)-close to an
(n, k)d symbol-fixing source. Let S ⊆ [d]m denote the support of X ′, and let
/dn be the `∞ distance between X and U[d]n , so that by our assumption,
 = 2−Ω(m). By the bound on the `∞ distance, we know that PrX (S) is
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between |S|dn (1 − ) and |S|dn (1 + ). Hence for any x ∈ S, PrX ′(x), which is
PrX (x)/PrX (S), is between 1|S| · 1−1+ and 1|S| · 1+1− . This differs from 1/|S| by
at most O()/|S|. Hence, X ′ is 2−Ω(m)-close to US .
In order to invert our new construction, we will need to construct an
inverter Invq,p for the function Modq,p. For that, given x ∈ [p] we will just
sample uniformly in its preimages. This is where the non-balancedness of
Mod causes problems, since if p does not divide q the distribution Invq,p(U[p])
is not uniform on [q].
Lemma 3.35. Suppose that q > p. Given a distribution X on [p] such that
‖X − U[p]‖∞ ≤ p , we have ‖Invq,p(X )− U[q]‖∞ ≤ 1q · p+qq−p .
Proof. Let X ∼ X and Y ∼ Invq,p(X ). Since we invert the modulo function
by taking for a given output a random preimage uniformly, Pr[Y = y] is equal
to Pr[X = Modq,p(y)] divided by the number of y with the same value for
Modq,p(y). The latter number is either bq/pc or dq/pe, so
1− 
pdq/pe ≤ Pr(Y = y) ≤
1 + 
pbq/pc
Bounding the floor and ceiling functions by q/p± 1, we obtain
1− 
q + p
≤ Pr(Y = y) ≤ 1 + 
q − p
That is −p− q
q(q + p)
≤ Pr(Y = y)− 1
q
≤ p+ q
q(q − p) ,
which concludes the proof since this is true for all y.
Now we describe the inverter Inv(x) for the extractor, again abusing the
notation. First the inverter calls InvN,dm(x) to obtain x1 ∈ [N ]. Then it
performs a random walk on the graph, starting from x1, to reach a vertex x2
at the end which is inverted to obtain x3 = Invdm′ ,N (x2) as a d-ary string of
length m′. Finally, the inverter outputs y = (x3, w), where w corresponds the
inverse of the random walk of length n−m′. It is obvious that this procedure
yields a valid preimage of x.
Using the previous lemma, if x is chosen uniformly, x1 will be at `∞-
distance
1 :=
1
N
· d
m
N − dm =
1
N
O(c−ηm).
For a given walk, the distribution of x2 will just be a permutation of the
distribution of x1 and applying the lemma again, we see that the `∞-distance
of x3 from the uniform distribution is
2 :=
1
dm′
· N + 1d
m′
dm′ −N =
1
dm′
O(c−ηm).
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This is true for all the dn−m′ possible walks so the `∞-distance of the distri-
bution of y from uniform is bounded by 1dnO(c
−ηm). Applying Lemma 3.34
in an argument similar to Lemma 3.15 concludes the proof.
Domenico Scarlatti (1685–1757): Keyboard Sonata
in B minor K. 87 (L. 33).

“War does not determine who is
right—only who is left.”
— Bertrand Russell
Chapter 4
Group Testing
The history of group testing is believed to date back to the second World
War. During the war, millions of blood samples taken from draftees had to
be subjected to a certain test, and be analyzed in order to identify a few
thousand cases of syphilis. The tests were identical for all the samples. Here
the idea of group testing came to a statistician called Robert Dorfman (and
perhaps, a few other researchers working together with him, among them
David Rosenblatt). He made a very intuitive observation, that, the samples
are constantly subjected to the same test, which is extremely sensitive and
remains reliable even if the sample is diluted. Therefore, it makes sense to,
instead of analyzing each sample individually, pool every few samples in a
group, and apply the test on the mixture of the samples. If the test outcome
is negative, we will be sure that none of the samples participating in the pool
are positive. On the other hand, if the outcome is positive, we know that
one or more of the samples are positive, and will have to proceed with more
refined, or individual, tests in order to identify the individual positives within
the group.
Since the number of positives in the entire population was suspected to be
in order of a few thousands—a small fraction of the population—Dorfman’s
idea would save a great deal of time and resources. Whether or not the idea
had been eventually implemented at the time, Dorfman went on to publish
a paper on the topic [49], which triggered an extensive line of research in
combinatorics known today as combinatorial group testing.
The main challenge in group testing is to design the pools in such a way
to minimize the number of tests required in order to identify the exact set of
positives. Larger groups would save a lot of tests if their outcome is nega-
tive, and are rather wasteful otherwise (since in the latter case they convey a
relatively small amount of information).
Of course the applications of group testing are not limited to blood sam-
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pling. To mention another early example, consider a production line of electric
items such as light bulbs (or resistors, capacitors, etc). As a part of the quality
assurance, defective items have to be identified and discarded. Group testing
can be used to aid this process. Suppose that a group of light bulbs are con-
nected in series, and an electric current is passed through the circuit. If all the
bulbs are illuminated, we can be sure than none is defective, and otherwise,
we know that at least one is defective.
Since its emergence decades ago, group testing has found a large number
of surprising applications that are too numerous to be extensively treated
here. We particularly refer to applications in molecular biology and DNA
library screening (cf. [18,58,102,113,130,163,164] and the references therein),
multiaccess communication [162], data compression [81], pattern matching
[37], streaming algorithms [38], software testing [14], compressed sensing [39],
and secure key distribution [26], among others. Moreover, entire books are
specifically targeted to combinatorial group testing [50,51].
In formal terms, the classical group testing problem can be described as
follows. Suppose that we wish to “learn” a Boolean vector of length n, namely
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n using as few questions as possible. Each question
can ask for a single bit xi, or more generally, specify a group of coordinates
I ⊆ [n] (I 6= ∅) and ask for the bit-wise “or” of the entries at the specified
coordinates; i.e.,
∨
i∈I xi. We will refer to this type of questions as disjunc-
tive queries. Obviously, in order to be able to uniquely identify x, there is in
general no better way than asking for individual bits x1, . . . , xn (and thus, n
questions), since the number of Boolean vectors of length n is 2n and thus,
information theoretically, n bits of information is required to describe an ar-
bitrary n-bit vector. Therefore, without imposing further restrictions on the
possible realizations of the unknown vector, the problem becomes trivial.
Motivated by the blood sampling application that we just described, natu-
ral restriction that is always assumed in group testing on the unknown vector
x is that it is sparse. Namely, for an integer parameter d > 0, we will assume
that the number of nonzero entries of x is at most d. We will refer to such a
vector as d-sparse. The number of d-sparse Boolean vectors is
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
= 2Θ(d log(n/d)),
and therefore, in principle, any d-sparse Boolean vector can be described using
only O(d log(n/d)) bits of information, a number that can be substantially
smaller than n if d n. The precise interpretation of the assumption “d n”
varies from a setting to another. For a substantial part of this chapter, one
can think of d = O(
√
n). The important question in group testing that we
will address in this chapter is that, whether the information-theoretic limit
Ω(d log(n/d)) on the number of questions can be achieved using disjunctive
queries as well.
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Notation for this chapter: In this chapter we will be constantly work-
ing with Boolean vectors and their support. The support of a vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, denoted by supp(x), is a subset of [n] such that i ∈
supp(x) if and only if xi = 1. Thus the Hamming weight of x, that we will
denote by wgt(x) can be defined as wgt(x) = |supp(x)|, and a d-sparse vector
has the property that wgt(x) ≤ d.
For a matrix M , we denote by M [i, j] the entry of M at the ith row and jth
column. Moreover, we denote the ith entry of a vector x by x(i) (assuming a
one-to-one correspondence between the coordinate positions of x and natural
numbers). For an m × n Boolean matrix M and S ⊆ [n], we denote by M |S
the m × |S| submatrix of M formed by restricting M to the columns picked
by S.
For non-negative integers e0 and e1, we say that an ordered pair of binary
vectors (x, y), each in {0, 1}n, are (e0, e1)-close (or x is (e0, e1)-close to y) if y
can be obtained from x by flipping at most e0 bits from 0 to 1 and at most
e1 bits from 1 to 0. Hence, such x and y will be (e0 + e1)-close in Hamming-
distance. Further, (x, y) are called (e0, e1)-far if they are not (e0, e1)-close.
Note that if x and y are seen as characteristic vectors of subsets X and Y
of [n], respectively, they are (|Y \X|, |X \ Y |)-close. Furthermore, (x, y) are
(e0, e1)-close if and only if (y, x) are (e1, e0)-close.
4.1 Measurement Designs and Disjunct Matrices
Suppose that we wish to correctly identify a d-sparse vector x ∈ {0, 1}n using
a reasonable amount of disjunctive queries (that we will simply refer to as
“measurements”). In order to do so, consider first the following simple scheme:
1. If n ≤ 2d, trivially measure the vector by querying x1, . . . , xn individu-
ally.
2. Otherwise, partition the coordinates of x into b2dc blocks of length either
bn/(2d)c or dn/(2d)e each, and query the bitwise “or” of the positions
within each block.
3. At least half of the measurement outcomes must be negative, since the
vector x is d-sparse. Recursively run the measurements over the union
of those blocks that have returned positive.
In the above procedure, each recursive call reduces the length of the vec-
tor to half or less, which implies that the depth of the recursion is log(n/2d).
Moreover, since 2d measurements are made at each level, altogether we will
have O(d log(n/d)) measurements. Therefore, the simple scheme above is op-
timal in the sense that it attains the information-theoretic limit Ω(d log(n/d))
on the number of measurements, up to constant factors.
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The main problem with this scheme is that, the measurements are adaptive
in nature. That is, the choice of the coordinate positions defining each mea-
surement may depend on the outcomes of the previous measurements. How-
ever, the scheme can be seen as having O(log(n/d)) adaptive stages. Namely,
each level of the recursion consists of 2d queries whose choices depend on the
query outcomes of the previous levels, but otherwise do not depend on the
outcomes of one another and can be asked in parallel.
Besides being of theoretical interest, for certain application such as those
in molecular biology, adaptive schemes can be infeasible or too costly, and the
“amortized” cost per test can be substantially lowered when all queries are
specified and fixed before any measurements are performed. Thus, a basic
goal would be to design a measurement scheme that is fully non-adaptive so
that all measurements can be performed in parallel. The trivial scheme, of
course, is an example of a non-adaptive scheme that achieves n measurements.
The question is that, how close can one get to the information-theoretic limit
Ω(log(n/d)) using a fully non-adaptive scheme? In order to answer this ques-
tion, we must study the combinatorial structure of non-adaptive group testing
schemes.
Non-adaptive measurements can be conveniently thought of in a matrix
form, known as the measurement matrix , that is simply the incidence matrix
of the set of queries. Each query can be represented by a Boolean row vector
of length n that is the characteristic vector of the set of indices that partic-
ipate in the query. In particular, for a query that takes a subset I ⊆ [n] of
the coordinate positions, the corresponding vector representation would the
Boolean vector of length n that is supported on the positions picked by I.
Then the measurement matrix is obtained by arranging the vector encodings
on the individual queries as its rows. In particular, the measurement matrix
corresponding to a set of m non-adaptive queries will be the m × n Boolean
matrix that has a 1 at each position (i, j) if and only if the jth coordinate
participates in the ith query. Under this notation, the measurement outcomes
corresponding to a Boolean vector x ∈ {0, 1}n and an m × n measurement
matrix M is nothing but the Boolean vector of length m that is equal to the
bit-wise “or” of those columns of M picked by the support of x. We will
denote the vector of measurement outcomes by M [x]. For example, for the
measurement matrix
M :=

0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0

and Boolean vector x := (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), we have M [x] = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1),
which is the bit-wise “or” of the columns shown in boldface.
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Now suppose that the measurement matrix M is chosen so that it can be
used to distinguish between any two d-sparse vectors. In particular, for every
set S ⊆ [n] of indices such that |S| ≤ d − 1, d being the sparsity parameter,
the (d− 1)-sparse vector x ∈ {0, 1}n supported on S must be distinguishable
from the d-sparse vector x′ ∈ {0, 1}n supported on S ∪ {i}, for any arbitrary
index i ∈ [n] \ S. Now observe that the Boolean function “or” is monotone.
Namely, for a Boolean vector (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}n that is monotonically less
than or equal to another vector (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ {0, 1}n (i.e., for every j ∈ [n],
aj ≤ bj), it must be that ∨
j∈[n]
aj ≤
∨
j∈[n]
bj .
Therefore, since we have chosen x and x′ so that supp(x) ⊆ supp(x′), we must
have supp(M [x]) ⊆ supp(M [x′]). Since by assumption, M [x] and M [x′] must
differ in at least one position, at least one of the rows of M must have an
entry 1 at the ith row but all zeros at those corresponding to the set S. This
is the idea behind the classical notion of disjunct matrices, formally defined
below (in a slightly generalized form).
Definition 4.1. For integer parameters d, e ≥ 0 (respectively called the spar-
sity parameter and noise tolerance), a Boolean matrix is (d, e)-disjunct if for
every choice of d+ 1 distinct columns C0, C1, . . . , Cd of the matrix we have
|supp(C0) \ ∪di=1supp(Ci)| > e.
A (d, 0)-disjunct matrix is simply called d-disjunct.
In the discussion preceding the above definition we saw that the notion of
(d− 1)-disjunct matrices is necessary for non-adaptive group testing, in that
any non-adaptive measurement scheme must correspond to a (d− 1)-disjunct
matrix. It turns out that this notion is also sufficient, and thus precisely
captures the combinatorial structure needed for non-adaptive group testing.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that M is an m × n matrix that is (d, e)-disjunct.
Then for every pair of distinct d-sparse vectors x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that
supp(x) * supp(x′), we have
(4.1) |supp(M [x]) \ supp(M [x′])| > e.
Conversely, if M is such that (4.1) holds for every choice of x, x′ as above,
then it must be (d− 1, e)-disjunct.
Proof. For the forward direction, let S := supp(x′) and i ∈ supp(x) \ supp(x′).
Then Definition 4.1 implies that there is a set E ⊆ [m] of rows of M such
that |E| > e and for every j ∈ E, we have M [i, j] = 1 and the jth row of
M restricted to the columns in S (i.e., the support of x′) entirely consists of
zeros. Thus, the measurement outcomes for x′ at positions in E must be zeros
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while those measurements have a positive outcome for x (since they include at
least one coordinate, namely i, on the support of x). Therefore, (4.1) holds.
For the converse, consider any set S ⊆ [n] of size at most d − 1 and
i ∈ [n] \ S. Consider d-sparse vectors x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that supp(x′) := S
and supp(x) := S ∪ {i}. By assumption, there must be a set E ⊆ [m] of
size larger than e such that, for every j ∈ E, we have M [x](j) = 1 but
M [x′](j) = 0. This implies that on those rows of M that are picked by E,
the ith entry must be one while those corresponding to S must be zeros.
Therefore, M is (d, e)-disjunct.
From the above theorem we know that the measurement outcomes cor-
responding to distinct d-sparse vectors differ from one another in more than
e positions provided that the measurement matrix is (d, e)-disjunct. When
e > 0, this would allow for distinguishability of sparse vectors even in pres-
ence of noise. Namely, even if up to be/2c of the measurements are allowed
to be incorrect, it would still possible to uniquely reconstruct the vector be-
ing measured. For this reason, we have called the parameter e the “noise
tolerance”.
4.1.1 Reconstruction
So far we have focused on combinatorial distinguishability of sparse vectors.
However, for applications unique distinguishability is by itself not sufficient
and it is important to have efficient “decoding” algorithms to reconstruct the
vector being measured.
Fortunately, monotonicity of the “or” function substantially simplifies the
decoding problem. In particular, if two Boolean vectors x, x′ such that the
support of x is not entirely contained in that of x′ are distinguishable by
a measurement matrix, adding new elements to the support of x will never
make it “less disginguishable” from x′. Moreover, observe that the proof of
Theorem 4.2 never uses sparsity of the vector x. Therefore we see that, (d, e)-
disjunct matrices are not only able to distinguish between d-sparse vectors, but
moreover, the only Boolean vector (be it sparse or not) that may reproduce
the measurement outcomes resulting from a d-sparse vector x ∈ {0, 1}n is x
itself. Thus, given a vector of measurement outcomes, in order to reconstruct
the sparse vector being measured it suffices to produce any vector that is
consistent with the measurement outcomes. This observation leads us to the
following simple decoding algorithm, that we will call the distance decoder :
1. Given a measurement outcome y˜ ∈ {0, 1}m, identify the set Sy˜ ⊆ [n] of
the column indices of the measurement matrix M such that each i ∈ [n]
is in Sy˜ if and only if the ith column of M , denoted by ci, satisfies
|supp(ci) \ supp(y˜)| ≤ be/2c.
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2. The reconstruction outcome x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n is the Boolean vector supported
on Sy˜.
Lemma 4.3. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be d-sparse and y := M [x], where the mea-
surement matrix M is (d, e)-disjunct. Suppose that a measurement outcome
y˜ that has Hamming distance at most be/2c with y is given to the distance
decoder. Then the outcome x˜ of the decoder is equal to x.
Proof. Since the distance decoder allows for a “mismatch” of size up to e for
the columns picked by the set Sy˜, we surely know that supp(x) ⊆ Sy˜ = supp(x˜).
Now suppose that there is an index i ∈ [n] such that i ∈ Sy˜ but i /∈ supp(x).
Since M is (d, e)-disjunct, we know that for the ith column ci we have
|supp(ci) \ supp(y)| > e.
On the other hand, since i ∈ Sy˜, it must be that
|supp(ci) \ supp(y˜)| ≤ be/2c,
and moreover, by assumption we have that
|supp(y˜) \ supp(y)| ≤ be/2c.
This is a contradiction. Therefore we must have Sy˜ ⊆ supp(x), implying that
x = x˜.
4.1.2 Bounds on Disjunct Matrices
So far we have seen that the notion of disjunct matrices is all we need for
non-adaptive group testing. But how small can the number of rows of such
matrices be? Equivalently, what is the smallest number of measurements
required by a non-adaptive group testing scheme that can correctly identify
the support of d-sparse vectors?
4.1.2.1 Upper and Lower Bounds
In the following, we use the probabilistic method to show that, a randomly
constructed matrix is with overwhelming probability disjunct, and thus obtain
an upperbound on the number of the rows of disjunct matrices.
Theorem 4.4. Let p ∈ [0, 1) be an arbitrary real parameter, and d, n be
integer parameters such that d < n. Consider a random m × n Boolean
matrix M such that each entry of M is, independently, chosen to be 1 with
probability q := 1/d. Then there is an m0 = O(d
2 log(n/d)/(1 − p)2) and
e = Ω(pm/d) such that M is (d, e)-disjunct with probability 1−o(1) provided
that m ≥ m0.
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Proof. Consider any set S of d columns of M , and any column outside those,
say the ith column where i /∈ S. First we upper bound the probability of a
failure for this choice of S and i, i.e., the probability that the number of the
positions at the ith column corresponding to which all the columns in S have
zeros is at most e. Clearly if this event happens the (d, e)-disjunct property of
M would be violated. On the other hand, if for no choice of S and i a failure
happens the matrix would be indeed (d, e)-disjunct.
Now we compute the failure probability pf for a fixed S and i. A row
is good if at that row the ith column has a 1 but all the columns in S have
zeros. For a particular row, the probability that the row is good is q(1− q)d.
Then failure corresponds to the event that the number of good rows is at
most e. The distribution of the number of good rows is binomial with mean
µ = q(1− q)dm. Choose e := pmq(1− q)d = Ω(pm/d). By a Chernoff bound,
the failure probability is at most
pf ≤ exp(−(µ− e)2/(2µ))
≤ exp(−mq(1− p)2/6)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that (1 − q)d = (1 − 1/d)d is
always between 1/3 and 1/2.
Now if we apply a union bound over all possible choices of S and i, the
probability of coming up with a bad choice of M would be at most
n
(
n
d
)
exp(−mq(1− p)2/6).
This probability vanishes so long asm ≥ m0 for somem0 = O(d2 log(n/d)/(1−
p)2).
The above result shows, in particular, that d-disjunct matrices with n
columns and O(d2 log(n/d)) rows exist. This is by off from the information-
theoretic barrier O(d log(n/d)) by a multiplicative factor O(d), which raises
the question, whether better disjunct matrices can be found. In the literature
of group testing, combinatorial lower bounds on the number of rows of disjunct
matrices exist, which show that the above upper bound is almost the best one
can hope for. In particular, D’yachkov and Rykov [54] have shown that the
number of rows of any d-disjunct matrices has to be Ω(d2 logd n). Several
other concrete lower bounds on the size of disjunct matrices is known, which
are all asymptotically equivalent (e.g., [63,129]). Moreover, for a nonzero noise
tolerance e, the lower bounds can be extended to Ω(d2 logd n+ ed).
4.1.2.2 The Fixed-Input Case
The probabilistic construction of disjunct matrices presented in Theorem 4.4
almost surely produces a disjunct matrices using O(d2 log(n/d)) measure-
ments. Obviously, due to almost-matching lower bounds, by lowering the
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number of the measurement the disjunctness property cannot be assured any-
more. However, the randomized nature of the designs can be used to our
benefit to show that, using merely O(d log n) measurements (almost match-
ing the information-theoretic lower bound) it is possible (with overwhelming
probability) to distinguish a “fixed” d-sparse vector from any other (not nec-
essarily sparse) vector. More precisely we have the following result, whose
proof is quite similar to that of Theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.5. Let p ∈ [0, 1) be an arbitrary real parameter, d, n be integer
parameters such that d < n, and x ∈ {0, 1}n be a fixed d-sparse vector.
Consider a random m × n Boolean matrix M such that each entry of M
is, independently, chosen to be 1 with probability q := 1/d. Then there is an
m0 = O(d(log n)/(1−p)2) and e = Ω(pm/d) such that, provided that m ≥ m0,
with probability 1 − o(1) the following holds: For every y ∈ {0, 1}n, y 6= x,
the Hamming distance between the outcomes M [y] and M [x] is greater than
e.
Proof. We follow essentially the same argument as the proof of Theorem 4.4,
but will need a weaker union bound at the end. Call a column i of M good if
there are more than e rows of M at which the ith column has a 1 but those
on the support of x (excluding the ith column) have zeros. Now we can follow
the argument in the proof of Theorem 4.4 to show that under the conditions
of the theorem, with probability 1−o(1), all columns of M are good (the only
difference is that, the last union bound will enumerate a set of n possibilities
rather than (n− 1)(nd)).
Now suppose that for the particular outcome of M all columns are good,
and take any y ∈ {0, 1}n, y 6= x. One of the following cases must be true,
and in either case, we show that M [x] and M [y] are different at more than e
positions:
1. There is an i ∈ supp(y) \ supp(x): Since the ith column is good, we
know that for more than e rows of M , the entry at the ith column is
1 while those at supp(x) are all zeros. This implies that at positions
corresponding to such rows, M [y] must be 1 but M [x] must be zero.
2. We have supp(y) ⊆ supp(x): In this case, take any i ∈ supp(x) \ supp(y),
and again use the fact that the ith column is good to conclude that at
more than e positions the outcome M [y] must be zero but M [x] must
be 1.
As a corollary, the above theorem shows that, with overwhelming proba-
bility, once we fix the outcome of the random matrix M constructed by the
theorem, the matrix M will be able to distinguish between most d-sparse vec-
tors even in presence of any up to be/2c incorrect measurement outcomes.
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In particular, we get an average-case result, that there is a fixed measure-
ment scheme with only O(d log n) measurements using which it is possible to
uniquely reconstruct a randomly chosen d-sparse vector (e.g., under the uni-
form distribution) with overwhelming probability over the distribution from
which the sparse vector is drawn.
4.1.2.3 Sparsity of the Measurements
The probabilistic construction of Theorem 4.4 results in a rather sparse matrix,
namely, one with density q = 1/d that decays with the sparsity parameter d.
Below we show that sparsity is a necessary condition for the probabilistic
construction to work at an optimal level on the number of measurements:
Lemma 4.6. Let M be an m × n Boolean random matrix, where m =
O(d2 log n) for an integer d > 0, which is constructed by setting each en-
try independently to 1 with probability q. Then either q = O(log d/d) or
otherwise the probability that M is (d, e)-disjunct (for any e ≥ 0) approaches
to zero as n grows.
Proof. Suppose thatM is anm×nmatrix that is (d, e)-disjunct. Observe that,
for any integer t ∈ (0, d), if we remove any t columns of M and all the rows on
the support of those columns, the matrix must remain (d− t, e)-disjunct. This
is because any counterexample for the modified matrix being (d−t, e)-disjunct
can be extended to a counterexample for M being (d, e)-disjunct by adding
the removed columns to its support.
Now consider any t columns of M , and denote by m0 the number of rows
of M at which the entries corresponding to the chosen columns are all zeros.
The expected value of m0 is (1− q)tm. Moreover, for any constant δ > 0 we
have
(4.2) Pr[m0 > (1 + δ)(1− q)tm] ≤ exp(−δ2(1− q)tm/4)
by a Chernoff bound.
Let t0 be the largest integer for which
(1 + δ)(1− q)t0m ≥ log n.
If t0 < d − 1, we let t := 1 + t0 above, and this makes the right hand side
of (4.2) upper bounded by o(1). So with probability 1 − o(1), the chosen t
columns of M will keep m0 at most (1 + δ)(1 − q)tm, and removing those
columns and m0 rows on their union leaves the matrix (d− t0− 1, e)-disjunct,
which obviously requires at least log n rows (as even a (1, 0)-disjunct matrix
needs so many rows). Therefore, we must have
(1 + δ)(1− q)tm ≥ log n
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or otherwise (with overwhelming probability) M will not be (d, e)-disjunct.
But the latter inequality is not satisfied by the assumption on t0. So if t0 <
d− 1, little chance remains for M to be (d, e)-disjunct.
Now consider the case t0 ≥ d− 1. Thus, by the choice of t0, we must have
(1 + δ)(1− q)d−1m ≥ log n.
The above inequality implies that we must have
q ≤ log(m(1 + δ)/ log n)
d− 1 ,
which, for m = O(d2 log n) gives q = O(log d/d).
4.2 Noise resilient schemes and approximate
reconstruction
So far, we have introduced the notion of (d, e)-disjunct matrices that can be
used in non-adaptive group testing schemes to identify d-sparse vectors up to
a number of measurement errors depending on the parameter e. However, as
the existing lower bounds suggest, the number of rows of such matrices cannot
reach to the information-theoretic optimum O(d log(n/d)) and moreover, the
noise tolerance e can be at most a factor 1/d of the number of measurements.
This motivates two natural questions:
1. Can the number of measurements be lowered at the cost of causing
a slight amount of “confusion”? We know, by Theorem 4.5 that, it
is possible to identify sparse vectors on average using only O(d log n)
measurements. But can something be said in the worst case ?
2. What can be said if the amount of possible errors can be substantially
high; e.g., when a constant fraction of the measurements can produce
false outcomes?
In order to answer the above questions, in this section we introduce a no-
tion of measurement schemes that can be “more flexible” than that of disjunct
matrices, and aims to study the trade-off between the amount of errors ex-
pected on the measurements versus the ambiguity of the reconstruction. More
formally we define the following notion.
Definition 4.7. Let m,n, d, e0, e1, e
′
0, e
′
1 be integers. An m× n measurement
matrix A is called (e0, e1, e
′
0, e
′
1)-resilient for d-sparse vectors if, for every y ∈
{0, 1}m there exists z ∈ {0, 1}n (called a valid decoding of y) such that for
every x ∈ {0, 1}n, whenever (x, z) are (e′0, e′1)-far, (A[x], y) are (e0, e1)-far1.
1 In particular this means that for every x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, if (A[x], A[x′]) are (e0, e1)-close,
then x and x′ must be (e′0 + e
′
1, e
′
0 + e
′
1)-close.
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The matrix A is called explicit if it can be computed in polynomial time
in its size, and fully explicit if each entry of the matrix can be computed in
time poly(m, log n).
Intuitively, the definition states that two measurements are allowed to be
confused only if they are produced from close vectors. The parameters e0
and e′0 correspond to amount of tolerable false positives on the measurement
outcomes and reconstructed vector, where by false positive we mean an error
caused by mistaking a 0 for 1. Similarly, e1 and e
′
1 define the amount of
tolerable false negatives on both sides, where a false negative occurs when a
bit that actually must be 1 is flipped to 0.
In particular, an (e0, e1, e
′
0, e
′
1)-resilient matrix gives a group testing scheme
that reconstructs the sparse vector up to e′0 false positives and e′1 false neg-
atives even in the presence of e0 false positives and e1 false negatives in the
measurement outcome. Under this notation, unique (exact) decoding would
be possible using an (e0, e1, 0, 0)-resilient matrix if the amount of measure-
ment errors is bounded by at most e0 false positives and e1 false negatives.
However, when e′0 + e′1 is positive, decoding may require a bounded amount
of ambiguity, namely, up to e′0 false positives and e′1 false negatives in the
decoded sequence.
Observe that the special case of (0, 0, 0, 0)-resilient matrices corresponds
to the classical notion of d-disjunct matrices, while a (d, e)-disjunct matrix
would give a (be/2c, be/2c, 0, 0)-resilient matrix for d-sparse vectors.
Definition 4.7 is in fact reminiscent of list-decoding in error-correcting
codes, but with the stronger requirement that the list of decoding possibilities
must consist of vectors that are close to one another.
4.2.1 Negative Results
In coding theory, it is possible to construct codes that can tolerate up to a
constant fraction of adversarially chosen errors and still guarantee unique de-
coding. Hence it is natural to wonder whether a similar possibility exists in
group testing, namely, whether there is a measurement matrix that is robust
against a constant fraction of adversarial errors and still recovers the mea-
sured vector exactly. We already have mentioned that this is in general not
possible, since any (d, e)-disjunct matrix (a notion that is necessary for this
task) requires at least de rows, and thus the fraction of tolerable errors by
disjunct matrices cannot be above 1/d. Below we extend this result to the
more “asymmetric” notion of resilient matrices, and show that the fraction of
tolerable false positives and false negatives must be both below 1/d.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that an m×n measurement matrix M is (e0, e1, e′0, e′1)-
resilient for d-sparse vectors. Then (max{e0, e1}+ 1)/(e′0 + e′1 + 1) ≤ m/d.
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Proof. We use similar arguments as those used in [20, 75] in the context of
black-box hardness amplification in NP: Define a partial ordering ≺ between
binary vectors using bit-wise comparisons (with 0 < 1). Let t := d/(e′0+e′1+1)
be an integer2, and consider any monotonically increasing sequence of vectors
x0 ≺ · · · ≺ xt in {0, 1}n where xi has weight i(e′0 + e′1 + 1). Thus, x0 and
xt will have weights zero and d, respectively. Note that we must also have
M [x0] ≺ · · · ≺M [xt] due to monotonicity of the “or” function.
A fact that is directly deduced from Definition 4.7 is that, for every x, x′ ∈
{0, 1}n, if (M [x],M [x′]) are (e0, e1)-close, then x and x′ must be (e′0 + e′1, e′0 +
e′1)-close. This can be seen by setting y := M [x′] in the definition, for which
there exists a valid decoding z ∈ {0, 1}n. As (M [x], y) are (e0, e1)-close, the
definition implies that (x, z) must be (e′0, e′1)-close. Moreover, (M [x′], y) are
(0, 0)-close and thus, (e0, e1)-close, which implies that (z, x
′) must be (e′1, e′0)-
close. Thus by the triangle inequality, (x, x′) must be (e′0 + e′1, e′0 + e′1)-close.
Now, observe that for all i, (xi, xi+1) are (e
′
0 + e
′
1, e
′
0 + e
′
1)-far, and hence,
their encodings must be (e0, e1)-far, by the fact we just mentioned. In partic-
ular this implies that M [xt] must have weight at least t(e0 +1), which must be
trivially upper bounded by m. Hence it follows that (e0 + 1)/(e
′
0 + e
′
1 + 1) ≤
m/d. Similarly we can also show that (e1 + 1)/(e
′
0 + e
′
1 + 1) ≤ m/d.
As shown by the lemma above, tolerance of a measurement matrix against
a constant fraction of errors would make an ambiguity of order Ω(d) in the
decoding inevitable, irrespective of the number of measurements. For most
applications this might be an unsatisfactory situation, as even a close estimate
of the set of positives might not reveal whether any particular individual is
defective or not, and in certain scenarios (such as an epidemic disease or in-
dustrial quality assurance) it is unacceptable to miss any defective individuals.
This motivates us to focus on approximate reconstructions with one-sided er-
ror. Namely, we will require the support of the reconstruction xˆ to always
contain the support of the original vector x being measured, and be possibly
larger by up to O(d) positions. It can be argued that, for most applications,
such a scheme is as good as exact reconstruction, as it allows one to signif-
icantly narrow-down the set of defectives to up to O(d) candidate positives.
In particular, as observed in [93], one can use a second stage if necessary and
individually test the resulting set of candidates, using more reliable measure-
ments, to identify the exact set of positives. In the literature, such schemes
are known as trivial two-stage schemes.
The trade-off given by the following lemma only focuses on false negatives
and is thus useful for trivial two-stage schemes:
2For the sake of simplicity in this presentation we ignore the fact that certain fractions
might in general give non-integer values. However, it should be clear that this will cause no
loss of generality.
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Lemma 4.9. Suppose that an m×n measurement matrix M is (e0, e1, e′0, e′1)-
resilient for d-sparse vectors. Then for every  > 0, either
e1 <
(e′1 + 1)m
d
or
e′0 ≥
(1− )(n− d+ 1)
(e′1 + 1)2
.
Proof. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be chosen uniformly at random among vectors of weight
d. Randomly flip e′1 + 1 of the bits on the support of x to 0, and denote the
resulting vector by x′. Using the partial ordering ≺ in the proof of the last
lemma, it is obvious that x′ ≺ x, and hence, M [x′] ≺M [x]. Let b denote any
disjunction of a number of coordinates in x and b′ the same disjunction in x′.
We must have
Pr[b′ = 0|b = 1] ≤ e
′
1 + 1
d
,
as for b to be 1 at least one of the variables on the support of x must be
present in the disjunction and one particular such variable must necessarily
be flipped to bring the value of b′ down to zero. Using this, the expected
Hamming distance between M [x] and M [x′] can be bounded as follows:
E[dist(M [x],M [x′])] =
∑
i∈[m]
1(M [x]i = 1 ∧M [x′]i = 0) ≤ e
′
1 + 1
d
·m,
where the expectation is over the randomness of x and the bit flips, dist(·, ·)
denotes the Hamming distance between two vectors, and 1(·) denotes an in-
dicator predicate.
Fix a particular choice of x′ that keeps the expectation at most (e′1+1)m/d.
Now the randomness is over the possibilities of x, that is, flipping up to e′1 + 1
zero coordinates of x′ randomly. Denote by X the set of possibilities of x
for which M [x] and M [x′] are (e
′
1+1)m
d -close, and by S the set of all vectors
that are monotonically larger than x′ and are (e′1 + 1)-close to it. Obviously,
X ⊆ S, and, by Markov’s inequality, we know that |X | ≥ (1− )|S|.
Let z be any valid decoding of M [x′], Thus, (x′, z) must be (e′0, e′1)-close.
Now assume that e1 ≥ (e
′
1+1)m
d and consider any x ∈ X . Hence, (M [x],M [x′])
are (e0, e1)-close and (x, z) must be (e
′
0, e
′
1)-close by Definition 4.7. Regard
x, x′, z as the characteristic vectors of sets X,X ′, Z ⊆ [n], respectively, where
X ′ ⊆ X. We know that |X \ Z| ≤ e′1 and |X \X ′| = e′1 + 1. Therefore,
(4.3) |(X \X ′) ∩ Z| = |X \X ′| − |X \ Z|+ |X ′ \ Z| > 0,
and z must take at least one nonzero coordinate from supp(x) \ supp(x′).
Now we construct an (e′1 + 1)-hypergraph3 H as follows: The vertex set is
[n] \ supp(x′), and for every x ∈ X , we put a hyperedge containing supp(x) \
3See Appendix 4.A for definitions.
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supp(x′). The density of this hypergraph is at least 1 − , by the fact that
|X | ≥ (1 − )S. Now Lemma 4.34 implies that H has a matching of size at
least
t :=
(1− )(n− d+ 1)
(e′1 + 1)2
.
As by (4.3), supp(z) must contain at least one element from the vertices in
each hyperedge of this matching, we conclude that |supp(z) \ supp(x′)| ≥ t,
and that e′0 ≥ t.
The lemma above shows that if one is willing to keep the number e′1 of false
negatives in the reconstruction at the zero level (or bounded by a constant),
only an up to O(1/d) fraction of false negatives in the measurements can be
tolerated (regardless of the number of measurements), unless the number e′0
of false positives in the reconstruction grows to an enormous amount (namely,
Ω(n) when n− d = Ω(n)) which is certainly undesirable.
Recall that exact reconstruction of d-sparse vectors of length n, even in a
noise-free setting, requires at least Ω(d2 logd n) non-adaptive measurements.
However, it turns out that there is no such restriction when an approximate
reconstruction is sought for, except for the following bound which can be
shown using simple counting and holds for adaptive noiseless schemes as well:
Lemma 4.10. Let M be an m× n measurement matrix that is (0, 0, e′0, e′1)-
resilient for d-sparse vectors. Then
m ≥ d log(n/d)− d− e′0 −O(e′1 log((n− d− e′0)/e′1)),
where the last term is defined to be zero for e′1 = 0.
Proof. The proof is a simple counting argument. For integers a > b > 0,
we use the notation V (a, b) for the volume of a Hamming ball of radius b in
{0, 1}a. It is given by
V (a, b) =
b∑
i=0
(
a
i
)
≤ 2ah(b/a),
where h(·) is the binary entropy function defined as
h(x) := −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x),
and thus
log V (a, b) ≤ b log a
b
+ (a− b) log a
a− b = Θ(b log(a/b)).
Also, denote by V ′(a, b, e0, e1) the number of vectors in {0, 1}a that are (e0, e1)-
close to a fixed b-sparse vector. Obviously, V ′(a, b, e0, e1) ≤ V (b, e0)V (a −
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b, e1). Now consider any (without loss of generality, deterministic) reconstruc-
tion algorithm D and let X denote the set of all vectors in {0, 1}n that it
returns for some noiseless encoding; that is,
X := {x ∈ {0, 1}n | ∃y ∈ B, x = D(A[y])},
where B is the set of d-sparse vectors in {0, 1}n. Notice that all vectors in X
must be (d+e′0)-sparse, as they have to be close to the corresponding “correct”
decoding. For each vector x ∈ X and y ∈ B, we say that x is matching to
y if (y, x) are (e′0, e′1)-close. A vector x ∈ X can be matching to at most
v := V ′(n, d+ e′0, e′0, e′1) vectors in B, and we upper bound log v as follows:
log v ≤ log V (n−d−e′0, e′1)+log V (d+e′0, e′0) = O(e′1 log((n−d−e′0)/e′1))+d+e′0,
where the term inside O(·) is interpreted as zero when e′1 = 0. Moreover,
every y ∈ B must have at least one matching vector in X, namely, D(M [y]).
This means that |X| ≥ |B|/v, and that
log |X| ≥ log |B| − log v ≥ d log(n/d)− d− e′0 −O(e′1 log((n− d− e′0)/e′1)).
Finally, we observe that the number of measurements has to be at least |X|
to enable D to output all the vectors in X.
According to the lemma, even in the noiseless scenario, any reconstruction
method that returns an approximation of the sparse vector up to e′0 = O(d)
false positives and without false negatives will require Ω(d log(n/d)) measure-
ments. As we will show in the next section, an upper bound of O(d log n)
is in fact attainable even in a highly noisy setting using only non-adaptive
measurements. This in particular implies an asymptotically optimal trivial
two-stage group testing scheme.
4.2.2 A Noise-Resilient Construction
In this section we introduce our general construction and design measurement
matrices for testing d-sparse vectors in {0, 1}n. The matrices can be seen as
adjacency matrices of certain unbalanced bipartite graphs constructed from
good randomness condensers or extractors. The main technique that we use to
show the desired properties is the list-decoding view of randomness condensers,
extractors, and expanders, developed over the recent years starting from the
work of Ta-Shma and Zuckerman on extractor codes [149] and followed by
Guruswami, Umans, Vadhan [78] and Vadhan [155].
4.2.2.1 Construction from Condensers
We start by introducing the terms and tools that we will use in our construc-
tion and its analysis.
92 CHAPTER 4. GROUP TESTING
Definition 4.11. (mixtures, agreement, and agreement list) Let Σ be a finite
set. A mixture over Σn is an n-tuple S := (S1, . . . , Sn) such that every Si,
i ∈ [n], is a nonempty subset of Σ.
The agreement of w := (w1, . . . wn) ∈ Σn with S, denoted by Agr(w, S), is
the quantity
1
n
|{i ∈ [n] : wi ∈ Si}|.
Moreover, we define the quantity
wgt(S) :=
∑
i∈[n]
|Si|
and
ρ(S) := wgt(S)/(n|Σ|),
where the latter is the expected agreement of a random vector with S.
For example, consider a mixture S := (S1, . . . , S8) over [4]
8 where S1 :=
∅, S2 := {1, 3}, S3 := {1, 2}, S4 := {1, 4}, S5 := {1}, S6 := {3}, S7 := {4}, S8 :=
{1, 2, 3, 4}. For this example, we have
Agr((1, 3, 2, 3, 4, 3, 4, 4), S) = 5/8,
and ρ(S) = 13/32.
For a code C ⊆ Σn and α ∈ (0, 1], the α-agreement list of C with respect
to S, denoted by LISTC(S, α), is defined as the set4
LISTC(S, α) := {c ∈ C : Agr(c, S) > α}.
Definition 4.12. (induced code) Let f : Γ × Ω → Σ be a function mapping
a finite set Γ × Ω to a finite set Σ. For x ∈ Γ, we use the shorthand f(x) to
denote the vector y := (yi)i∈Ω, yi := f(x, i), whose coordinates are indexed by
the elements of Ω in a fixed order. The code induced by f , denoted by C(f) is
the set
{f(x) : x ∈ Γ}.
The induced code has a natural encoding function given by x 7→ f(x).
Definition 4.13. (codeword graph) Let C ⊆ Σn, |Σ| = q, be a q-ary code.
The codeword graph of C is a bipartite graph with left vertex set C and right
vertex set n × Σ, such that for every x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C, there is an edge
between x on the left and (1, x1), . . . , (n, xn) on the right. The adjacency
matrix of the codeword graph is an n|Σ| × |C| binary matrix whose (i, j)th
entry is 1 if and only if there is an edge between the ith right vertex and the
jth left vertex.
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Figure 4.1: A function f : {0, 1}4× [3]→ {0, 1} with its truth table (top left),
codeword graph of the induced code (right), and the adjacency matrix of the
graph (bottom left). Solid, dashed and dotted edges in the graph respectively
correspond to the choices y = 1, y = 2, and y = 3 of the second argument.
A simple example of a function with its truth table, codeword graph of
the induced code along with its adjacency matrix is given in Figure 4.1.
The following theorem is a straightforward generalization of the result in
[149] that is also shown in [78] (we have included a proof for completeness):
Theorem 4.14. Let f : {0, 1}n˜ × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}˜` be a strong k → k′ con-
denser, and C ⊆ Σ2t be its induced code, where Σ := {0, 1}˜`. Then for any
mixture S over Σ2
t
we have
|LISTC(S, ρ(S)2˜`−k′ + )| < 2k.
Proof. Index the coordinates of S by the elements of {0, 1}t and denote the
ith coordinate by Si. Let Y be any random variable with min-entropy at least
t+ k′ distributed on Ft+k
′
2 . Define an information-theoretic test T : {0, 1}˜`×
{0, 1}t → {0, 1} as follows: T (x, i) = 1 if and only if x ∈ Si. Observe that
Pr[T (Y ) = 1] ≤ wgt(S)2−(t+k′) = ρ(S)2˜`−k′ ,
4When α = 1, we consider codewords with full agreement with the mixture.
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and that for every vector w ∈ ({0, 1}`)2t ,
Pr
i∼Ut
[T (wi, i) = 1] = Agr(w, S).
Now, let the random variable X = (X1, . . . , X2t) be uniformly distributed on
the codewords in LISTC(S, ρ(S)2
˜`−k′ + ) and Z ∼ Ut. Thus, from Defini-
tion 4.11 we know that
Pr
X,Z
[T (XZ , Z) = 1] > ρ(S)2
˜`−k′ + .
As the choice of Y was arbitrary, this implies that T is able to distinguish
between the distribution of (Z,X) and any distribution on {0, 1}t+˜` with min-
entropy at least t + k′, with bias greater than , which by the definition of
condensers implies that the min-entropy of X must be less than k, or
|LISTC(S, ρ(S)2˜`−k′ + )| < 2k.
Now using the above tools, we are ready to describe and analyze our
construction of error-resilient measurement matrices. We first state a general
result without specifying the parameters of the condenser, and then instantiate
the construction with various choices of the condenser, resulting in matrices
with different properties.
Theorem 4.15. Let f : {0, 1}n˜ × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}˜` be a strong k → k′ con-
denser, and C be its induced code. Suppose that the parameters p, ν, γ > 0
are chosen so that
(p+ γ)2
˜`−k′ + ν/γ < 1− ,
and d := γ2
˜`
. Then the adjacency matrix of the codeword graph of C (which
has m := 2t+
˜`
rows and n := 2n˜ columns) is a (pm, (ν/d)m, 2k − d, 0)-resilient
measurement matrix for d-sparse vectors. Moreover, it allows for a reconstruc-
tion algorithm with running time O(mn).
Proof. Define L := 2
˜`
and T := 2t. Let M be the adjacency matrix of the
codeword graph of C. It immediately follows from the construction that the
number of rows of M (denoted by m) is equal to TL. Moreover, notice that
the Hamming weight of each column of M is exactly T .
Let x ∈ {0, 1}n and denote by y ∈ {0, 1}m its encoding, i.e., y := M [x],
and by yˆ ∈ {0, 1}m a received word, or a noisy version of y.
The encoding of x can be schematically viewed as follows: The coefficients
of x are assigned to the left vertices of the codeword graph and the encoded
bit on each right vertex is the bitwise “or” of the values of its neighbors.
The coordinates of x can be seen in one-to-one correspondence with the
codewords of C. Let X ⊆ C be the set of codewords corresponding to the
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support of x. The coordinates of the noisy encoding yˆ are indexed by the
elements of [T ]× [L] and thus, yˆ naturally defines a mixture S = (S1, . . . , ST )
over [L]T , where Si contains j iff yˆ at position (i, j) is 1.
Observe that ρ(S) is the relative Hamming weight (denoted below by δ(·))
of yˆ; thus, we have
ρ(S) = δ(yˆ) ≤ δ(y) + p ≤ d/L+ p = γ + p,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that the relative weight of each
column of M is exactly 1/L and that x is d-sparse.
Furthermore, from the assumption we know that the number of false nega-
tives in the measurement is at most νTL/d = νT/γ. Therefore, any codeword
in X must have agreement at least 1 − ν/γ with S. This is because S is in-
deed constructed from a mixture of the elements in X, modulo false positives
(that do not decrease the agreement) and at most νT/γ false negatives each
of which can reduce the agreement by at most 1/T .
Accordingly, we consider a decoder which, similar to the distance decoder
that we have introduced before, simply outputs a binary vector xˆ supported
on the coordinates corresponding to those codewords of C that have agreement
larger than 1− ν/γ with S. Clearly, the running time of the decoder is linear
in the size of the measurement matrix.
By the discussion above, xˆ must include the support of x. Moreover,
Theorem 4.14 applies for our choice of parameters, implying that xˆ must have
weight less than 2k.
4.2.2.2 Instantiations
Now we instantiate the general result given by Theorem 4.15 with various
choices of the underlying condenser, among the results discussed in Section 2.3,
and compare the obtained parameters. First, we consider two extreme cases,
namely, a non-explicit optimal condenser with zero overhead (i.e., extractor)
and then a non-explicit optimal condenser with zero loss (i.e., lossless con-
denser) and then consider how known explicit constructions can approach the
obtained bounds. A summary of the obtained results is given in Table 4.1.
Optimal Extractors
Recall Radhakrishan and Ta-Shma’s non-constructive bound that for every
choice of the parameters k, n˜, , there is a strong (k, )-extractor with input
length n˜, seed length t = log(n˜ − k) + 2 log(1/) + O(1) and output length
˜`= k−2 log(1/)−O(1), and that the bound is achieved by a random function.
Plugging this result in Theorem 4.15, we obtain a non-explicit measurement
matrix from a simple, randomized construction that achieves the desired trade-
off with high probability:
96 CHAPTER 4. GROUP TESTING
Table 4.1: A summary of constructions in Section 4.2.2. The parameters
α ∈ [0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1] are arbitrary constants, m is the number of measure-
ments, e0 (resp., e1) the number of tolerable false positives (resp., negatives)
in the measurements, and e′0 is the number of false positives in the recon-
struction. The fifth column shows whether the construction is explicit (Exp)
or randomized (Rnd), and the last column shows the running time of the
reconstruction algorithm.
Exp/ Rec.
m e0 e1 e
′
0 Rnd Time
O(d log n) αm Ω(m/d) O(d) Rnd O(mn)
O(d log n) Ω(m) Ω(m/d) δd Rnd O(mn)
O(d1+o(1) log n) αm Ω(m/d) O(d) Exp O(mn)
d · quasipoly(log n) Ω(m) Ω(m/d) δd Exp O(mn)
d · quasipoly(log n) αm Ω(m/d) O(d) Exp poly(m)
poly(d)poly(log n) poly(d)poly(log n) Ω(e0/d) δd Exp poly(m)
Corollary 4.16. For every choice of constants p ∈ [0, 1) and ν ∈ [0, ν0),
ν0 := (
√
5− 4p− 1)3/8, and positive integers d and n ≥ d, there is an m× n
measurement matrix, where m = O(d log n), that is (pm, (ν/d)m,O(d), 0)-
resilient for d-sparse vectors of length n and allows for a reconstruction algo-
rithm with running time O(mn).
Proof. For simplicity we assume that n = 2n˜ and d = 2d˜ for positive integers
n˜ and d˜. However, it should be clear that this restriction will cause no loss of
generality and can be eliminated with a slight change in the constants behind
the asymptotic notations.
We instantiate the parameters of Theorem 4.15 using an optimal strong
extractor. If ν = 0, we choose γ,  small constants such that γ +  < 1 − p.
Otherwise, we choose γ := 3
√
ν, which makes ν/γ =
3
√
ν2, and  < 1 − p −
3
√
ν− 3
√
ν2. (One can easily see that the right hand side of the latter inequality
is positive for ν < ν0). Hence, the condition p+ ν/γ < 1− − γ required by
Theorem 4.15 is satisfied.
Let r = 2 log(1/) + O(1) = O(1) be the entropy loss of the extractor
for error , and set up the extractor for min-entropy k = log d + log(1/γ) +
r, which means that K := 2k = O(d) and L := 2
˜`
= d/γ = O(d). Now
we can apply Theorem 4.15 and conclude that the measurement matrix is
(pm, (ν/d)m,O(d), 0)-resilient. The seed length required by the extractor is
t ≤ log n˜ + 2 log(1/) + O(1), which gives T := 2t = O(log n). Therefore, the
number of measurements will be m = TL = O(d log n).
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Optimal Lossless Condensers
Now we instantiate Theorem 4.15 with an optimal strong lossless condenser
with input length n˜, entropy requirement k, seed length t = log n˜+ log(1/) +
O(1) and output length ˜` = k + log(1/) + O(1). Thus we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.17. For positive integers n ≥ d and every constant δ > 0 there is
an m×n measurement matrix, where m = O(d log n), that is (Ω(m),Ω(1/d)m,
δd, 0)-resilient for d-sparse vectors of length n and allows for a reconstruction
algorithm with running time O(mn).
Proof. We will use the notation of Theorem 4.15 and apply it using an optimal
strong lossless condenser. This time, we set up the condenser with error
 := 12δ/(1 + δ) and min-entropy k such that K := 2
k = d/(1 − 2). As the
error is a constant, the overhead and hence 2
˜`−k will also be a constant. The
seed length is t = log(n˜/) + O(1), which makes T := 2t = O(log n). As
L := 2
˜`
= O(d), the number of measurements becomes m = TL = O(d log n),
as desired.
Moreover, note that our choice of K implies that K − d = δd. Thus we
only need to choose p and ν appropriately to satisfy the condition
(4.4) (p+ γ)L/K + ν/γ < 1− ,
where γ = d/L = K/(L(1 + δ)) is a constant, as required by the lemma.
Substituting for γ in (4.4) and after simple manipulations, we get the condition
pL/K + ν(L/K)(1 + δ) <
δ
2(1 + δ)
,
which can be satisfied by choosing p and ν to be appropriate positive constants.
Both results obtained in Corollaries 4.16 and 4.17 almost match the lower
bound of Lemma 4.10 for the number of measurements. However, we note the
following distinction between the two results: Instantiating the general con-
struction of Theorem 4.15 with an extractor gives us a sharp control over the
fraction of tolerable errors, and in particular, we can obtain a measurement
matrix that is robust against any constant fraction (bounded from 1) of false
positives. However, the number of potential false positives in the reconstruc-
tion will be bounded by some constant fraction of the sparsity of the vector
that cannot be made arbitrarily close to zero.
On the other hand, using a lossless condenser enables us to bring down the
number of false positives in the reconstruction to an arbitrarily small fraction
of d (which is, in light of Lemma 4.8, the best we can hope for), though it does
not give as good a control on the fraction of tolerable errors as in the extractor
case, though we still obtain resilience against the same order of errors.
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Recall that the simple divide-and-conquer adaptive construction given
in beginning the chapter consists of O(log(n/d)) non-adaptive stages, where
within each stage O(d) non-adaptive measurements are made, but the choice
of the measurements for each stage fully depends on all the previous out-
comes. By the lower bounds on the size of disjunct matrices, we know that
the number of non-adaptive rounds cannot be reduced to 1 without affecting
the total number of measurements by a multiplicative factor of Ω˜(d). How-
ever, our non-adaptive upper bounds (Corollaries 4.16 and 4.17) show that
the number of rounds can be reduced to 2, while preserving the total number
of measurements at O(d log n). In particular, in a two-stage scheme, the first
non-adaptive round would output an approximation of the d-sparse vector up
to O(d) false positive (even if the measurements are highly unreliable) and
the second round simply examines the O(d) possible positions using trivial
singleton measurements to pinpoint the exact support of the vector.
Applying the Guruswami-Umans-Vadhan’s Extractor
While Corollaries 4.16 and 4.17 give probabilistic constructions of noise-resi-
lient measurement matrices, certain applications require a fully explicit ma-
trix that is guaranteed to work. To that end, we need to instantiate Theo-
rem 4.15 with an explicit condenser. First, we use the nearly-optimal explicit
extractor of Guruswami, Umans and Vadhan (Theorem 2.24), that currently
gives the best trade-off for the range of parameters needed for our applica-
tion. Using this extractor, we obtain a similar trade-off as in Corollary 4.16,
except for a higher number of measurements which would be bounded by
O(2O(log
2 log d)d log n) = O(d1+o(1) log n).
Corollary 4.18. For every choice of constants p ∈ [0, 1) and ν ∈ [0, ν0),
ν0 := (
√
5− 4p − 1)3/8, and positive integers d and n ≥ d, there is a fully
explicit m× n measurement matrix, where
m = O(2O(log
2 log d)d log n) = O(d1+o(1) log n),
that is (pm, (ν/d)m,O(d), 0)-resilient for d-sparse vectors of length n and al-
lows for a reconstruction algorithm with running time O(mn).
Applying “Zig-Zag” Lossless Condenser
An important explicit construction of lossless condensers that has an almost
optimal output length is due to Capalbo et al. [23]. This construction borrows
the notion of “zig-zag products” that is a combinatorial tool for construction
of expander graphs as a major ingredient of the condenser. The following
theorem quotes a setting of this construction that is most useful for our ap-
plication:
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Theorem 4.19. [23] For every k ≤ n ∈ N,  > 0 there is an explicit k → k
condenser5 with seed length d = O(log3(n/)) and output length m = k +
log(1/) +O(1).
Combining Theorem 4.15 with the above condenser, we obtain a similar
result as in Corollary 4.17, except that the number of measurements would be
d2log
3(logn) = d · quasipoly(log n).
Corollary 4.20. For positive integers n ≥ d and every constant δ > 0 there
is a fully explicit m× n measurement matrix, where
m = d2log
3(logn) = d · quasipoly(log n),
that is (Ω(m),Ω(1/d)m, δd, 0)-resilient for d-sparse vectors of length n and
allows for a reconstruction algorithm with running time O(mn).
4.2.2.3 Measurements Allowing Sublinear Time Reconstruction
The naive reconstruction algorithm given by Theorem 4.15 works efficiently
in linear time in the size of the measurement matrix. However, for very sparse
vectors (i.e., d  n), it might be of practical importance to have a recon-
struction algorithm that runs in sublinear time in n, the length of the vec-
tor, and ideally, polynomial in the number of measurements, which is merely
poly(log n, d) if the number of measurements is optimal.
As shown in [149], if the code C in Theorem 4.14 is obtained from a strong
extractor constructed from a black-box pseudorandom generator (PRG), it is
possible to compute the agreement list (which is guaranteed by the theorem
to be small) more efficiently than a simple exhaustive search over all possible
codewords. In particular, in this case they show that LISTC(S, ρ(S)+) can be
computed in time poly(2t, 2
˜`
, 2k, 1/) (where t, ˜`, k,  are respectively the seed
length, output length, entropy requirement, and error of the extractor), which
can be much smaller than 2n˜ (n˜ being the input length of the extractor).
Currently two constructions of extractors from black-box PRGs are known:
Trevisan’s extractor [152] (as well as its improvement in [123]) and Shaltiel-
Umans’ extractor [134]. However, the latter can only extract a sub-constant
fraction of the min-entropy and is not suitable for our needs, albeit it requires
a considerably shorter seed than Trevisan’s extractor. Thus, here we only
consider Raz’s improvement of Trevisan’s extractor given in Theorem 2.20.
Using this extractor in Theorem 4.15, we obtain a measurement matrix for
which the reconstruction is possible in polynomial time in the number of
measurements; however, as the seed length required by this extractor is larger
than Theorem 2.24, we will now require a higher number of measurements
than before. Specifically, using Trevisan’s extractor, we get the following.
5Though not explicitly mentioned in [23], these condensers can be considered to be
strong.
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Corollary 4.21. For every choice of constants p ∈ [0, 1) and ν ∈ [0, ν0),
ν0 := (
√
5− 4p − 1)3/8, and positive integers d and n ≥ d, there is a fully
explicit m× n measurement matrix M that is (pm, (ν/d)m,O(d), 0)-resilient
for d-sparse vectors of length n, where
m = O(d2log
3 logn) = d · quasipoly(log n).
Furthermore, M allows for a reconstruction algorithm with running time
poly(m), which would be sublinear in n for d = O(nc) and a suitably small
constant c > 0.
On the condenser side, we observe that the strong lossless (and lossy)
condensers due to Guruswami et al. (given in Theorem 2.22) also allow ef-
ficient list-recovery. The code induced by this condenser is precisely a list-
decodable code due to Parvaresh and Vardy [118]. Thus, the efficient list
recovery algorithm of the condenser is merely the list-decoding algorithm for
this code6. Combined with Theorem 4.15, we can show that codeword graphs
of Parvaresh-Vardy codes correspond to good measurement matrices that al-
low sublinear time recovery, but with incomparable parameters to what we
obtained from Trevisan’s extractor (the proof is similar to Corollary 4.17):
Corollary 4.22. For positive integers n ≥ d and any constants δ, α > 0 there
is an m× n measurement matrix, where
m = O(d3+α+2/α(log n)2+2/α),
that is (Ω(e),Ω(e/d), δd, 0)-resilient for d-sparse vectors of length n, where
e := (log n)1+1/αd2+1/α.
Moreover, the matrix allows for a reconstruction algorithm with running time
poly(m).
We remark that we could also use a lossless condenser due to Ta-Shma et
al. [148] which is based on Trevisan’s extractor and also allows efficient list
recovery, but it achieves inferior parameters compared to Corollary 4.22.
4.2.2.4 Connection with List-Recoverability
Extractor codes that we used in Theorem 4.15 are instances of soft-decision
decodable codes7 that provide high list-decodability in “extremely noisy” sce-
narios. In fact it is not hard to see that good extractors or condensers are
6 For similar reasons, any construction of measurement matrices based on codeword
graphs of algebraic codes that are equipped efficient soft-decision decoding (including the
original Reed-Solomon based construction of Kautz and Singleton [89]) allow sublinear time
reconstruction.
7To be precise, here we are dealing with a special case of soft-decision decoding with
binary weights.
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required for our construction to carry through, as Theorem 4.14 can be shown
to hold, up to some loss in parameters, in the reverse direction as well (as
already shown by Ta-Shma and Zuckerman [149, Theorem 1] for the case of
extractors).
However, for designing measurement matrices for the noiseless (or low-
noise) case, it is possible to resort to the slightly weaker notion of list recover-
able codes. Formally, a code C of block length n˜ over an alphabet Σ is called
(α, d, ˜`)-list recoverable if for every mixture S over Σn˜ consisting of sets of
size at most d each, we have |LISTC(S, α)| ≤ ˜`. A simple argument similar
to Theorem 4.15 shows that the adjacency matrix of the codeword graph of
such a code with rate R gives a (log n)|Σ|/R × n measurement matrix8 for
d-sparse vectors in the noiseless case with at most ˜`− d false positives in the
reconstruction.
Ideally, a list-recoverable code with α = 1, alphabet size O(d), positive
constant rate, and list size ˜` = O(d) would give an O(d log n) × n matrix for
d-sparse vectors, which is almost optimal (furthermore, the recovery would
be possible in sublinear time if C is equipped with efficient list recovery).
However, no explicit construction of such a code is so far known.
Two natural choices of codes with good list-recoverability properties are
Reed-Solomon and Algebraic-Geometric codes, which in fact provide soft-
decision decoding with short list size (cf. [74]). However, while the list size is
polynomially bounded by n˜ and d, it can be much larger than O(d) that we
need for our application even if the rate is polynomially small in d.
On the other hand, it is shown in [77] that folded Reed-Solomon Codes are
list-recoverable with constant rate, but again they suffer from large alphabet
and list size9.
We also point out a construction of (α, d, d) list-recoverable codes (allowing
list recovery in time O(n˜d)) in [77] with rate polynomially small but alphabet
size exponentially large in d, from which they obtain superimposed codes.
4.2.2.5 Connection with the Bit-Probe Model and Designs
An important problem in data structures is the static set membership problem
in bit-probe model, which is the following: Given a set S of at most d elements
from a universe of size n, store the set as a string of length m such that any
query of the type “is x in S?” can be reliably answered by reading few bits of
the encoding. The query algorithm might be probabilistic, and be allowed to
err with a small one or two-sided error. Information theoretically, it is easy to
8For codes over large alphabets, the factor |Σ| in the number of rows can be improved
using concatenation with a suitable inner measurement matrix.
9As shown in [78], folded Reed-Solomon codes can be used to construct lossless con-
densers, which eliminates the list size problem. However, they give inferior parameters
compared to Parvaresh-Vardy codes used in Corollary 4.22.
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see that m = Ω(d log(n/d)) regardless of the bit-probe complexity and even if
a small constant error is allowed.
Remarkably, it was shown in [19] that the lower bound on m can be (non-
explicitly) achieved using only one bit-probe. Moreover, a part of their work
shows that any one-probe scheme with negative one-sided error  (where the
scheme only errs in case x /∈ S) gives a bd/c-superimposed code (and hence,
requires m = Ω(d2 log n) by [54]). It follows that from any such scheme one can
obtain a measurement matrix for exact reconstruction of sparse vectors, which,
by Lemma 4.8, cannot provide high resiliency against noise. The converse
direction, i.e., using superimposed codes to design bit-probe schemes does not
necessarily hold unless the error is allowed to be very close to 1. However,
in [19] combinatorial designs10 based on low-degree polynomials are used to
construct one bit-probe schemes with m = O(d2 log2 n) and small one-sided
error.
On the other hand, Kautz and Singleton [89] observed that the encoding of
a combinatorial design as a binary matrix corresponds to a superimposed code
(which is in fact slightly error-resilient). Moreover, they used Reed-Solomon
codes to construct a design, which in particular gives a d-superimposed code.
This is in fact the same design that is used in [19], and in our terminology, can
be regarded as the adjacency matrix of the codeword graph of a Reed-Solomon
code.
It is interesting to observe the intimate similarity between our framework
given by Theorem 4.15 and classical constructions of superimposed codes.
However, some key differences are worth mentioning. Indeed, both construc-
tions are based on codeword graphs of error-correcting codes. However, classi-
cal superimposed codes owe their properties to the large distance of the under-
lying code. On the other hand, our construction uses extractor and condenser
codes and does not give a superimposed code simply because of the substan-
tially low number of measurements. However, as shown in Theorem 4.15, they
are good enough for a slight relaxation of the notion of superimposed codes
because of their soft-decision list decodability properties, which additionally
enables us to attain high noise resilience and a considerably smaller number
of measurements.
Interestingly, Buhrman et al. [19] use randomly chosen bipartite graphs to
construct storage schemes with two-sided error requiring nearly optimal space
O(d log n), and Ta-Shma [147] later shows that expander graphs from lossless
condensers would be sufficient for this purpose. However, unlike schemes
with negative one-sided error, these schemes use encoders that cannot be
implemented by the “or” function and thus do not translate to group testing
schemes.
10 A design is a collection of subsets of a universe, each of the same size, such that the
pairwise intersection of any two subset is upper bounded by a prespecified parameter.
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4.3 The Threshold Model
A natural generalization of classical group testing, introduced by Damaschke
[42], considers the case where the measurement outcomes are determined by
a threshold predicate instead of logical “or”.
In particular, the threshold model is characterized by two integer param-
eters `, u such that 0 < ` ≤ u (that are considered to be fixed constants), and
each measurement outputs positive if the number of positives within the cor-
responding pool is at least u. On the other hand, if the number of positives
is less than `, the test returns negative, and otherwise the outcome can be
arbitrary. In this view, classical group testing corresponds to the special case
where ` = u = 1. In addition to being of theoretical interest, the threshold
model is interesting for applications, in particular in biology, where the mea-
surements have reduced or unpredictable sensitivity or may depend on various
factors that must be simultaneously present in the sample.
The difference g := u − ` between the thresholds is known as the gap
parameter. As shown by Damaschke [42], in threshold group testing identifi-
cation of the set of positives is only possible when the number of positives is at
least u. Moreover, regardless of the number of measurements, in general the
set of positives can only be identified within up to g false positives and g false
negatives (thus, unique identification can be guaranteed only when ` = u).
Additionally, Damaschke constructed a scheme for identification of the
positives in the threshold model. For the gap-free case where g = 0, the
number of measurements in this scheme is O((d + u2) log n), which is nearly
optimal (within constant factors). However, when g > 0, the number of
measurements becomes O(dnb + du), for an arbitrary constant b > 0, if up
to g + (u − 1)/b misclassifications are allowed. Moreover, Chang et al. [24]
have proposed a different scheme for the gap-free case that achieves O(d log n)
measurements.
A drawback of the scheme presented by Damaschke (as well as the one
by Chang et al.) is that the measurements are adaptive. As mentioned be-
fore, for numerous applications (in particular, molecular biology), adaptive
measurements are infeasible and must be avoided.
In this section, we consider the non-adaptive threshold testing problem
in a possibly noisy setting, and develop measurement matrices that can be
used in the threshold model. Similar to the classical model of group testing,
non-adaptive measurements in the threshold model can be represented as a
Boolean matrix, where the ith row is the characteristic vector of the set of
items that participate in the ith measurement.
4.3.1 Strongly Disjunct Matrices
Non-adaptive threshold testing has been considered by Chen and Fu [27].
They observe that, a generalization of the standard notion of disjunct matrices
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(the latter being extensively used in the literature of classical group testing)
is suitable for the threshold model. In this section, we refer to this generalized
notion as strongly disjunct matrices and to the standard notion as classical
disjunct matrices. Strongly disjunct matrices can be defined as follows.
Definition 4.23. A Boolean matrix (with at least d + u columns) is said to
be strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct if for every choice of d+ u distinct columns
C1, . . . , Cu, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
d,
all distinct, we have
| ∩ui=1 supp(Ci) \ ∪di=1supp(C ′i)| > e.
Observe that, (d, e;u)-disjunct matrices are, in particular, (d′, e′;u′)-dis-
junct for any d′ ≤ d, e′ ≤ e, and u′ ≤ u. Moreover, classical (d, e)-disjunct
matrices correspond to the special case u = 1.
An important motivation for the study of this notion is the following hidden
hypergraph learning problem (cf. [51, Chapter 6] and [50, Chapter 12]), itself
being motivated by the so-called complex model in computational biology [26].
A (≤ u)-hypergraph is a tuple (V,E) where V and E are known as the set of
vertices and hyper-edges, respectively. Each hyperedge e ∈ E is a non-empty
subset of V of size at most u. The classical notion of undirected graphs (with
self-loops) corresponds to (≤ 2)-hypergraphs.
Now, suppose that G is a (≤ u)-hypergraph on a vertex set V of size n,
and denote by V(G) the set of vertices induced by the hyper-edge set of G;
i.e., v ∈ V(G) if and only if G has a hyper-edge incident to v. Then assuming
that |V(G)| ≤ d for a sparsity parameter d, the aim in the hypergraph-learning
problem is to identify G using as few (non-adaptive) queries of the following
type as possible: Each query specifies a set Q ⊆ V , and its corresponding
answer is a Boolean value which is 1 if and only if G has a hyperedge contained
in Q.
It is known that [26,66], in the hypergraph learning problem, any suitable
grouping strategy defines a strongly disjunct matrix (whose rows are charac-
teristic vectors of individual queries Q), and conversely, any strongly disjunct
matrix can be used as the incidence matrix of the set of queries. Below we
recollect a simple proof of this fact.
Lemma 4.24. Let M be a strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct matrix with columns
indexed by the elements of a vertex set V , and G and G′ be any two distinct
(≤ u)-hypergraphs on V such that V(G) ≤ d and V(G′) ≤ d. Then the vector
of the outcomes corresponding to the queries defined by M on G and G′ differ
in more than e positions. Conversely, if M is such that the query outcomes
differ in more than e positions for every choice of the hypergraphs G and G′
as above, then it must be strongly (d− u, e;u)-disjunct.
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Proof. Suppose that M is an m × |V | strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct matrix, and
consider distinct (≤ u)-hypergraphs G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′) with V(G) ≤
d and V(G′) ≤ d. Denote by y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}m the vector of query outcomes
for the two graphs G and G′, respectively. Without loss of generality, let
S ∈ E be chosen such that no hyper-edge of G′ is contained in it. Let V ′ :=
V(G′) \ S, and denote by C1, . . . , C|S| (resp., C ′1, . . . , C|V ′|) the columns of M
corresponding to the vertices in S (resp., V ′). By Definition 4.23, there is a set
T ⊆ [m] of more than e indices such that for every i ∈ [|S|] (resp., i ∈ [|V ′|])
and every t ∈ T , Ci(t) = 1 (resp., C ′i(t) = 0). This means that, for each such
t, the answer to the tth query must be 1 for G (as the query includes the
vertex set of S) but 0 for G′ (considering the assumption that no edge of G′
is contained in S).
For the converse, let S,Z ⊆ [V ] be disjoint sets of vertices such that |S| = u
and |Z| = d − u, and denote by {C1, . . . , Cu} and {C ′1, . . . , C ′d−u} the set of
columns of M picked by S and T , respectively. Take any v ∈ S, let the u-
hypergraph G = (V,E) be a u-clique on Z ∪S \ {v}, and G′ = (V,E′) be such
that E′ := E ∪ {S}. Denote by y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}m the vector of query outcomes
for the two graphs G and G′, respectively. Since G′ is a subgraph of G, it
must be that supp(y′) ⊆ supp(y).
Let T := supp(y) \ supp(y). By the distinguishing property of M , the set
T must have more than e elements. Take any t ∈ T . We know that the tth
query defined by M returns positive for G but negative for G′. Thus this
query must contain the vertex set of S, but not any of the elements in Z
(since otherwise, it would include some z ∈ Z and subsequently, {z}∪S \{v},
which is a hyperedge of G′). It follows that for each i ∈ [u] (resp., i ∈ [d−u]),
we must have Ci(t) = 1 (resp., C
′
i(t) = 0) and the disjunctness property as
required by Definition 4.23 holds.
The parameter e determines “noise tolerance” of the measurement scheme.
Namely, a strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct matrix can uniquely distinguish between
d-sparse hypergraphs even in presence of up to be/2c erroneous query out-
comes.
The key observation made by Chen and Fu [27] is that threshold group
testing corresponds to the special case of the hypergraph learning problem
where the hidden graph G is known to be a u-clique11. In this case, the
unknown Boolean vector in the corresponding threshold testing problem would
be the characteristic vector of V(G). It follows that strongly disjunct matrices
are suitable choices for the measurement matrices in threshold group testing.
More precisely, the result by Chen and Fu states that, for threshold param-
eters ` and u, a strongly (d−`−1, 2e;u)-disjunct matrix suffices to distinguish
11A u-clique on the vertex set V is a (≤ u)-hypergraph (V,E) such that, for some V ′ ⊆ V ,
E is the set of all subsets of V ′ of size u.
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between d-sparse vectors in the threshold model12, even if up to e erroneous
measurements are allowed.
Much of the known results for classical disjunct matrices can be extended
to strongly disjunct matrices by following similar ideas. In particular, the
probabilistic result of Theorem 4.4 can be generalized to show that strongly
(d, e;u)-disjunct matrices exist with
m = O(du+1(log(n/d))/(1− p)2)
rows and error tolerance
e = Ω(pd log(n/d)/(1− p)2),
for any noise parameter p ∈ [0, 1). On the negative side, however, several
concrete lower bounds are known for the number of rows of such matrices
[53,144,145]. In asymptotic terms, these results show that one must have
m = Ω(du+1 logd n+ ed
u),
and thus, the probabilistic upper bound is essentially optimal.
4.3.2 Strongly Disjunct Matrices from Codes
For the underlying strongly disjunct matrix, Chen and Fu [27] use a greedy
construction [28] that achieves, for any e ≥ 0, O((e + 1)du+1 log(n/d)) rows,
but may take exponential time in the size of the resulting matrix.
Nevertheless, as observed by several researchers [26, 53, 66, 91], a classical
explicit construction of combinatorial designs due to Kautz and Singleton [89]
can be extended to construct strongly disjunct matrices. This concatenation-
based construction transforms any error-correcting code having large distance
into a disjunct matrix.
While the original construction of Kautz and Singleton uses Reed-Solomon
codes and achieves nice bounds, it is possible to use other families of codes. In
particular, as was shown by Porat and Rothschild [120], codes on the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound (see Appendix A) would result in nearly optimal disjunct
matrices. Moreover, for a suitable range of parameters, they give a determin-
istic construction of such codes that runs in polynomial time in the size of the
resulting disjunct matrix (albeit exponential in code’s dimension13).
In this section, we will elaborate on details of this (known) class of con-
structions, and in addition to Reed-Solomon codes and codes on the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound (that, as mentioned above, were used by Kautz, Singleton,
12Considering unavoidable assumptions that up to g := u − ` false positives and g false
negatives are allowed in the reconstruction, and that the vector being measured has weight
at least u.
13In this regard, this construction of disjunct matrices can be considered weakly explicit
in that, contrary to fully explicit constructions, it is not clear if each individual entry of the
matrix can be computed in time poly(d, logn).
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• Given: An (n˜, k, d˜)q error-correcting code C ⊆ [q]n˜, and integer pa-
rameter u > 0.
• Output: An m× n Boolean matrix M , where n = qk, and m = n˜qu.
• Construction: First, consider the mapping ϕ : [q]→ {0, 1}qu from q-
ary symbols to column vectors of length qu defined as follows. Index
the coordinates of the output vector by the u-tuples from the set
[q]u. Then ϕ(x) has a 1 at position (a1, . . . , au) if and only if there is
an i ∈ [u] such that ai = x. Arrange all codewords of C as columns
of an n˜ × qk matrix M ′ with entries from [q]. Then replace each
entry x of M ′ with ϕ(x) to obtain the output m× n matrix M .
Construction 4.1: Extension of Kautz-Singleton’s method [89].
Porat and Rothschild), will consider a family of algebraic-geometric codes and
Hermitian codes which give nice bounds as well. Construction 4.1 describes
the general idea, which in analyzed in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.25. Construction 4.1 outputs a strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct matrix
for every d < (n˜− e)/((n˜− d˜)u).
Proof. Let C := {c1, . . . , cu} ⊆ [n] and C ′ := {c′1, . . . , c′d} ⊆ [n] be disjoint
subsets of column indices. We wish to show that, for more than e rows of M ,
the entries at positions picked by C are all-ones while those picked by C ′ are
all-zeros. For each j ∈ [n], denote the jth column of M ′ by M ′(j), and let
M ′(C) := {M ′(cj) : j ∈ [u]}, and M ′(C ′) := {M ′(c′j) : j ∈ [d]}.
From the minimum distance of C, we know that every two distinct columns
of M ′ agree in at most n˜− d˜ positions. By a union bound, for each i ∈ [d], the
number of positions where M ′(c′i) agrees with one or more of the codewords
in M ′(C) is at most u(n˜− d˜), and the number of positions where some vector
in M ′(C ′) agrees with one or more of those in M ′(C) is at most du(n˜ − d˜).
By assumption, we have n˜ − du(n˜ − d˜) > e, and thus, for a set E ⊆ [n˜] of
size greater than e, at positions picked by E none of the codewords in M ′(C ′)
agree with any of the codewords in M ′(C).
Now let w ∈ [q]n be any of the rows of M ′ picked by E, and consider the
qu×n Boolean matrix W formed by applying the mapping ϕ(·) on each entry
of w. We know that {w(cj) : j ∈ [u]} ∩ {w(c′j) : j ∈ [d]} = ∅. Thus we observe
that the particular row of W indexed by (w(c1), . . . , w(cu)) (and in fact, any
of its permutations) must have all-ones at positions picked by C and all-zeros
at those picked by C ′. As any such row is a distinct row of M , it follows that
M is strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct.
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Now we mention a few specific instantiations of the above construction.
We will first consider the family of Reed-Solomon codes, that are also used
in the original work of Kautz and Singleton [89], and then move on to the
family of algebraic geometric (AG) codes on the Tsfasman-Vla˘dut¸-Zink (TVZ)
bound, and Hermitian codes, and finally, codes on the Gilbert-Varshamov
(GV) bound. A quick review of the necessary background on coding-theoretic
terms is given in Appendix A.
Reed-Solomon Codes
Let p ∈ [0, 1) be an arbitrary “noise” parameter. If we take C to be an [n˜, k, d˜]n˜
Reed-Solomon code over an alphabet of size n˜ (more precisely, the smallest
prime power that is no less than n˜), where d˜ = n˜ − k + 1, we get a strongly
disjunct (d, e;u)-matrix with
m = O(du log n/(1− p))u+1
rows and
e = pn˜ = Ω(pdu(log n)/(1− p)).
AG Codes on the TVZ Bound
Another interesting family for the code C is the family of algebraic geometric
codes that attain the Tsfasman-Vla˘dut¸-Zink bound (cf. [67,154]). This family
is defined over any alphabet size q ≥ 49 that is a square prime power, and
achieves a minimum distance d˜ ≥ n˜ − k − n˜/(√q − 1). Let e := pn, for a
noise parameter p ∈ [0, 1). By Lemma 4.25, the underlying code C needs
to have minimum distance at least n˜(1 − (1 − p)/(du)). Thus in order to
be able to use the above-mentioned family of AG codes, we need to have
q  (du/(1 − p))2 =: q0. Let us take an appropriate q ∈ [2q0, 8q0], and
following Lemma 4.25, n˜ − d˜ = dn˜(1 − p)/(du)e. Thus the dimension of C
becomes at least
k ≥ n˜− d˜− n˜√
q − 1 = Ω
(
n˜(1− p)
du
)
= Ω(n˜/
√
q0),
and subsequently14 we get that log n = k log q ≥ k = Ω(n˜/√q0). Now, noting
that m = qun˜, we conclude that
m = qun˜ = O(q
u+1/2
0 log n) = O
(
du
1− p
)2u+1
log n,
and e = Ω(pdu(log n)/(1− p)).
14Note that, given the parameters p, d, n, the choice of q depends on p, d, as explained
above, and then one can choose the code length n˜ to be the smallest integer for which we
have qk ≥ n. But for the sake of clarity we have assumed that qk = n.
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We see that the dependence of the number of measurements on the sparsity
parameter d is worse for AG codes than Reed-Solomon codes by a factor du,
but the construction from AG codes benefits from a linear dependence on log n,
compared to logu+1 n for Reed-Solomon codes. Thus, AG codes become more
favorable only when the sparsity is substantially low; namely, when d log n.
Hermitian Codes
A particularly nice family of AG codes arises from the Hermitian function
field15. Let q′ be a prime power and q := q′2. Then the Hermitian function
field over Fq is a finite extension of the rational function field Fq(x), denoted
by Fq(x, y), where we have y
q′+y = xq
′+1. The structure of this function field
is relatively well understood and the family of Goppa codes defined over the
rational points of the Hermitian function field is known as Hermitian codes.
This family is recently used by Ben-Aroya and Ta-Shma [10] for construction
of small-bias sets. Below we quote some parameters of Hermitian codes from
their work.
The number of rational points of the Hermitian function field is equal to
q′3 + 1, which includes a common pole Q∞ of x and y. The genus of the
function field is g = q′(q′ − 1)/2. For some integer parameter r, we take
G := rQ∞ as the divisor defining the Riemann-Roch space L(G) of the code
C, and the set of rational points except Q∞ as the evaluation points of the
code. Thus the length of C becomes n˜ = q′3. Moreover, the minimum distance
of the code is d˜ = n − deg(G) = n − r. When r ≥ 2g − 1, the dimension of
the code is given by the Riemann-Roch theorem, which is equal to r − g + 1.
For the low-degree regime where r < 2g − 1, the dimension k of the code is
the size of the Wirestrauss semigroup of G, which turns out to be the set
W = {(i, j) ∈ N2 : j ≤ q′ − 1 ∧ iq′ + j(q′ + 1) ≤ r}.
Now, given parameters d, p of the disjunct matrix, define ρ := (1−p)/((d+
1)u), take the alphabet size q as a square prime power, and set r := ρq3/2.
First we consider the case where r < 2g − 1 = 2q − 2√q − 1. In this case,
the dimension of the Hermitian code becomes k = |W | = Ω(r2/q) = Ω(ρ2q2).
The distance d˜ of the code satisfies d˜ = n˜ − r ≥ n˜(1 − ρ) and thus, for
e := pn˜, conditions of Lemma 4.25 are satisfied. The number of the rows of
the resulting measurement matrix becomes m = qu+3/2, and we have n = qk.
Therefore,
log n = k log q ≥ k = Ω(ρ2q2)
⇒ q = O(
√
log n/ρ)⇒ m = O
((d√log n
1− p
)u+3/2)
,
and in order to ensure that r < 2g− 1, we need to have du/(1− p) √log n.
On the other hand, when du/(1 − p)  √log n, we are in the high-degree
15See [142] for an extensive treatment of the notions in algebraic geometry.
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regime, in which case the dimension of the code becomes k = r − g + 1 =
Ω(r) = Ω(ρq3/2), and we will thus have
q = O((log n/ρ)2/3)⇒ m = O
((d log n
1− p
)1+2u/3)
Altogether, we conclude that Construction 4.1 with Hermitian codes results
in a strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct matrix with
m = O
((d√log n
1− p +
(d log n
1− p
)2/3)u+3/2)
rows, where e = p · Ω (d(log n)/(1− p) + (d√log n/(1− p))3/2). Compared
to the Reed-Solomon codes, the number of measurements has a slightly worse
dependence on d, but a much better dependence on n. Compared to AG codes
on the TVZ bound, the dependence on d is better while the dependence on n
is inferior.
Codes on the GV Bound
A q-ary (n˜, k, d˜)-code (of sufficiently large length) is said to be on the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound if it satisfies k ≥ n˜(1 − hq(d˜/n˜)), where hq(·) is the q-ary
entropy function defined as
hq(x) := x logq(q − 1)− x logq(x)− (1− x) logq(1− x).
It is well known that a random linear code achieves the bound with over-
whelming probability (cf. [103]). Now we apply Lemma 4.25 on a code on the
GV bound, and calculate the resulting parameters. Let ρ := (1 − p)/(4du),
choose any alphabet size q ∈ [1/ρ, 2/ρ], and let C be any q-ary code of length
n˜ on the GV bound, with minimum distance d˜ ≥ n˜(1 − 2/q). By the Taylor
expansion of the function hq(x) around x = 1 − 1/q, we see that the dimen-
sion of C asymptotically behaves as k = Θ(n˜/(q log q)). Thus the number of
columns of the resulting measurement matrix becomes n = qk = 2Ω(n˜/q), and
therefore, the number m of its rows becomes
m = qun˜ = O(qu+1 log n) = O((d/(1− p))u+1 log n),
and the matrix would be strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct for
e = pn˜ = Ω(pd(log n)/(1− p)).
We remark that for the range of parameters that we are interested in, Porat
and Rothschild [120] have recently come up with a deterministic construction
of linear codes on the GV bound that runs in time poly(qk) (and thus, poly-
nomial in the size of the resulting measurement matrix). Their construction
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Table 4.2: Bounds obtained by strongly (d, e;u)-disjunct matrices. The noise
parameter p ∈ [0, 1) is arbitrary. The first four rows correspond to the explicit
coding-theoretic construction described in Section 4.3.2, with the underlying
code indicated as a remark.
Number of rows Noise tolerance Remark
O(( d1−p)
u+1 log n) Ω(pd logn1−p ) Using codes on the GV bound.
O((d logn1−p )
u+1) Ω(pd logn1−p ) Using Reed-Solomon codes.
O(( d1−p)
2u+1 log n) Ω(pd logn1−p ) Using Algebraic Geometric
codes.
O((d
√
logn
1−p )
u+3/2) Ω(p(d
√
logn
1−p )
3/2) Using Hermitian codes (d √
log n).
O(du+1 log(n/d)
(1−p)2 ) Ω(pd
log(n/d)
(1−p)2 ) Probabilistic construction.
Ω(du+1 logd n+ ed
u) e Lower bound (Section 4.3.1).
is based on a derandomization of the probabilistic argument for random lin-
ear codes using the method of conditional expectations, and as such, can be
considered weakly explicit (in the sense that, the entire measurement matrix
can be computed in polynomial time in its length; but for a fully explicit
construction one must be ideally able to deterministically compute any single
entry of the measurement matrix in time poly(d, log n), which is not the case
for this construction).
We see that, for a fixed p, Construction 4.1 when using codes on the GV
bound achieves almost optimal parameters. Moreover, the explicit construc-
tion based on the Reed-Solomon codes possesses the “right” dependence on
the sparsity d, AG codes on the TVZ bound have a matching dependence
on the vector length n with random measurement matrices, and finally, the
trade-off offered by the construction based on Hermitian codes lies in between
the one for Reed-Solomon codes and AG codes. These parameters are sum-
marized in Table 4.2. Note that the special case u = 1 would give classical
(d, e)-disjunct matrices as in Definition 4.1.
4.3.3 Disjunct Matrices for Threshold Testing
Even though, as discussed above, the general notion of strongly (d, e;u)-
disjunct matrices is sufficient for threshold group testing with upper threshold
u, in this section we show that a weaker notion of disjunct matrices (which
turns out to be strictly weaker when the lower threshold ` is greater than 1),
would also suffice. We proceed by showing how such measurement matrices
can be constructed.
Before introducing our variation of disjunct matrices, let us fix some nota-
tion that will be useful for the threshold model. Consider the threshold model
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with thresholds ` and u, and an m × n measurement matrix M that defines
the set of measurements. For a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by M [x]`,u the set
of vectors in {0, 1}m that correctly encode the measurement outcomes corre-
sponding to the vector x. In particular, for any y ∈M [x]`,u we have y(i) = 1
if |supp(Mj) ∩ supp(x)| ≥ u, and y(i) = 0 if |supp(Mj) ∩ supp(x)| < `, where
Mj indicates the jth row of M . In the gap-free case, the set M [x]`,u may only
have a single element that we denote by M [x]u. Note that the gap-free case
with u = 1 reduces to ordinary group testing, and thus we have M [x]1 = M [x].
To make the main ideas more transparent, until Section 4.3.3.3 we will
focus on the gap-free case where ` = u. The extension to nonzero gaps is
straightforward and will be discussed in Section 4.3.3.3. Moreover, often we
will implicitly assume that the Hamming weight of the Boolean vector that is
to be identified is at least u (since otherwise, any (u− 1)-sparse vector would
be confused with the all-zeros vector). Moreover, we will take the thresholds
`, u as fixed constants while the parameters d and n are allowed to grow.
4.3.3.1 The Definition and Properties
Our variation of disjunct matrices along with an “auxiliary” notion of regular
matrices is defined in the following.
Definition 4.26. A Boolean matrix M with n columns is called (d, e;u)-
regular if for every subset of columns S ⊆ [n] (called the critical set) and
every Z ⊆ [n] (called the zero set) such that u ≤ |S| ≤ d, |Z| ≤ |S|, S∩Z = ∅,
there are more than e rows of M at which M |S has weight exactly u and (at
the same rows) M |Z has weight zero. Any such row is said to u-satisfy S and
Z.
If, in addition, for every distinguished column i ∈ S, more than e rows of
M both u-satisfy S and Z and have a 1 at the ith column, the matrix is called
(d, e;u)-disjunct (and the corresponding “good” rows are said to u-satisfy i,
S, and Z).
It is easy to verify that (assuming 2d ≤ n) the classical notion of (2d−1, e)-
disjunct matrices is equivalent to strongly (2d− 1, e; 1)-disjunct and (d, e; 1)-
disjunct. Moreover, any (d, e;u)-disjunct matrix is (d, e;u)-regular, (d−1, e;u−
1)-regular, and (d, e)-disjunct (but the reverse implications do not in general
hold). Therefore, the lower bound
m = Ω(d2 logd n+ ed)
that applies for (d, e)-disjunct matrices holds for (d, e;u)-disjunct matrices as
well.
Below we show that our notion of disjunct matrices is necessary and suf-
ficient for the purpose of threshold group testing:
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Lemma 4.27. Let M be an m × n Boolean matrix that is (d, e;u)-disjunct.
Then for every distinct d-sparse vectors x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that16 supp(x) *
supp(x′), wgt(x) ≥ |supp(x′) \ supp(x)| and wgt(x) ≥ u, we have
(4.5) |supp(M [x]u) \ supp(M [x′]u)| > e.
Conversely, assuming d ≥ 2u, if M satisfies (4.5) for every choice of x and x′
as above, it must be (bd/2c, e;u)-disjunct.
Proof. First, suppose that M is (d, e;u)-disjunct, and let y := M [x]u and
y′ := M [x′]u. Take any i ∈ supp(x) \ supp(x′), and let S := supp(x) and
Z := supp(x′) \ supp(x). Note that |S| ≤ d and by assumption, we have
|Z| ≤ |S|. Now, Definition 4.26 implies that there is a set E of more than e
rows of M that u-satisfy i as the distinguished column, S as the critical set
and Z as the zero set. Thus for every j ∈ E, the jth row of M restricted to
the columns chosen by supp(x) must have weight exactly u, while its weight
on supp(x′) is less than u. Therefore, y(j) = 1 and y′(j) = 0 for more than e
choices of j.
For the converse, consider any choice of a distinguished column i ∈ [n], a
critical set S ⊆ [n] containing i (such that |S| ≥ u), and a zero set Z ⊆ [n]
where |Z| ≤ |S|. Define d-sparse Boolean vectors x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n so that
supp(x) := S and supp(x′) := S ∪ Z \ {i}. Let y := M [x]u and y′ := M [x′]u
and E := supp(y) \ supp(y′). By assumption we know that |E| > e. Take any
j ∈ E. Since y(j) = 1 and y′(j) = 0, we get that the jth row of M restricted
to the columns picked by S ∪Z \ {i} must have weight at most u− 1, whereas
it must have weight at least u when restricted to S. As the sets {i}, S \ {i},
and Z are disjoint, this can hold only if M [j, i] = 1, and moreover, the jth
row of M restricted to the columns picked by S (resp., Z) has weight exactly
u (resp., zero). Hence, this row (as well as all the rows of M picked by E)
must u-satisfy i, S, and Z, confirming that M is (bd/2c, e;u)-disjunct.
We will use regular matrices as intermediate building blocks in our con-
structions of disjunct matrices to follow. The connection with disjunct ma-
trices is made apparent through a direct product of matrices defined in Con-
struction 4.2. Intuitively, using this product, regular matrices can be used
to transform any measurement matrix suitable for the standard group test-
ing model to one with comparable properties in the threshold model. The
following lemma formalizes this idea.
Lemma 4.28. Let M1 and M2 be Boolean matrices with n columns, such
that M1 is (d− 1, e1;u− 1)-regular. Let M := M1M2, and suppose that for
d-sparse Boolean vectors x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that wgt(x) ≥ wgt(x′), we have
|supp(M2[x]1) \ supp(M2[x′]1)| ≥ e2.
16 Note that at least one of the two possible orderings of any two distinct d-sparse vectors,
at least one having weight u or more, satisfies this condition.
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Then, |supp(M [x]u) \ supp(M [x′]u)| ≥ (e1 + 1)e2.
Proof. First we consider the case where u > 1. Let y := M2[x]1 ∈ {0, 1}m2 ,
y′ := M2[x′]1 ∈ {0, 1}m2 , where m2 is the number of rows of M2, and let
E := supp(y) \ supp(y′). By assumption, |E| ≥ e2. Fix any i ∈ E so that
y(i) = 1 and y′(i) = 0. Therefore, the ith row of M2 must have all zeros
at positions corresponding to supp(x′) and there is a j ∈ supp(x) \ supp(x′)
such that M2[i, j] = 1. Define S := supp(x) \ {j}, Z := supp(x′) \ supp(x),
z := M [x]u and z
′ := M [x′]u.
As wgt(x) ≥ wgt(x′), we know that |Z| ≤ |S| + 1. The extreme case
|Z| = |S| + 1 only happens when x and x′ have disjoint supports, in which
case one can remove an arbitrary element of Z to ensure that |Z| ≤ |S| and
the following argument (considering the assumption u > 1) still goes through.
By the definition of regularity, there is a set E1 consisting of at least e1 + 1
rows of M1 that (u − 1)-satisfy the critical set S and the zero set Z. Pick
any k ∈ E1, and observe that z must have a 1 at position (k, i). This is
because the row of M indexed by (k, i) has a 1 at the jth position (since the
ith row of M2 does), and at least u − 1 more 1’s at positions corresponding
to supp(x) \ {j} (due to regularity of M1). On the other hand, note that the
kth row of M1 has at most u− 1 ones at positions corresponding to supp(x′)
(because supp(x′) ⊆ S ∪ Z), and the ith row of M2 has all zeros at those
positions (because y′(i) = 0). This means that the row of M indexed by (k, i)
(which is the bit-wise or of the kth row of M1 and the ith row of M2) must
have less than u ones at positions corresponding to supp(x′), and thus, z′ must
be 0 at position (k, i). Therefore, z and z′ differ at position (k, i).
Since there are at least e2 choices for i, and for each choice of i, at least
e1 + 1 choices for k, we conclude that in at least (e1 + 1)e2 positions, z has a
one while z′ has a zero.
The argument for u = 1 is similar, in which case it suffices to take S :=
supp(x) and Z := supp(x′) \ supp(x).
• Given: Boolean matrices M1 and M2 that are m1 × n and m2 × n,
respectively.
• Output: An m× n Boolean matrix M1 M2, where m := m1m2.
• Construction: Let the rows of M := M1M2 be indexed by the set
[m1] × [m2]. Then the row corresponding to (i, j) is defined as the
bit-wise or of the ith row of M1 and the jth row of M2.
Construction 4.2: Direct product of measurement matrices.
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• Given: Integer parameters n,m′, d, u.
• Output: An m× n Boolean matrix M , where m := m′dlog(d/u)e.
• Construction: Let r := dlog(d/u)e. Index the rows of M by [r]×[m′].
Sample the (i, j)th row of M independently from a (u + 1)-wise
independent distribution on n bit vectors, where each individual bit
has probability 1/(2i+2u) of being 1.
Construction 4.3: Probabilistic construction of regular and disjunct matrices.
As a corollary it follows that, when M1 is a (d − 1, e1;u − 1)-regular and
M2 is a (d, e2)-disjunct matrix, the product M := M1 M2 will distinguish
between any two distinct d-sparse vectors (of weight at least u) in at least
(e1 + 1)(e2 + 1) positions of the measurement outcomes. This combined with
Lemma 4.27 would imply thatM is, in particular, (bd/2c, (e1+1)(e2+1)−1;u)-
disjunct. However, using a direct argument similar to the above lemma it is
possible to obtain a slightly better result, given by Lemma 4.29 (the proof
follows the same line of argument as that of Lemma 4.28 and is thus omitted).
Lemma 4.29. Suppose that M1 is a (d, e1;u−1)-regular and M2 is a (2d, e2)-
disjunct matrix. Then M1M2 is a (d, (e1 +1)(e2 +1)−1;u)-disjunct matrix.
As another particular example, we remark that the resilient measurement
matrices that we constructed in Section 4.2.2 for the ordinary group test-
ing model can be combined with regular matrices to offer the same qualities
(i.e., approximation of sparse vectors in highly noisy settings) in the threshold
model. In the same way, numerous existing results in group testing can be
ported to the threshold model by using Lemma 4.28 (e.g., constructions of
measurement matrices suitable for trivial two-stage schemes; cf. [29]).
4.3.3.2 Constructions
In this section, we obtain several constructions of regular and disjunct matri-
ces. Our first construction, described in Construction 4.3, is a randomness-
efficient probabilistic construction that can be analyzed using standard tech-
niques from the probabilistic method. The bounds obtained by this construc-
tion are given by Lemma 4.30 below. The amount of random bits required by
this construction is polynomially bounded in d and log n, which is significantly
smaller than it would be had we picked the entries of M fully independently.
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Lemma 4.30. For every p ∈ [0, 1) and integer parameter u > 0, Construc-
tion 4.3 with17 m′ = Ou(d log(n/d)/(1−p)2) (resp., m′ = Ou(d2 log(n/d)/(1−
p)2)) outputs a (d,Ωu(pm
′);u)-regular (resp., (d,Ωu(pm′/d);u)-disjunct) ma-
trix with probability 1− o(1).
Proof. We show the claim for regular matrices, the proof for disjunct matrices
is similar. Consider any particular choice of a critical set S ⊆ [n] and a zero
set Z ⊆ [n] such that u ≤ |S| ≤ d and |Z| ≤ |S|. Choose an integer i so that
2i−1u ≤ |S| ≤ 2iu, and take any j ∈ [m′]. Denote the (i, j)th row of M by
the random variable w ∈ {0, 1}n, and by q the “success” probability that w|S
has weight exactly u and w|Z is all zeros. For an integer ` > 0, we will use
the shorthand 1` (resp., 0`) for the all-ones (resp., all-zeros) vector of length
`. We have
q =
∑
R⊆[S]
|R|=u
Pr[(w|R) = 1u ∧ (w|Z∪(S\R)) = 0|S|+|Z|−u]
=
∑
R
Pr[(w|R) = 1u] · Pr[(w|Z∪(S\R)) = 0|S|+|Z|−u | (w|R) = 1u]
(a)
=
∑
R
(1/(2i+2u))u · (1− Pr[(w|Z∪(S\R)) 6= 0|S|+|Z|−u | (w|R) = 1u])
(b)
≥
∑
R
(1/(2i+2u))u · (1− (|S|+ |Z| − u)/(2i+2u))
(c)
≥ 1
2
(|S|
u
)
(1/(2i+2u))u ≥ 1
2
( |S|
u
)u
· (1/(2i+2u))u ≥ 1
23u+1 · uu =: c,
where (a) and (b) use the fact that the entries of w are (u+ 1)-wise indepen-
dent, and (b) uses an additional union bound. Moreover, in (c) the binomial
term counts the number of possibilities for the set R. Note that the lower
bound c > 0 obtained at the end is a constant that only depends on u. Now,
let e := m′pq, and observe that the expected number of “successful” rows is
m′q. Using Chernoff bounds, and independence of the rows, the probability
that there are at most e rows (among (i, 1), . . . , (i,m′)) whose restriction to S
and Z has weights u and 0, respectively, becomes upper bounded by
exp(−(m′q − e)2/(2m′q)) = exp(−(1− p)2m′q/2) ≤ exp(−(1− p)2m′c/2).
17The subscript in Ou(·) and Ωu(·) implies that the hidden constant in the asymptotic
notation is allowed to depend on u.
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• Given: A strong lossless (k, )-condenser f : {0, 1}n˜ × {0, 1}t →
{0, 1}˜`, integer parameter u ≥ 1 and real parameter p ∈ [0, 1) such
that  < (1− p)/16,
• Output: An m × n Boolean matrix M , where n := 2n˜ and m =
2t+kOu(2
u(˜`−k)).
• Construction: Let G1 = ({0, 1}˜`, {0, 1}k, E1) be any bipartite bi-
regular graph with left vertex set {0, 1}˜`, right vertex set {0, 1}k,
left degree d` := 8u, and right degree dr := 8u2
˜`−k. Replace each
right vertex v of G1 with
(
dr
u
)
vertices, one for each subset of size
u of the vertices on the neighborhood of v, and connect them to
the corresponding subsets. Denote the resulting graph by G2 =
({0, 1}˜`, V2, E2), where |V2| = 2k
(
dr
u
)
. Define the bipartite graph
G3 = ({0, 1}n, V3, E3), where V3 := {0, 1}t×V2, as follows: Each left
vertex x ∈ {0, 1}n is connected to (y,Γ2(f(x, y)), for each y ∈ {0, 1}t,
where Γ2(·) denotes the neighborhood function of G2 (i.e., Γ2(v)
denotes the set of vertices adjacent to v in G2). The output matrix
M is the bipartite adjacency matrix of G3.
Construction 4.4: A building block for construction of regular matrices.
Now take a union bound on all the choices of S and Z to conclude that the
probability that the resulting matrix is not (d, e;u)-regular is at most(
d∑
s=u
(
n
s
) s∑
z=0
(
n− s
z
))
exp(−(1− p)2m′c/2)
≤ d2
(
n
d
)2
exp(−(1− p)2m′c/2),
which can be made o(1) by choosing m′ = Ou(d log(n/d)/(1− p)2).
Now we turn to a construction of regular matrices using strong lossless
condensers. Details of the construction are described in Construction 4.5 that
assumes a family of lossless condensers with different entropy requirements18,
and in turn, uses Construction 4.4 as a building block.
The following theorem analyzes the obtained parameters without specify-
ing any particular choice for the underlying family of condensers.
18We have assumed that all the functions in the family have the same seed length t. If
this is not the case, one can trivially set t to be the largest seed length in the family.
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• Given: Integer parameters d ≥ u ≥ 1, real parameter p ∈ [0, 1),
and a family f0, . . . , fr of strong lossless condensers, where r :=
dlog(d/u′)e and u′ is the smallest power of two such that u′ ≥ u.
Each fi : {0, 1}n˜ × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}˜`(i) is assumed to be a strong
lossless (k(i), )-condenser, where k(i) := log u′ + i + 1 and  <
(1− p)/16.
• Output: An m × n Boolean matrix M , where n := 2n˜ and m =
2td
∑r
i=0Ou(2
u(˜`(i)−k(i))).
• Construction: For each i ∈ {0, . . . , r}, denote by Mi the output ma-
trix of Construction 4.4 when instantiated with fi as the underlying
condenser, and by mi its number of rows. Define ri := 2
r−i and let
M ′i denote the matrix obtained from Mi by repeating each row ri
times. Construct the output matrix M by stacking M ′0, . . . ,M ′r on
top of one another.
Construction 4.5: Regular matrices from strong lossless condensers.
Theorem 4.31. Them×nmatrixM output by Construction 4.5 is (d, pγ2t;u)-
regular, where γ = max{1,Ωu(d ·min{2k(i)−˜`(i) : i = 0, . . . , r})}.
Proof. As a first step, we verify the upper bound on the number of measure-
ments m. Each matrix Mi has mi = 2
t+k(i)Ou(2
u(˜`(i)−k(i))) rows, and M ′i has
miri rows, where ri = 2
r−i. Therefore, the number of rows of M is
r∑
i=0
rimi =
r∑
i=0
2t+log u
′+r+1mi = 2
td
r∑
i=0
Ou(2
u(˜`(i)−k(i))).
Let S,Z ⊆ {0, 1}n˜ respectively denote any choice of a critical set and
zero set of size at most d, where |Z| ≤ |S|, and choose an integer i ≥ 0 so
that 2i−1u′ ≤ |S| ≤ 2iu′. Arbitrarily grow the two sets S and Z to possibly
larger, and disjoint, sets S′ ⊇ S and Z ′ ⊇ Z such that |S′| = |Z ′| = 2iu′ (for
simplicity we have assumed that d ≤ n/2). Our goal is to show that there are
“many” rows of the matrix Mi (in Construction 4.5) that u-satisfy S and Z.
Let k := k(i) = log u′ + i + 1, ˜` := ˜`(i), and denote by G1, G2, G3 the
bipartite graphs used by the instantiation of Construction 4.4 that outputs
Mi. Thus we need to show that “many” right vertices of G3 are each connected
to exactly u of the vertices in S and none of those in Z.
Consider the uniform distribution X on the set S′ ∪ Z ′, which has min-
entropy log u′ + i + 1. By an averaging argument, since the condenser fi
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is strong, for more than a p fraction of the choices of the seed y ∈ {0, 1}t
(call them good seeds), the distribution Zy := fi(X , y) is /(1 − p)-close (in
particular, 1/16-close) to a distribution with min-entropy log u′ + i+ 1.
Fix any good seed y ∈ {0, 1}t. Let G = ({0, 1}n˜, {0, 1}˜`, E) denote a
bipartite graph representation of fi, where each left vertex x ∈ {0, 1}n˜ is
connected to fi(x, y) on the right. Denote by Γy(S
′ ∪Z ′) the right vertices of
G corresponding to the neighborhood of the set of left vertices picked by S′∪Z ′.
Note that Γy(S
′ ∪ Z ′) = supp(Zy). Using Proposition 2.14 in the appendix,
we see that since Zy is 1/16-close to having min-entropy log(|S′ ∪ Z ′|), there
are at least (7/8)|S′ ∪ Z ′| vertices in Γ(S′ ∪ Z ′) that are each connected to
exactly one left vertex in S′ ∪ Z ′. Since |S| ≥ |S′ ∪ Z ′|/4, this implies that at
least |S′ ∪Z ′|/8 vertices in Γ(S′ ∪Z ′) (call them Γ′y) are connected to exactly
one left vertex in S and no other vertex in S′ ∪ Z ′. In particular we get that
|Γ′y| ≥ 2k−3.
Now, in G1, let Ty be the set of left vertices corresponding to Γ
′
y (regarding
the left vertices of G1 in one-to-one correspondence with the right vertices of
G). The number of edges going out of Ty in G1 is d`|Ty| ≥ u2k. Therefore, as
the number of the right vertices of G1 is 2
k, there must be at least one right
vertex that is connected to at least u vertices in Ty. Moreover, a counting
argument shows that the number of right vertices connected to at least u
vertices in Ty is also at least 2
k−˜`2k/(10u).
Observe that in construction of G2 from G1, any right vertex of G1 is
replicated
(
dr
u
)
times, one for each u-subset of its neighbors. Therefore, for a
right vertex of G1 that is connected to at least u left vertices in Ty, one or
more of its copies in G2 must be connected to exactly u vertex in Ty (among
the left vertices of G2) and no other vertex (since the right degree of G2 is
equal to u).
Define γ′ := max{1, 2k−˜`2k/(10u)}. From the previous argument we know
that, looking at Ty as a set of left vertices of G2, there are at least γ
′ right
vertices on the neighborhood of Ty in G2 that are connected to exactly u of
the vertices in Ty and none of the left vertices outside Ty. Letting vy be any
such vertex, this implies that the vertex (y, vy) ∈ V3 on the right part of G3
is connected to exactly u of the vertices in S, and none of the vertices in Z.
Since the argument holds for every good seed y, the number of such vertices is
at least the number of good seeds, which is more than pγ′2t. Since the rows of
the matrix mi are repeated ri = 2
r−i times in M , we conclude that M has at
least pγ′2t+r−i ≥ pγ2t rows that u-satisfy S and Z, and the claim follows.
Instantiations
We now instantiate the result obtained in Theorem 4.31 by various choices
of the family of lossless condensers. The crucial factors that influence the
number of measurements are the seed length and the output length of the
condenser. In particular, we will consider optimal lossless condensers (with
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parameters achieved by random functions), zig-zag based construction of The-
orem 4.19, and the coding-theoretic construction of Guruswami et al., quoted
in Theorem 2.22. The results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.32. Let u > 0 be fixed, and p ∈ [0, 1) be a real parameter. Then
for integer parameters d, n ∈ N where u ≤ d ≤ n,
1. Using an optimal lossless condenser in Construction 4.5 results in an
m1 × n matrix M1 that is (d, e1;u)-regular, where
m1 = O(d(log n)(log d)/(1− p)u+1)
and e1 = Ω(pd log n),
2. Using the lossless condenser of Theorem 4.19 in Construction 4.5 results
in an m2 × n matrix M2 that is (d, e2;u)-regular, where
m2 = O(T2d(log d)/(1− p)u)
for some
T2 = exp(O(log
3((log n)/(1− p)))) = quasipoly(log n),
and e2 = Ω(pdT2(1− p)).
3. Let β > 0 be any fixed constant. Then Construction 4.5 can be instan-
tiated using the lossless condenser of Theorem 2.22 so that we obtain an
m3 × n matrix M3 that is (d, e3;u)-regular, where
m3 = O(T
1+u
3 d
1+β(log d))
for
T3 := ((log n)(log d)/(1− p))1+u/β = poly(log n, log d),
and e3 = Ω(pmax{T3, d1−β/u}).
Proof. First we show the claim for M1. In this case, we take each fi in
Construction 4.5 to be an optimal lossless condenser satisfying the bounds
obtained in19 [23]. Thus we have that 2t = O(n˜/) = O(log n/), and for every
i = 0, . . . , r, we have 2
˜`(i)−k(i) = O(1/), where  = O(1 − p). Now we apply
Theorem 4.31 to obtain the desired bounds (and in particular, γ = Ω(d)).
Similarly, for the construction of M2 we set up each fi using the explicit
construction of condensers in Theorem 4.19 for min-entropy k(i). In this case,
the maximum required seed length is t = O(log3(n˜/)), and we let
T2 := 2
t = exp(O(log3((log n)/(1− p)))).
19This result is similar in spirit to the probabilistic argument used in [122] for showing
the existence of good extractors.
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Moreover, for every i = 0, . . . , r, we have 2
˜`(i)−k(i) = O(1/). Plugging these
parameters in Theorem 4.31 gives γ = Ω(d) and the bounds on m2 and e2
follow.
Finally, for M3 we use Theorem 2.22 with α := β/u. Thus the maximum
seed length becomes
t = (1 + u/β) log(n˜(log d)/(1− p)) +O(1),
and for every i = 0, . . . , r, we have ˜`(i) − k(i) = O(t + β(log d)/u). Clearly,
T3 = Θ(2
t), and thus (using Theorem 4.31) the number of measurements
becomes m3 = T
1+ud1+β(log d). Moreover, we get
γ = max{1,Ω(d1−β/u/T )},
which gives
e3 = Ω(pTγ) = pmax{T, d1−β/u},
as claimed.
By combining this result with Lemma 4.29 using any explicit construction
of classical disjunct matrices, we will obtain (d, e;u)-disjunct matrices that
can be used in the threshold model with any fixed threshold, sparsity d, and
error tolerance be/2c.
In particular, using the coding-theoretic explicit construction of nearly
optimal classical disjunct matrices (see Table 4.2), we obtain (d, e;u)-disjunct
matrices with
m = O(m′d2(log n)/(1− p)2)
rows and error tolerance
e = Ω(e′pd(log n)/(1− p)),
where m′ and e′ are respectively the number of rows and error tolerance of
any of the regular matrices obtained in Theorem 4.32.
We note that in all cases, the final dependence on the sparsity parameter
d is, roughly, O(d3) which has an exponent independent of the threshold u.
Table 4.3 summarizes the obtained parameters for the general case (with ar-
bitrary gaps). We see that, when d is not negligibly small (e.g., d = n1/10),
the bounds obtained by our explicit constructions are significantly better than
those offered by strongly disjunct matrices (as in Table 4.2).
4.3.3.3 The Case with Positive Gaps
In preceding sections we have focused on the case where g = 0. However, we
observe that all the techniques that we have developed so far can be extended
to the positive-gap case in a straightforward way. The main observations are
as follows.
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Table 4.3: Summary of the parameters achieved by various threshold testing
schemes. The noise parameter p ∈ [0, 1) is arbitrary, and thresholds `, u =
`+ g are fixed constants. “Exp” and “Rnd” respectively indicate explicit and
randomized constructions.
Number of rows Tolerable Remarks
errors
O(dg+2 (log d) log(n/d)
(1−p)2 ) Ω(pd
log(n/d)
(1−p)2 ) Rnd: Construction 4.3.
O(dg+3 (log d) log
2 n
(1−p)2 ) Ω(pd
2 log
2 n
(1−p)2 ) Constructions 4.5 and 4.2 combined,
assuming optimal condensers and
strongly disjunct matrices.
O(dg+3 (log d)T2 logn
(1−p)g+2 ) Ω(pd
2 T2 logn
1−p ) Exp (?)
O(dg+3+β
T `3 logn
(1−p)g+2 ) Ω(pd
2−β logn
1−p ) Exp (??)
Ω(dg+2 logd n+ ed
g+1) e Lower bound (see Section 4.3.3.3).
(?) Constructions 4.5 and 4.2 combined using Theorem 4.19 and [120], where
T2 = exp(O(log
3 log n)) = quasipoly(log n).
(??) Constructions 4.5 and 4.2 combined using Theorem 2.22 and [120], where
β > 0 is any arbitrary constant and T3 = ((log n)(log d))
1+u/β =
poly(log n, log d).
1. Definition 4.26 can be adapted to allow more than a single distinguished
column in disjunct matrices. In particular, in general we may require
the matrix M to have more than e rows that u-satisfy every choice
of a critical set S, a zero set Z, and any g + 1 designated columns
D ⊆ S (at which all entries of the corresponding rows must be 1).
Denote this generalized notion by (d, e;u, g)-disjunct matrices. It is
straightforward to extend the arguments of Lemma 4.27 to show that
the generalized notion of (d, e;u, g)-disjunct matrices is necessary and
sufficient to capture non-adaptive threshold group testing with upper
threshold u and gap g.
2. Lemma 4.30 can be generalized to show that Construction 4.3 (with
probability 1−o(1)) results in a (d,Ωu(pd log(n/d)/(1−p)2);u, g)-disjunct
matrix if the number of measurements is increased by a factor O(dg).
3. Lemma 4.28 can be extended to positive gaps, by taking M1 as a (d −
1, e1; `− 1)-regular matrix, provided that, for every y ∈ M2[x]1,g+1 and
y′ ∈ M2[x′]1,g+1, we have |supp(y) \ supp(y′)| ≥ e2. In particular this
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is the case if M2 is strongly (d, e2 − 1; g + 1)-disjunct20. Similarly for
Lemma 4.29, M2 must be taken as a strongly (2d, e2; g+1)-disjunct ma-
trix. Consequently, using the coding-theoretic construction of strongly
disjunct matrices described in Section 4.3.2, our explicit constructions
of (d, e;u)-disjunct matrices can be extended to the gap model at the
cost of a factor O(dg) increase in the number of measurements (as sum-
marized in Table 4.3).
4. Observe that a (d, e;u, g)-disjunct matrix is in particular, strongly (d−
g, e; g+ 1)-disjunct and thus, the lower bound Ω(dg+2 logd n+ ed
g+1) on
the number of rows of strongly disjunct matrices applies to them as well.
4.4 Notes
The notion of d-disjunct matrices is also known in certain equivalent forms;
e.g., d-superimposed codes, d-separable matrices, or d-cover-free families (cf.
[50]). The special case of Definition 4.7 corresponding to (0, 0, e′0, 0)-resilient
matrices is related to the notion of selectors in [43] and resolvable matrices in
[56]. Lemma 4.10 is similar in spirit to the lower bound obtained in [43] for
the size of selectors.
The notion of strongly disjunct matrices, in its general form, has been
studied in the literature under different names and equivalent formulations,
e.g., superimposed (u, d)-designs/codes and (u, d) cover-free families (see [26,
28,53,91,144,145] and the references therein).
4.A Some Technical Details
For a positive integer c > 1, define a c-hypergraph as a tuple (V,E), where V
is the set of vertices and E is the set of hyperedges such that every e ∈ E is
a subset of V of size c. The degree of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted by deg(v), is
the size of the set {e ∈ E : v ∈ E}. Note that |E| ≤ (|V |c ) and deg(v) ≤ ( |V |c−1).
The density of the hypergraph is given by |E|/(|V |c ). A vertex cover on the
hypergraph is a subset of vertices that contains at least one vertex from every
hyperedge. A matching is a set of pairwise disjoint hyperedges. It is well
known that any dense hypergraph must have a large matching. Below we
reconstruct a proof of this claim.
Proposition 4.33. Let H be a c-hypergraph such that every vertex cover of
H has size at least k. Then H has a matching of size at least k/c.
Proof. Let M be a maximal matching of H, i.e., a matching that cannot be
extended by adding further hyperedges. Let C be the set of all vertices that
20Here we are also considering the unavoidable assumption that
max{|supp(x) \ supp(x′)|, |supp(x′) \ supp(x)|} > g.
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participate in hyperedges of M . Then C has to be a vertex cover, as otherwise
one could add an uncovered hyperedge to M and violate maximality of M .
Hence, c|M | = |C| ≥ k, and the claim follows.
Lemma 4.34. Let H = (V,E) be a c-hypergraph with density at least  > 0.
Then H has a matching of size at least 
c2
(|V | − c+ 1).
Proof. For every subset S ⊆ V of size c, denote by 1(S) the indicator value
of S being in E. Let C be any vertex cover of H. Denote by S the set of all
subsets of V of size c. Then we have

(|V |
c
)
≤
∑
S∈S
1(S) ≤
∑
v∈C
deg(v) ≤ |C|
( |V |
c− 1
)
.
Hence, |C| ≥ (n− c+ 1)/c, and the claim follows using Proposition 4.33.
Andantino
Fre´de´ric Chopin (1810–1849): Ballade Op. 38 No. 2 in F major.

“How is an error possible in
mathematics?”
— Henri Poincare´
Chapter 5
Capacity Achieving Codes
One of the basic goals of coding theory is coming up with efficient construc-
tions of error-correcting codes that allow reliable transmission of information
over discrete communication channels. Already in the seminal work of Shan-
non [136], the notion of channel capacity was introduced which is a charac-
teristic of the communication channel that determines the maximum rate at
which reliable transmission of information (i.e., with vanishing error proba-
bility) is possible. However, Shannon’s result did not focus on the feasibility
of the underlying code and mainly concerned with the existence of reliable,
albeit possibly complex, coding schemes. Here feasibility can refer to a com-
bination of several criteria, including: succinct description of the code and its
efficient computability, the existence of an efficient encoder and an efficient
decoder, the error probability, and the set of message lengths for which the
code is defined.
Besides heuristic attempts, there is a large body of rigorous work in the
literature on coding theory with the aim of designing feasible capacity ap-
proaching codes for various discrete channels, most notably, the natural and
fundamental cases of the binary erasure channel (BEC) and binary symmetric
channel (BSC). Some notable examples in “modern coding” include Turbo
codes and sparse graph codes (e.g., LDPC codes and Fountain codes, cf.
[13,125,137]). These classes of codes are either known or strongly believed to
contain capacity achieving ensembles for the erasure and symmetric channels.
While such codes are very appealing both theoretically and practically, and
are in particular designed with efficient decoding in mind, in this area there
still is a considerable gap between what we can prove and what is evidenced by
practical results, mainly due to complex combinatorial structure of the code
constructions. Moreover, almost all known code constructions in this area
involve a considerable amount of randomness, which makes them prone to a
possibility of design failure (e.g., choosing an “unfortunate” degree sequence
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for an LDPC code). While the chance of such possibilities is typically small, in
general there is no known efficient way to certify whether a particular outcome
of the code construction is satisfactory. Thus, it is desirable to come up with
constructions of provably capacity achieving code families that are explicit,
i.e., are efficient and do not involve any randomness.
Explicit construction of capacity achieving codes was considered as early
as the classic work of Forney [60], who showed that concatenated codes can
achieve the capacity of various memoryless channels. In this construction, an
outer MDS code is concatenated with an inner code with small block length
that can be found in reasonable time by brute force search. An important
subsequent work by Justesen [87] (that was originally aimed for explicit con-
struction of asymptotically good codes) shows that it is possible to eliminate
the brute force search by varying the inner code used for encoding different
symbols of the outer encoding, provided that the ensemble of inner codes
contains a large fraction of capacity achieving codes.
Recently, Arikan [7] gave a framework for deterministic construction of
capacity achieving codes for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) with bi-
nary input that are equipped with efficient encoders and decoders and attain
slightly worse than exponentially small error probability. These codes are de-
fined for every block length that is a power of two, which might be considered
a restrictive requirement. Moreover, the construction is currently explicit (in
the sense of polynomial-time computability of the code description) only for
the special case of BEC and requires exponential time otherwise.
In this chapter, we revisit the concatenation scheme of Justesen and give
new constructions of the underlying ensemble of the inner codes. The code
ensemble used in Justesen’s original construction is attributed to Wozencraft.
Other ensembles that are known to be useful in this scheme include the en-
semble of Goppa codes and shortened cyclic codes (see [127], Chapter 12).
The number of codes in these ensembles is exponential in the block length
and they achieve exponentially small error probability. These ensembles are
also known to achieve the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, and owe their capacity
achieving properties to the property that each nonzero vector belongs to a
small number of the codes in the ensemble.
Here, we will use extractors and lossless condensers to construct much
smaller ensembles with similar, random-like, properties. The quality of the
underlying extractor or condenser determines the quality of the resulting code
ensemble. In particular, the size of the code ensemble, the decoding error and
proximity to the channel capacity are determined by the seed length, the error,
and the output length of the extractor or condenser being used.
As a concrete example, we will instantiate our construction with appro-
priate choices of the underlying condenser (or extractor) and obtain, for every
block length n, a capacity achieving ensemble of size 2n that attains expo-
nentially small error probability for both erasure and symmetric channels (as
well as the broader range of channels described above), and an ensemble of
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quasipolynomial1 size 2O(log
3 n) that attains the capacity of BEC. Using nearly
optimal extractors and condensers that require logarithmic seed lengths, it is
possible to obtain polynomially small capacity achieving ensembles for any
block length.
Finally, we apply our constructions to Justesen’s concatenation scheme to
obtain an explicit construction of capacity-achieving codes for both BEC and
BSC that attain exponentially small error, as in the original construction of
Forney. Moreover, the running time of the encoder is almost linear in the block
length, and decoding takes almost linear time for BEC and almost quadratic
time for BSC. Using our quasipolynomial-sized ensemble as the inner code, we
are able to construct a fully explicit code for BEC that is defined and capacity
achieving for every choice of the message length.
5.1 Discrete Communication Channels
A discrete communication channel is a randomized process that takes a po-
tentially infinite stream of symbols X0, X1, . . . from an input alphabet Σ and
outputs an infinite stream Y0, Y1, . . . from an output alphabet Γ. The indices
intuitively represent the time, and each output symbol is only determined
from what channel has observed in the past. More precisely, given X0, . . . , Xt,
the output symbol Yt must be independent of Xt+1, Xt+2, . . .. Here we will
concentrate on finite input and finite output channels, that is, the alphabets
Σ and Γ are finite. In this case, the conditional distribution p(Yt|Xt) of each
output symbol Yt given the input symbol Xt can be written as a stochastic
|Σ| × |Γ| transition matrix, where each row is a probability distribution.
Of particular interest is a memoryless channel, which is intuitively “oblivi-
ous” of the past. In this case, the transition matrix is independent of the time
instance. That is, we have p(Yt|Xt) = p(Y0|X0) for every t. When the rows
of the transition matrix are permutations of one another and so is the case
for the columns, the channel is called symmetric. For example, the channel
defined by
p(Y |X) =
0.4 0.1 0.50.5 0.4 0.1
0.1 0.5 0.4

is symmetric. Intuitively, a symmetric channel does not “read” the input
sequence. An important class of symmetric channels is defined by additive
noise. In an additive noise channel, the input and output alphabets are the
same finite field Fq and each output symbol Yt is obtained from Xt using
Yt = Xt + Zt,
1A quantity f(n) is said to be quasipolynomial in n (denoted by f(n) = quasipoly(n)) if
f(n) = 2(logn)
O(1)
.
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where the addition is over Fq and the channel noise Zt ∈ Fq is chosen inde-
pendently of the input sequence2. Typically Zt is also independent of time t,
in which case we get a memoryless additive noise channel. For a noise distri-
bution Z, we denote the memoryless additive noise channel over the input (as
well as output) alphabet Σ by SC(Σ,Z).
Note that the notion of additive noise channels can be extended to the
case where the input and alphabet sets are vector spaces Fnq , and the noise
distribution is a probability distribution over Fnq . By considering an isomor-
phism between Fnq and the field extension Fqn , such a channel is essentially an
additive noise channel SC(Fqn ,Z), where Z is a noise distribution over Fqn .
On the other hand, the channel SC(Fqn ,Z) can be regarded as a “block-wise
memoryless” channel over the alphabet Fq. Namely, in a natural way, each
channel use over the alphabet Fqn can be regarded as n subsequent uses of a
channel over the alphabet Fq. When regarding the channel over Fq, it does
not necessarily remain memoryless since the additive noise distribution Z can
be an arbitrary distribution over Fqn and is not necessarily expressible as a
product distribution over Fq. However, the noise distribution of blocks of n
subsequent channel uses are independent from one another and form a product
distribution (since the original channel SC(Fqn ,Z) is memoryless over Fqn).
Often by choosing larger and larger values of n and letting n grow to infinity, it
is possible to obtain good approximations of a non-memoryless additive noise
channel using memoryless additive noise channels over large alphabets.
An important additive noise channel is the q-ary symmetric channel , which
is defined by a (typically small) noise parameter p ∈ [0, 1). For this channel,
the noise distribution Z has a probability mass 1 − p on zero, and p/(q − 1)
on every nonzero alphabet letter. A fundamental special case is the binary
symmetric channel (BSC), which corresponds to the case q = 2 and is denoted
by BSC(p).
Another fundamentally important channel is the binary erasure channel .
The input alphabet for this channel is {0, 1} and the output alphabet is the set
{0, 1, ?}. The transition is characterized by an erasure probability p ∈ [0, 1).
A transmitted symbol is output intact by the channel with probability 1− p.
However, with probability p, a special erasure symbol “?” is delivered by the
channel. The behavior of the binary symmetric channel BSC(p) and binary
erasure channel BEC(p) is schematically described by Figure 5.1.
A channel encoder E for a channel C with input alphabet Σ and output
alphabet Γ is a mapping C : {0, 1}k → Σn. A channel decoder, on the other
hand, is a mapping D : Γn → {0, 1}k. A channel encoder and a channel de-
coder collectively describe a channel code. Note that the image of the encoder
mapping defines a block code of length n over the alphabet Σ. The parameter
2 In fact, since we are only using the additive structure of Fq, it can be replaced by any
additive group, and in particular, the ring Z/qZ for an arbitrary integer q > 1. This way, q
does not need to be restricted to a prime power.
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0
1 1
0
1− p
1− p
p
p
0
1 1
0
?
1− p
1− p
p
p
Figure 5.1: The binary symmetric channel (left) and binary erasure channel
(right). On each graph, the left part corresponds to the input alphabet and
the right part to the output alphabet. Conditional probability of each output
symbol given an input symbol is shown by the labels on the corresponding
arrows.
n defines the block length of the code. For a sequence Y ∈ Σn, denote by the
random variable C(Y ) a sequence Yˆ ∈ Γn that is output by the channel, given
the input Y .
Intuitively, a channel encoder adds sufficient redundancy to a given “mes-
sage” X ∈ {0, 1}k (that is without loss of generality modeled as a binary
string of length k), resulting in an encoded sequence Y ∈ Σn that can be fed
into the channel. The channel manipulates the encoded sequence and delivers
a sequence Yˆ ∈ Γn to a recipient whose aim is to recover X. The recovery
process is done by applying the channel decoder on the received sequence Yˆ .
The transmission is successful when D(Yˆ ) = X. Since the channel behavior
is not deterministic, there might be a nonzero probability, known as the error
probability, that the transmission is unsuccessful. More precisely, the error
probability of a channel code is defined as
pe := sup
X∈{0,1}k
Pr[D(C(E(X))) 6= X],
where the probability is taken over the randomness of C. A schematic diagram
of a simple communication system consisting of an encoder, point-to-point
channel, and decoder is shown in Figure 5.2.
Channel
Encoder
X = (X1, . . . ,Xk) Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
message redundant encoding received sequence
Yˆ = (Yˆ1, . . . , Yˆn)
Channel 
Decoder
Channel
p(Yˆ |Y )
estimate
Xˆ = (Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆk)
Figure 5.2: The schematic diagram of a point-to-point communication sys-
tem. The stochastic behavior of the channel is captured by the conditional
probability distribution p(Yˆ |Y ).
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For linear codes over additive noise channels, it is often convenient to
work with syndrome decoders. Consider a linear code with generator and
parity check matrices G and H, respectively. The encoding of a message
x (considered as a row vector) can thus be written as xG. Suppose that
the encoded sequence is transmitted over an additive noise channel, which
produces a noisy sequence y := xG+ z, for a randomly chosen z according to
the channel distribution. The receiver receives the sequence y and, without
loss of generality, the decoder’s task is to obtain an estimate of the noise
realization z from y. Now, observe that
Hy> = HG>x> +Hz> = Hz>,
where the last equality is due to the orthogonality of the generator and par-
ity check matrices. Therefore, Hz> is available to the decoder and thus, in
order to decode the received sequence, it suffices to obtain an estimate of the
noise sequence z from the syndrome Hz>. A syndrome decoder is a function
that, given the syndrome, outputs an estimate of the noise sequence (note
that this is independent of the codeword being sent). The error probability of
a syndrome decoder can be simply defined as the probability (over the noise
randomness) that it obtains an incorrect estimate of the noise sequence. Ob-
viously, the error probability of a syndrome decoder upper bounds the error
probability of the channel code.
The rate of a channel code (in bits per channel use) is defined as the
quantity k/n. We call a rate r ≥ 0 feasible if for every  > 0, there is a
channel code with rate r and error probability at most . The rate of a channel
code describes its efficiency; the larger the rate, the more information can
be transmitted through the channel in a given “time frame”. A fundamental
question is, given a channel C, to find the largest possible rate at which reliable
transmission is possible. In his fundamental work, Shannon [136] introduced
the notion of channel capacity that answers this question. Shannon capacity
can be defined using purely information-theoretic terminology. However, for
the purposes of this chapter, it is more convenient to use the following, more
“computational”, definition which turns out to be equivalent to the original
notion of Shannon capacity:
Cap(C) := sup{r | r is a feasible rate for the channel C}.
Capacity of memoryless symmetric channels has a particularly nice form.
Let Z denote the probability distribution defined by any of the rows of the
transition matrix of a memoryless symmetric channel C with output alphabet
Γ. Then, capacity of C is given by
Cap(C) = log2 |Γ| −H(Z),
where H(·) denotes the Shannon entropy [40, Section 7.2]. In particular,
capacity of the binary symmetric channel BSC(p) (in bits per channel use) is
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equal to
1− h(p) = 1 + p log2 p+ (1− p) log2(1− p).
Capacity of the binary erasure channel BEC(p) is moreover known to be 1− p
[40, Section 7.1].
A family of channel codes of rate r is an infinite set of channel codes, such
that for every (typically small) rate loss δ ∈ (0, r) and block length n, the
family contains a code C(n, δ) of length at least n and rate at least r− δ. The
family is called explicit if there is a deterministic algorithm that, given n and δ
as parameters, computes the encoder function of the code C(n, δ) in polynomial
time in n. For linear channel codes, this is equivalent to computing a generator
or parity check matrix of the code in polynomial time. If, additionally, the
algorithm receives an auxiliary index i ∈ [s], for a size parameter s depending
on n and δ, we instead get an ensemble of size s of codes. An ensemble can
be interpreted as a set of codes of length n and rate at least r − δ each, that
contains a code for each possibility of the index i.
We call a family of codes capacity achieving for a channel C if the family is
of rate Cap(C) and moreover, the code C(n, δ) as described above can be chosen
to have an arbitrarily small error probability for the channel C. If the error
probability decays exponentially with the block length n; i.e., pe = O(2
−γn),
for a constant γ > 0 (possibly depending on the rate loss), then the family is
said to achieve an error exponent γ. We call the family capacity achieving for
all lengths if it is capacity achieving and moreover, there is an integer constant
n0 (depending only on the rate loss δ) such that for every n ≥ n0, the code
C(n, δ) can be chosen to have length exactly n.
5.2 Codes for the Binary Erasure Channel
Any code with minimum distance d can tolerate up to d − 1 erasures in the
worst case3. Thus one way to ensure reliable communication over BEC(p)
is to use binary codes with relative minimum distance of about p. However,
known negative bounds on the rate-distance trade-off (e.g., the sphere packing
and MRRW bounds) do not allow the rate of such codes to approach the
capacity 1 − p. However, by imposing the weaker requirement that most of
the erasure patterns should be recoverable, it is possible to attain the capacity
with a positive, but arbitrarily small, error probability (as guaranteed by the
definition of capacity).
In this section, we consider a different relaxation that preserves the worst-
case guarantee on the erasure patterns; namely we consider ensembles of linear
codes with the property that any pattern of up to p erasures must be tolerable
by all but a negligible fraction of the codes in the ensemble. This in particular
allows us to construct ensembles in which all but a negligible fraction of the
3See Appendix A for a quick review of the basic notions in coding theory.
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codes are capacity achieving for BEC. Note that as we are only considering
linear codes, recoverability from a particular erasure pattern S ⊆ [n] (where n
is the block length) is a property of the code and independent of the encoded
sequence.
Now we introduce two constructions, which employ strong, linear extrac-
tors and lossless condensers as their main ingredients. Throughout this section
we denote by f : Fn2 × Fd2 → Fr2 a strong, linear, lossless condenser for min-
entropy m and error  and by g : Fn2 × Fd
′
2 → Fk2 a strong, linear extractor
for min-entropy n −m and error ′. We assume that the errors  and ′ are
substantially small. Using this notation, we define the ensembles F and G as
in Construction 5.1.
Obviously, the rate of each code in F is at least 1− r/n. Moreover, as g is
a strong extractor we can assume without loss of generality that the rank of
each Gu is exactly
4 k. Thus, each code in G has rate k/n. Lemma 5.2 below
is our main tool in quantifying the erasure decoding capabilities of the two
ensembles. Before stating the lemma, we mention a proposition showing that
linear condensers applied on affine sources achieve either zero or large errors:
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that a distribution X is uniformly supported on an
affine k-dimensional subspace over Fnq . Consider a linear function f : F
n
q →
Fmq , and define the distribution Y as Y := f(X ). Suppose that, for some
integer k and  < 1/2, Y is -close to having either min-entropy m log q or at
least k log q. Then,  = 0.
Proof. By linearity, Y is uniformly supported on an affine subspace A of Fmq .
Let k′ ≤ m be the dimension of this subspace, and observe that k′ ≤ k.
4 This causes no loss of generality since, if the rank of some Gu is not maximal, one of
the k symbols output by the linear function g(·, u) would linearly depend on the others and
thus, the function would fail to be an extractor for any source (so one can arbitrarily modify
g(·, u) to have rank k without negatively affecting the parameters of the extractor g).
Ensemble F : Define a code Cu for each seed u ∈ Fd2 as follows: Let Hu
denote the r × n matrix that defines the linear function f(·, u), i.e.,
for each x ∈ Fn2 , Hu · x = f(x, u). Then Hu is a parity check matrix
for Cu.
Ensemble G: Define a code C′u for each seed u ∈ Fd
′
2 as follows: Let Gu
denote the k×n matrix that defines the linear function g(·, u). Then
Gu is a generator matrix for C′u.
Construction 5.1: Ensembles F and G of error-correcting codes.
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First, suppose that Y is -close to a distribution with min-entropy m log q;
i.e., the uniform distribution on Fmq . Now, the statistical distance between Y
and the uniform distribution is, by definition,∑
x∈A
(q−k
′ − q−m) = 1− qk′−m − 1.
Since  < 1/4, q ≥ 2, and k′ and m are integers, this implies that the distance
is greater than 1/2 (a contradiction) unless k′ = m, in which case it becomes
zero. Therefore, the output distribution is exactly uniform over Fmq .
Now consider the case where Y is -close to having min-entropy at least
k log q. Considering that k′ ≤ k, the definition of statistical distance implies
that  is at least ∑
x∈A
(q−k
′ − q−k) = 1− qk′−k.
Similarly as before, we get that k′ = k, meaning that Y is precisely a distri-
bution with min-entropy k log q.
Lemma 5.2. Let S ⊆ [n] be a set of size at most m. Then all but a 5
fraction of the codes in F and all but a 5′ fraction of those in G can tolerate
the erasure pattern defined by S.
Proof. We prove the result for the ensemble G. The argument for F is similar.
Consider a probability distribution S on Fn2 that is uniform on the coordinates
specified by S¯ := [n] \ S and fixed to zeros elsewhere. Thus the min-entropy
of S is at least n − m, and the distribution (U, g(S, U)), where U ∼ Ud′ , is
′-close to Ud′+k.
By Corollary 2.13, for all but a 5′ fraction of the choices of u ∈ Fd′2 , the
distribution of g(S, u) is (1/5)-close to Uk. Fix such a u. By Proposition 5.1,
the distribution of g(S, u) must in fact be exactly uniform. Thus, the k ×m
submatrix of Gu consisting of the columns picked by S¯ must have rank k,
which implies that for every x ∈ Fk2, the projection of the encoding x ·Gu to
the coordinates chosen by S¯ uniquely identifies x.
The lemma combined with a counting argument implies the following corol-
lary:
Corollary 5.3. Let S be any distribution on the subsets of [n] of size at most
m. Then all but a
√
5 (resp.,
√
5′) fraction of the codes in F (resp., G) can
tolerate erasure patterns sampled from S with probability at least 1 − √5
(resp., 1−√5′).
Note that the result holds irrespective of the distribution S, contrary to
the familiar case of BEC(p) for which the erasure pattern is an i.i.d. (i.e.,
independent and identically-distributed) sequence. For the case of BEC(p),
the erasure pattern (regarded as its binary characteristic vector in Fn2 ) is given
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by S := (S1, . . . , Sn), where the random variables S1, . . . , Sn ∈ F2 are i.i.d.
and Pr[Si = 1] = p. We denote this particular distribution by Bn,p, which
assigns a nonzero probability to every vector in Fn2 . Thus in this case we
cannot directly apply Corollary 5.3. However, note that Bn,p can be written
as a convex combination
(5.1) Bn,p = (1− γ)Un,≤p′ + γD,
for p′ := p + Ω(1) that is arbitrarily close to p, where D is an “error distri-
bution” whose contribution γ is exponentially small. The distribution Un,≤p′
is the distribution Bn,p conditioned on vectors of weight at most np′. Corol-
lary 5.3 applies to Un,≤p′ by setting m = np′. Moreover, by the convex com-
bination above, the erasure decoding error probability of any code for erasure
pattern distributions Bn,p and Un,≤p′ differ by no more than γ. Therefore, the
above result applied to the erasure distribution Un,≤p′ handles the particular
case of BEC(p) with essentially no change in the error probability.
In light of Corollary 5.3, in order to obtain rates arbitrarily close to the
channel capacity, the output lengths of f and g must be sufficiently close to the
entropy requirement m. More precisely, it suffices to have r ≤ (1 + α)m and
k ≥ (1−α)m for arbitrarily small constant α > 0. The seed length of f and g
determine the size of the code ensemble. Moreover, the error of the extractor
and condenser determine the erasure error probability of the resulting code
ensemble. As achieving the channel capacity is the most important concern
for us, we will need to instantiate f (resp., g) with a linear, strong, lossless
condenser (resp., extractor) whose output length is close to m. We mention
one such instantiation for each function.
For both functions f and g, we can use the explicit extractor and loss-
less condenser obtained from the Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma 2.17), which
is optimal in the output length, but requires a large seed, namely, d = n.
The ensemble resulting this way will thus have size 2n, but attains a posi-
tive error exponent δ/2 for an arbitrary rate loss δ > 0. Using an optimal
lossless condenser or extractor with seed length d = log(n) +O(log(1/)) and
output length close to m, it is possible to obtain a polynomially small capacity-
achieving ensemble. However, in order to obtain an explicit ensemble of codes,
the condenser of extractor being used must be explicit as well.
In the world of linear extractors, we can use Trevisan’s extractor (The-
orem 2.20) to improve the size of the ensemble compared to what obtained
from the Leftover Hash Lemma. In particular, Trevisan’s extractor combined
with Corollary 5.3 (using ensemble G) immediately gives the following result:
Corollary 5.4. Let p, c > 0 be arbitrary constants. Then for every integer
n > 0, there is an explicit ensemble G of linear codes of rate 1 − p − o(1)
such that, the size of G is quasipolynomial, i.e., |G| = 2O(c3 log3 n), and, all but
an n−c = o(1) fraction of the codes in the ensemble have error probability at
most n−c when used over BEC(p).
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For the ensemble F , on the other hand, we can use the linear lossless
condenser of Guruswami et al. that only requires a logarithmic seed (Corollary
2.23). Using this condenser combined with Corollary 5.3, we can strengthen
the above result as follows:
Corollary 5.5. Let p, c, α > 0 be arbitrary constants. Then for every integer
n > 0, there is an explicit ensemble F of linear codes of rate 1 − p − α such
that |G| = O(nc′) for a constant c′ only depending on c, α. Moreover, all but
an n−c = o(1) fraction of the codes in the ensemble have error probability at
most n−c when used over BEC(p).
5.3 Codes for the Binary Symmetric Channel
The goal of this section is to design capacity achieving code ensembles for
the binary symmetric channel BSC(p). In order to do so, we obtain codes for
the general (and not necessarily memoryless) class SC(Fq,Z) of symmetric
channels, where Z is any flat distribution or sufficiently close to one. For
concreteness, we will focus on the binary case where q = 2.
Recall that the capacity of BSC(Z), seen as a binary channel, is 1− h(Z)
where h(Z) is the entropy rate of Z. The special case BSC(p) is obtained by
setting Z = Bn,p; i.e., the product distribution of n Bernoulli random variables
with probability p of being equal to 1.
The code ensemble that we use for the symmetric channel is the ensemble
F , obtained from linear lossless condensers, that we introduced in the pre-
ceding section. Thus, we adopt the notation (and parameters) that we used
before for defining the ensemble F . Recall that each code in the ensemble has
rate at least 1−r/n. In order to show that the ensemble is capacity achieving,
we consider the following brute-force decoder for each code:
Brute-force decoder for code Cu: Given a received word yˆ ∈ Fn2 ,
find a codeword y ∈ Fn2 of Cu used and a vector z ∈ supp(Z) such
that yˆ = y + z. Output y, or an arbitrary codeword if no such
pair is found. If there is more than one choice for the codeword y,
arbitrarily choose one of them.
For each u ∈ Fd2, denote by E(Cu,Z) the error probability of the above
decoder for code Cu over BSC(F2,Z). The following lemma quantifies this
probability:
Lemma 5.6. Let Z be a flat distribution with entropy m. Then for at least
a 1− 2√ fraction of the choices of u ∈ Fd2, we have E(Cu,Z) ≤
√
.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from the almost-injectivity property of
lossless condensers discussed in Section 2.2.2. We will use this property to
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construct a syndrome decoder for the code ensemble that achieves a sufficiently
small error probability.
By Corollary 2.13, for a 1− 2√ fraction of the choices of u ∈ {0, 1}d, the
distribution Y := f(Z, u) is (√/2)-close to having min-entropy at least m.
Fix any such u. We show that the error probability E(Cu,Z) is bounded by√
.
For each y ∈ Fr2, define
N (y) := |{x ∈ supp(Z) : f(x, u) = y}|
and recall that f(x, u) = Hu ·x. Now suppose that a message is encoded using
the code Cu to an encoding x ∈ Cu, and that x is transmitted through the
channel. The error probability E(Cu,Z) can be written as
E(Cu,Z) = Pr
z∼Z
[∃x′ ∈ Cu, ∃z′ ∈ supp(Z) \ z : x+ z = x′ + z′]
≤ Pr
z∼Z
[∃x′ ∈ Cu, ∃z′ ∈ supp(Z) \ z : Hu · (x+ z) = Hu · (x′ + z′)]
= Pr
z∼Z
[∃z′ ∈ supp(Z) \ z : Hu · z = Hu · z′](5.2)
= Pr
z∼Z
[N (H · z) > 1]
= Pr
z∼Z
[N (f(x, u)) > 1],(5.3)
where (5.2) uses the fact that any codeword of Cu is in the right kernel of Hu.
By the first part of Proposition 2.14, there is a set T ⊆ Fr2 of size at least
(1−√)|supp(Z)| such that, N (y) = 1 for every y ∈ T . Since Z is uniformly
distributed on its support, this combined with (5.3) immediately implies that
E(Cu,Z) ≤
√
.
The lemma implies that any linear lossless condenser with entropy require-
ment m can be used to construct an ensemble of codes such that all but a
small fraction of the codes are good for reliable transmission over BSC(Z),
where Z is an arbitrary flat distribution with entropy at most m. Similar to
the case of BEC, the seed length determines the size of the ensemble, the error
of the condenser bounds the error probability of the decoder, and the output
length determines the proximity of the rate to the capacity of the channel.
Again, using the condenser given by the Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma 2.17),
we can obtain a capacity achieving ensemble of size 2n. Moreover, using the
linear lossless condenser of Guruswami et al. (Corollary 2.23) the ensemble
can be made polynomially small (similar to the result given by Corollary 5.5).
It is not hard to see that the converse of the above result is also true;
namely, that any ensemble of linear codes that is universally capacity achieving
with respect to any choice of the noise distribution Z defines a strong linear,
lossless, condenser. This is spelled out in the lemma below.
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Lemma 5.7. Let {C1, . . . , CT } be a binary code ensemble of length n and
dimension n − r such that for every flat distribution Z with min-entropy at
most m on Fn2 , all but a γ fraction of the codes in the ensemble (for some
γ ∈ [0, 1)) achieve error probability at most  (under syndrome decoding)
when used over SC(Fqn ,Z). Then the function f : Fn2 × [T ]→ Fr2 defined as
f(x, u) := Hu · x,
where Hu is a parity check matrix of Cu, is a strong, lossless, (m, 2 + γ)-
condenser.
Proof. The proof is straightforward using similar arguments as in Lemma 5.6.
Without loss of generality (by Proposition 2.8), let Z be a flat distribution
with min-entropy m, and denote by D : Fr2 → Fn2 the corresponding syndrome
decoder. Moreover, without loss of generality we have taken the decoder to be
a deterministic function. For a randomized decoder, one can fix the internal
coin flips so as to preserve the upper bound on its error probability. Now let u
be chosen such that Cu achieves an error probability at most  (we know this
is the case for at least γT of the choices of u).
Denote by T ⊆ supp(Z) the set of noise realizations that can potentially
confuse the syndrome decoder. Namely,
T := {z ∈ supp(Z) : ∃z′ ∈ supp(Z), z′ 6= z,Hu · z = Hu · z′}.
Note that, for a random Z ∼ Z, conditioned on the event that Z ∈ T , the
probability that the syndrome decoder errs on Z is at least 1/2, since we know
that Z can be confused by at least one different noise realization. We can write
this more precisely as
Pr
Z∼Z
[D(Z) 6= Z | Z ∈ T ] ≥ 1/2.
Since the error probability of the decoder is upper bounded by , we conclude
that
Pr
Z∼Z
[Z ∈ T ] ≤ 2.
Therefore, the fraction of the elements on support of Z that collide with some
other element under the mapping defined by Hu is at most 2. Namely,
|{Hu · z : z ∈ supp(Z)}| ≥ 2m(1− 2),
and this is true for at least 1 − γ fraction of the choices of u. Thus, for a
uniformly random U ∈ [T ] and Z ∼ Z, the distribution of (U,HU · Z) has a
support of size at least
(1− γ)(1− 2)T2m ≥ (1− γ − 2)T2m.
By the second part of Proposition 2.14, we conclude that this distribution is
(2+ γ)-close to having entropy m+ log T and thus, the function f defined in
the statement is a strong lossless (m, 2+ γ)-condenser.
5.3. CODES FOR THE BINARY SYMMETRIC CHANNEL 139
By this lemma, the known lower bounds on the seed length and the output
length of lossless condensers that we discussed in Chapter 2 translate into lower
bounds on the size of the code ensemble and proximity to the capacity that
can be obtained from our framework. In particular, in order to get a positive
error exponent (i.e., exponentially small error in the block length), the size of
the ensemble must be exponentially large.
It is worthwhile to point out that the code ensembles F and G discussed
in this and the preceding section preserve their erasure and error correcting
properties under any change of basis in the ambient space Fn2 , due to the
fact that a change of basis applied on any linear condenser results in a linear
condenser with the same parameters. This is a property achieved by the
trivial, but large, ensemble of codes defined by the set of all r×n parity check
matrices. Observe that no single code can be universal in this sense, and it is
inevitable to have a sufficiently large ensemble to attain this property.
The Case BSC(p)
For the special case of BSC(p), the noise distribution Bn,p is not a flat distri-
bution. Fortunately, similar to the BEC case, we can again use convex com-
binations to show that the result obtained in Lemma 5.6 can be extended to
this important noise distribution. The main tool that we need is an extension
of Lemma 5.6 to convex combinations with a small number of components.
Suppose that the noise distribution Z is not a flat distribution but can be
written as a convex combination
(5.4) Z = α1Z1 + · · ·+ αtZt.
of t flat distributions, where the number t of summands is not too large, and
|supp(Z1)| ≥ |supp(Z2)| ≥ · · · ≥ |supp(Zt)|.
For this more general case, we need to slightly tune our brute-force decoder
in the way it handles ties. In particular, we now require the decoder to find
a codeword y ∈ Cu and a potential noise vector z ∈ supp(Z) that add up to
the received word, as before. However, in case more than one matching pair
is found, we will require the decoder to choose the one whose noise vector
z belongs to the component Z1, . . . ,Zt with smallest support (i.e., largest
index). If the noise vector z ∈ supp(Zi) that maximizes the index i is still not
unique, the decoder can arbitrarily choose one. Under these conventions, we
can now prove the following:
Lemma 5.8. Suppose that a noise distribution Z is as in (5.4), where each
component Zi has entropy at mostm, and the function f defining the ensemble
F is a strong lossless (≤ m+1, )-condenser. Then for at least a 1− t(t+1)√
fraction of the choices of u ∈ Fd2, the brute-force decoder satisfies E(Cu,Z) ≤
2t
√
.
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Proof. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ t, we define a flat distribution Zij that is
uniformly supported on supp(Zi) ∪ supp(Zj). Observe that each Zij has min-
entropy at most m + 1 and thus the function f is a lossless condenser with
error at most  for this source. By Corollary 2.13 and a union bound, for a
1− t(t+ 1)√ fraction of the choices of u ∈ {0, 1}d, all t(t+ 1)/2 distributions
f(Zij , u) : 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ t
are simultaneously (
√
/2)-close to having min-entropy at least m. Fix any
such u.
Consider a random variable Z, representing the channel noise, that is
sampled from Z as follows: First choose an index I ∈ [t] randomly according
to the distribution induced by (α1, . . . , αt) over the indices, and then sample
a random noise Z ∼ ZI . Using the same line of reasoning leading to (5.2)
in the proof of Lemma 5.6, the error probability with respect to the code Cu
(i.e., the probability that the tuned distance decoder gives a wrong estimate
on the noise realization Z) can now be bounded as
E(Cu,Z) ≤ Pr
I,Z
[∃i ∈ {I, . . . , t}, ∃z′ ∈ supp(Zi) \ Z : f(Z, u) = f(z′, u)].
For i = 1, . . . , t, denote by Ei the right hand side probability in the above
bound conditioned on the event that I = i. Fix any choice of the index i.
Now it suffices to obtain an upper bound on Ei irrespective of the choice of i,
since
E(Cu,Z) ≤
∑
i∈[t]
αiEi.
We call a noise realization z ∈ supp(Zi) confusable if
∃j ≥ i,∃z′ ∈ supp(Zj) \ z : f(z, u) = f(z′, u).
That is, a noise realization is confusable if it can potentially cause the brute-
force decoder to compute a wrong noise estimate. Our goal is to obtain an
upper bound on the fraction of vectors on supp(Zi) that are confusable.
For each j ≥ i, we know that f(Zij , u) is (
√
/2)-close to having min-
entropy at least m. Therefore, by the first part of Proposition 2.14, the set of
confusable elements
{z ∈ supp(Zi) : ∃z′ ∈ supp(Zj) \ z such that f(z, u) = f(z′, u)}
has size at most
√
|supp(Zij)| ≤ 2
√
|supp(Zi)| (using the fact that, since
j ≥ i, the support of Zj is no larger than that of Zi). By a union bound on
the choices of j, we see that the fraction of confusable elements on supp(Zi)
is at most 2t
√
. Therefore, Ei ≤ 2t
√
 and we get the desired upper bound on
the error probability of the brute-force decoder.
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The result obtained by Lemma 5.8 can be applied to the channel BSC(p)
by observing that the noise distribution Bn,p can be written as a convex com-
bination
Bn,p =
n(p+η)∑
i=n(p−η)
αiUn,i + γD,
where Un,i denotes the flat distribution supported on binary vectors of length
n and Hamming weight exactly i, and D is the distribution Bn,p conditioned on
the vectors whose Hamming weights lie outside the range [n(p− η), n(p+ η)].
The parameter η > 0 can be chosen as an arbitrarily small real number, so
that the min-entropies of the distributions Un,i become arbitrarily close to the
Shannon entropy of Bn,p; namely, nh(p). This can be seen by the estimate(
n
w
)
= 2nh(w/n)±o(n),
h(·) being the binary entropy function, that is easily derived from Stirling’s
formula. By Chernoff bounds, the error γ can be upper bounded as
γ = Pr
Z∼Bn,p
[|wgt(Z)− np| > ηn] ≤ 2e−cηnp = 2−Ω(n),
where cη > 0 is a constant only depending on η, and is thus exponentially
small. Thus the error probability attained by any code under noise distribu-
tions Bn,p and Z :=
∑n(p+η)
i=n(p−η) αiUn,i differ by the exponentially small quan-
tity γ. We may now apply Lemma 5.8 on the noise distribution Z to attain
code ensembles for the binary symmetric channel BSC(p). The error prob-
ability of the ensemble is at most 2n
√
, and this bound is satisfied by at
least a 1− n2√ fraction of the codes. Finally, the code ensemble is capacity
achieving for BSC(p) provided that the condenser f attains an output length
r ≤ (1 + α)(p+ η)n for arbitrarily small constant α, and  = o(n−4).
5.4 Explicit Capacity Achieving Codes
In the preceding sections, we showed how to obtain small ensembles of explicit
capacity achieving codes for various discrete channels, including the important
special cases BEC(p) and BSC(p). Two drawbacks related to these construc-
tions are:
1. While an overwhelming fraction of the codes in the ensemble are capacity
achieving, in general it is not clear how to pin down a single, capacity
achieving code in the ensemble.
2. For the symmetric additive noise channels, the brute-force decoder is ex-
tremely inefficient and is of interest only for proving that the constructed
ensembles are capacity achieving.
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In a classic work, Justesen [87] showed that the idea of code concatenation5
first introduced by Forney [60] can be used to transform any ensemble of
capacity achieving codes, for a memoryless channel, into an explicit, efficiently
decodable code with improved error probability over the same channel. In this
section we revisit this idea and apply it to our ensembles. For concreteness,
we focus on the binary case and consider a memoryless channel C that is either
BEC(p) or BSC(p).
Throughout this section, we consider an ensemble S of linear codes with
block length n and rate R, for which it is guaranteed that all but a γ = o(1)
fraction of the codes are capacity achieving (for a particular DMSC, in our
case either BEC(p) or BSC(p)) with some vanishing error probability η = o(1)
(the asymptotics are considered with respect to the block length n).
Justesen’s concatenated codes take an outer code Cout of block length s :=
|S|, alphabet F2k , rate R′ as the outer code. The particular choice of the
outer code in the original construction is Reed-Solomon codes. However, we
point out that any outer code that allows unique decoding of some constant
fraction of errors at rates arbitrarily close to one would suffice for the purpose
of constructing capacity achieving codes. In particular, in this section we
will use an expander-based construction of asymptotically good codes due to
Spielman [141], from which the following theorem can be easily derived6:
Theorem 5.9. For every integer k > 0 and every absolute constant R′ < 1,
there is an explicit family of F2-linear codes over F2k for every block length
and rate R′ that is error-correcting for an Ω(1) fraction of errors. The running
time of the encoder and the decoder is linear in the bit-length of the codewords.
5.4.1 Justesen’s Concatenation Scheme
The concatenation scheme of Justesen differs from traditional concatenation
in that the outer code is concatenated with an ensemble of codes rather than
a single inner code.
In this construction, size of the ensemble is taken to be matching with the
block length of the outer code, and each symbol of the outer code is encoded
with one of the inner codes in the ensemble. We use the notation C := Cout S
to denote concatenation of an outer code Cout with the ensemble S of inner
codes. Suppose that the alphabet size of the outer code is taken as 2bRnc,
where we recall that n and R denote the block length and rate of the inner
codes in S.
The encoding of a message with the concatenated code can be obtained
as follows: First, the message is encoded using Cout to obtain an encoding
(c1, . . . , cs) ∈ Fs2k , where k = bRnc denotes the dimension of the inner codes.
5 A quick review of code concatenation and its basic properties appears in Appendix A.
6There are alternative choices of the outer code that lead to a similar result, e.g.,
expander-based codes due to Guruswami and Indyk [76].
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Figure 5.3: Justesen’s concatenation scheme.
Then, for each i ∈ [s], the ith symbol of the encoding ci is further encoded by
the ith code in the ensemble S (under some arbitrary ordering of the codes
in the ensemble), resulting in a binary sequence c′i of length n. The ns-bit
long binary sequence (c′1, . . . , c′s) defines the encoding of the message under
Cout  S. The concatenation is scheme is depicted in Figure 5.3.
Similar to classical concatenated codes, the resulting binary code C has
block length N := ns and dimension K := kk′, where k′ is the dimension of
the outer code Cout. However, the neat idea in Justesen’s concatenation is
that it eliminates the need for a brute-force search for finding a good inner
code, as long as almost all inner codes are guaranteed to be good.
5.4.2 The Analysis
In order to analyze the error probability attained by the concatenated code
Cout  S, we consider the following naive decoder7:
1. Given a received sequence (y1, . . . , ys) ∈ (Fn2 )s, apply an appropriate
decoder for the inner codes (e.g., the brute-force decoder for BSC, or
Gaussian elimination for BEC) to decode each yi to a codeword c
′
i of the
ith code in the ensemble.
7Alternatively, one could use methods such as Forney’s Generalized Minimum Distance
(GMD) decoder for Reed-Solomon codes [60]. However, the naive decoder suffices for our
purposes and works for any asymptotically good choice of the outer code.
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2. Apply the outer code decoder on (c′1, . . . , c′s) that is guaranteed to correct
some constant fraction of errors, to obtain a codeword (c1, . . . , cs) of the
outer code Cout.
3. Recover the decoded sequence from the corrected encoding (c1, . . . , cs).
Since the channel is assumed to be memoryless, the noise distributions on
inner codes are independent. Let G ⊆ [s] denote the set of coordinate positions
corresponding to “good” inner codes in S that achieve an error probability
bounded by η. By assumption, we have G ≥ (1− γ)|S|.
Suppose that the outer code Cout corrects some γ + α fraction of adver-
sarial errors, for a constant α > η. Then an error might occur only if more
than αN of the codes in G fail to obtain a correct decoding. We expect the
number of failures within the good inner codes to be η|G|. Due to the noise
independence, it is possible to show that the fraction of failures may deviate
from the expectation η only with a negligible probability. In particular, a
direct application of Chernoff bound implies that the probability that more
than an α fraction of the good inner codes err is at most
(5.5) ηα
′|G| = 2−Ωα(log(1/η)s),
where α′ > 0 is a constant that only depends on α. This also upper bounds
the error probability of the concatenated code. In particular, we see that if
the error probability η of the inner codes is exponentially small in their block
length n, the concatenated code also achieves an exponentially small error in
its block length N .
Now we analyze the encoding and decoding complexity of the concatenated
code, assuming that Spielman’s expander codes (Theorem 5.9) are used for
the outer code. With this choice, the outer code becomes equipped with a
linear-time encoder and decoder. Since any linear code can be encoded in
quadratic time (in its block length), the concatenated code can be encoded in
O(n2s), which for s n can be considered “almost linear” in the block length
N = ns of C. The decoding time of each inner code is cubic in n for the erasure
channel, since decoding reduces to Gaussian elimination, and thus for this case
the naive decoder runs in time O(n3s). For the symmetric channel, however,
the brute-force decoder used for the inner codes takes exponential time in
the block length, namely, 2Rnpoly(n). Therefore, the running time of the
decoder for concatenated code becomes bounded by O(2Rnspoly(n)). When
the inner ensemble is exponentially large; i.e., s = 2n (which is the case for
our ensembles if we use the Leftover Hash Lemma), the decoding complexity
becomes O(s1+Rpoly(log s)) which is at most quadratic in the block length of
C.
Since the rate R′ of the outer code can be made arbitrarily close to 1, rate
of the concatenated code C can be made arbitrarily close to the rate R of the
inner codes. Thus, if the ensemble of inner codes is capacity-achieving, so
would be the concatenated code.
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5.4.3 Density of the Explicit Family
In the preceding section we saw how to obtain explicit capacity achieving
codes from capacity achieving code ensembles using concatenation. One of
the important properties of the resulting family of codes that is influenced by
the size of the inner code ensemble is the set of block lengths N for which the
concatenated code is defined. Recall that N = ns, where n and s respectively
denote the block length of the inner codes and the size of the code ensemble,
and the parameter s is a function of n. For instance, for all classical examples
of capacity achieving code ensembles (namely, Wozencraft’s ensemble, Goppa
codes and shortened cyclic codes) we have s(n) = 2n. In this case, the resulting
explicit family of codes would be defined for integer lengths of the form N(i) =
i2i.
A trivial approach for obtaining capacity achieving codes for all lengths
is to use a padding trick. Suppose that we wish to transmit a particular
bit sequence of length K through the channel using the concatenated code
family of rate ρ that is taken to be sufficiently close to the channel capacity.
The sequence might originate from a source that does not produce a constant
stream of bits (e.g., consider a terminal emulator that produces data only
when a user input is available).
Ideally, one requires the length of the encoded sequence to be N = dK/ρe.
However, since the family might not be defined for the block length N , we
might be forced to take a code C in the family with smallest length N ′ ≥ N
that is of the form N ′ = ns(n), for some integer n, and pad the original
message with redundant symbols. This way we have encoded a sequence of
length K to one of length N ′, implying an effective rate K/N ′. The rate loss
incurred by padding is thus equal to ρ − K/N ′ = K(1/N − 1/N ′). Thus, if
N ′ ≥ N(1 + δ) for some positive constant δ > 0, the rate loss becomes lower
bounded by a constant and thus, even if the original concatenated family is
capacity achieving, it no longer remains capacity achieving when extended to
arbitrarily chosen lengths using the padding trick.
Therefore, if we require the explicit family obtained from concatenation to
remain capacity achieving for all lengths, the set of block lengths {is(i)}i∈N
for which it is defined must be sufficiently dense. This is the case provided
that we have
s(n)
s(n+ 1)
= 1− o(1),
which in turn, requires the capacity achieving code ensemble to have a sub-
exponential size (by which we mean s(n) = 2o(n)).
Using the framework introduced in this chapter, linear extractors and loss-
less condensers that achieve nearly optimal parameters would result in code
ensembles of polynomial size in n. The explicit erasure code ensemble obtained
from Trevisan’s extractor (Corollary 5.4) or Guruswami-Umans-Vadhan’s loss-
less condenser (Corollary 5.5) combined with Justesen’s concatenation scheme
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results in an explicit sequence of capacity achieving codes for the binary era-
sure channel that is defined for every block length, and allows almost linear-
time (i.e., N1+o(1)) encoding and decoding. Moreover, the latter sequence of
codes that is obtained from a lossless condenser is capacity achieving for the
binary symmetric channel (with a matching bit-flip probability) as well.
5.5 Duality of Linear Affine Condensers
In Section 5.2 we saw that linear extractors for bit-fixing sources can be used
to define generator matrices of a family of erasure-decodable codes. On the
other hand, we showed that linear lossless condensers for bit-fixing sources
define parity check matrices of erasure-decodable codes.
Recall that generator and parity check matrices are dual notions, and in
our construction we have considered matrices in one-to-one correspondence
with linear mappings. Indeed, we have used linear mappings defined by ex-
tractors and lossless condensers to obtain generator and parity check matrices
of our codes (where the ith row of the matrix defines the coefficient vector of
the linear form corresponding to the ith output of the mapping). Thus, we get
a natural duality between linear functions: If two linear functions represent
generator and parity check matrices of the same code, they can be considered
dual8. Just in the same way that the number of rows of a generator matrix
and the corresponding parity check matrix add up to their number of columns
(provided that there is no linear dependence between the rows), the dual of a
linear function mapping Fnq to F
m
q (where m ≤ n) that has no linear depen-
dencies among its n−m outputs can be taken to be a linear function mapping
Fnq to F
n−m
q .
In fact, a duality between linear extractors and lossless condensers for
affine sources is implicit in the analysis leading to Corollary 5.3. Namely, it
turns out that if a linear function is an extractor for an affine source, the dual
function becomes a lossless condenser for the dual distribution, and vice versa.
This is made precise (and slightly more general) in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.10. Suppose that the linear mapping defined by a matrix G ∈
Fm×nq of rank m ≤ n is a (k log q)→0 (k′ log q) condenser for a k-dimensional
affine source X over Fnq so that for X ∼ X , the distribution of G · X> has
entropy at least k′ log q. Let H ∈ F(n−m)×nq be a dual matrix for G (i.e.,
GH> = 0) of rank n − m and Y be an (n − k)-dimensional affine space
over Fnq supported on a translation of the dual subspace corresponding to the
support of X . Then for Y ∼ Y, the distribution of H ·Y > has entropy at least
(n− k + k′ −m) log q.
8Note that, under this notion of duality, the dual of a linear function need not be unique
even though its linear-algebraic properties (e.g., kernel) would be independent of its choice.
5.5. DUALITY OF LINEAR AFFINE CONDENSERS 147
Proof. Suppose that X is supported on a set
{x ·AG + a : x ∈ Fkq},
where AG ∈ Fk×nq has rank k and a ∈ Fnq is a fixed row vector. Moreover we
denote the dual distribution Y by the set
{y ·AH + b : y ∈ Fn−kq },
where b ∈ Fnq is fixed and AH ∈ F(n−k)×nq is of rank n − k, and we have the
orthogonality relationship AH ·A>G = 0.
The assumption that G is a (k log q) →0 (k′ log q)-condenser implies that
the distribution
G · (A>G · UFkq + a>),
where UFkq stands for a uniformly random row vector in Fkq , is an affine source
of dimension at least k′, equivalent to saying that the matrix G · A>G ∈ Fm×kq
has rank at least k′ (since rank is equal to the dimension of the image), or in
symbols,
(5.6) rank(G ·A>G) ≥ k′.
Observe that since we have assumed rank(G) = m, its right kernel is (n−m)-
dimensional, and thus the linear mapping defined by G cannot reduce more
than n−m dimensions of the affine source X . Thus, the quantity n−k+k′−m
is non-negative.
By a similar argument as above, in order to show the claim we need to
show that
rank(H ·A>H) ≥ n− k + k′ −m.
Suppose not. Then the right kernel of H · A>H ∈ F(n−m)×(n−k)q must have
dimension larger than (n− k)− (n− k + k′ −m) = m− k′. Denote this right
kernel by R ⊆ Fn−kq . Since the matrix AH is assumed to have maximal rank
n − k, and n − k ≥ m − k′, for each nonzero y ∈ R, the vector y · AH ∈ Fnq
is nonzero and since H · (A>Hy>) = 0 (by the definition of right kernel), the
duality of G and H implies that there is a nonzero x ∈ Fmq where
x ·G = y ·AH ,
and the choice of y uniquely specifies x. In other words, there is a subspace
R′ ⊆ Fmq such that
dim(R′) = dim(R),
and
{x ·G : x ∈ R′} = {y ·AH : y ∈ R}.
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But observe that, by orthogonality of AG and AH , every y satisfies y ·AHA>G =
0, meaning that for every x ∈ R′, we must have x · GA>G = 0. Thus the
left kernel of GA>G has dimension larger than m − k′ (since R′ does), and
we conclude that the matrix GA>G has rank less than k
′, a contradiction for
(5.6).
Since every k-dimensional affine space over Fnq has an (n− k)-dimensional
dual vector space, the above result combined with Proposition 5.1 directly
implies the following corollary:
Corollary 5.11. Suppose that the linear mapping defined by a matrix G ∈
Fm×nq of rank m ≤ n is a (k log q) → (k′ log q) condenser, for some  < 1/2.
Let H ∈ F(n−m)×nq of rank n − m be so that GH> = 0. Then, the linear
mapping defined by H is an (n−k) log q →0 (n−k+k′−m) log q condenser.
Similarly, linear seeded condensers for affine sources define linear seeded
dual condensers for affine sources with complementary entropy (this is done
by taking the dual linear function for every fixing of the seed).
Two important special cases of the above results are related to affine ex-
tractors and lossless condensers. When the linear mapping G is an affine ex-
tractor for k-dimensional distributions, the dual mapping H becomes a lossless
condenser for (n− k)-dimensional spaces, and vice versa.
Andante con moto
espressivo
Johannes Brahms (1833–1897): Ballade Op. 10 No. 4 in B major.

“I confess that Fermat’s Theorem
as an isolated proposition has
very little interest for me,
because I could easily lay down a
multitude of such propositions,
which one could neither prove
nor dispose of.”
— Carl Friedrich GaussChapter 6
Codes on the
Gilbert-Varshamov Bound
One of the central problems in coding theory is the construction of codes
with extremal parameters. Typically, one fixes an alphabet size q, and two
among the three fundamental parameters of the code (block-length, number
of codewords, and minimum distance), and asks about extremal values of the
remaining parameter such that there is a code over the given alphabet with
the given parameters. For example, fixing the minimum distance d and the
block-length n, one may ask for the largest number of codewords M such that
there exists a code over an alphabet with q elements having n,M, d as its
parameters, or in short, an (n,M, d)q-code.
Answering this question in its full generality is extremely difficult, espe-
cially when the parameters are large. For this reason, researchers have con-
centrated on asymptotic assertions: to any [n, logM,d]q-code C we associate
a point (δ(C), R(C)) ∈ [0, 1]2, where δ(C) = d/n and R(C) = logqM/n are
respecitvely the relative distance and rate of the code. A particular point
(δ,R) is called asymptotically achievable (over a q-ary alphabet) if there exists
a sequence (C1, C2, . . .) of codes of increasing block-length such that δ(Ci)→ δ
and R(Ci)→ R as i→∞.
Even with this asymptotic relaxation the problem of determining the shape
of the set of asymptotically achievable points remains difficult. Let αq(δ) be
defined as the supremum of all R such that (δ,R) is asymptotically achievable
over a q-ary alphabet. It is known that αq is a continuous function of δ [105],
that αq(0) = 1 (trivial), and αq(δ) = 0 for δ ≥ (q − 1)/q (by the Plotkin
bound). However, for no δ ∈ (0, (q − 1)/q) and for no q is the value of αq(δ)
known.
What is known are lower and upper bounds for αq. The best lower bound
known is due to Gilbert and Varshamov[68, 157] which states that αq(δ) ≥
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1− hq(δ), where the q-ary entropy function hq is defined as
hq(δ) := −δ logq δ − (1− δ) logq(1− δ) + δ logq(q − 1).
Up until 1982, years of research had made it plausible to think that this bound
is tight, i.e., that αq(δ) = 1− hq(δ). Goppa’s invention of algebraic-geometric
codes [72], and the subsequent construction of Tsfasman, Vla˘dut¸, and Zink
[154] using curves with many points over a finite field and small genus showed
however that the bound is not tight when the alphabet size is large enough.
Moreover, Tsfasman et al. also gave a polynomial time construction of such
codes (which has been greatly simplified since, see, e.g., [67]).
The fate of the binary alphabet is still open. Many researchers still be-
lieve that α2(δ) = 1 − h2(δ). In fact, for a randomly chosen linear code
C (one in which the entries of a generator matrix are chosen independently
and uniformly over the alphabet) and for any positive  we have R(C) ≥
1 − hq(δ(C)) −  with high probability (with probability at least 1 − 2−nc
where n is the block-length and c is a constant depending on ). However,
even though this shows that most randomly chosen codes are arbitrarily close
to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, no explicit polynomial time construction of
such codes is known when the alphabet size is small (e.g., for binary alpha-
bets).
In this chapter, we use the technology of pseudorandom generators which
has played a prominent role in the theoretical computer science research in
recent years to (conditionally) produce, for any block-length n and any rate
R < 1, a list of poly(n) many codes of block length n and designed rate R
(over an arbitrary alphabet) such that a very large fraction of these codes has
parameters arbitrarily close to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Here, poly(n)
denotes a polynomial in n.
In a nutshell, our construction is based on the pseudorandom generator
of Nisan and Wigderson [115]. In particular, we will first identify a Boolean
function f of which we assume that it satisfies a certain complexity-theoretic
assumption. More precisely, we assume that the function cannot be computed
by algorithms that require sub-exponential amount of memory. A natural
candidate for such a function is given later in the chapter. This function is
then extended to produce nk bits from O(log n) bits. The extended function
is called a pseudorandom generator. The main point about this extended
function is that the nk bits produced cannot be distinguished from random
bits by a Turing machine with restricted resources. In our case, the output
cannot be distinguished from a random sequence when a Turing machine is
used which uses only an amount of space that is polynomially bounded in the
length of its input.
The new nk bits are regarded as the entries of a generator matrix of a code.
Varying the base O(log n) bits in all possible ways gives us a polynomially long
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list of codes of which we can show that a majority lies asymptotically on the
Glibert-Varshamov bound, provided the hardness assumption is satisfied1.
6.1 Basic Notation
We begin with the definitions of the terms we will use throughout the chapter.
For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the particular cases of our interest and
will avoid presenting the definitions in full generality. See Appendix A for a
quick review of the basic notions in coding theory and [117,139] for complex-
ity-theoretic notions.
Our main tool in this chapter is a hardness-based pseudorandom gener-
ator. Informally, this is an efficient algorithm that receives a sequence of
truly random bits at input and outputs a much longer sequence looking ran-
dom to any distinguisher with bounded computational power. This property
of the pseudorandom generator can be guaranteed to hold by assuming the
existence of functions that are hard to compute for certain computational de-
vices. This is indeed a broad sketch; Depending on what we precisely mean by
the quantitative measures just mentioned, we come to different definitions of
pseudorandom generators. Here we will be mainly interested in computational
hardness against algorithms with bounded space complexity.
Hereafter, we will use the shorthand DSPACE[s(n)] to denote the class
of problems solvable with O(s(n)) bits of working memory and E for the
class of problems solvable in time 2O(n) (i.e., E =
⋃
c∈NDTIME[2
cn], where
DTIME[t(n)] stands for the class of problems deterministically solvable in time
O(t(n))).
Certain arguments that we use in this chapter require non-uniform com-
putational models. Hence, we will occasionally refer to algorithms that receive
advice strings to help them carry out their computation. Namely, in addition
to the input string, the algorithm receives an advice string whose content only
depends on the length of the input and not the input itself. It is assumed that,
for every n, there is an advice string that makes the algorithm work correctly
on all inputs of length n. We will use the notation DSPACE[f(n)]/g(n) for
the class of problems solvable by algorithms that receive g(n) bits of advice
and use O(f(n)) bits of working memory.
Definition 6.1. Let S : N → N be a (constructible) function. A Boolean
function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} is said to have hardness S if for every algorithm
1 We remark that the method used in this chapter can be regarded as a “relativized”
variation of the original Nisan-Wigderson generator and, apart from construction of error-
correcting codes, can be applied to a vast range of probabilistic constructions of combinato-
rial objects (e.g., Ramsey graphs, combinatorial designs, etc). Even though this derandom-
ization technique seems to be “folklore” among the theoretical computer science community,
it is included in the thesis mainly since there appears to be no elaborate and specifically
focused writeup of it in the literature.
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A in DSPACE[S(n)]/O(S(n)) and infinitely many n (and no matter how the
advice string is chosen) it holds that
|Pr
x
[A(x) = f(x)]− 1/2| < 1/S(n),
where x is uniformly sampled from {0, 1}n.
Obviously, any Boolean function can be trivially computed correctly on at
least half of the inputs by an algorithm that always outputs a constant value
(either 0 or 1). Intuitively, for a hard function no efficient algorithm can do
much better. For the purpose of this chapter, the central hardness assumption
that we use is the following:
Assumption 1. There is a Boolean function in E with hardness at least 2n,
for some constant  > 0.
The term pseudorandom generator emphasizes the fact that it is infor-
mation-theoretically impossible to transform a sequence of truly random bits
into a longer sequence of truly random bits, hence the best a transformation
with a nontrivial stretch can do is to generate bits that look random to a
particular family of observers. To make this more precise, we need to define
computational indistinguishability first.
Definition 6.2. Let p = {pn} and q = {qn} be families of probability dis-
tributions, where pn and qn are distributed over {0, 1}n. Then p and q are
(S, `, )-indistinguishable (for some S, ` : N→ N and  : N→ (0, 1)) if for every
algorithm A in DSPACE(S(n))/O(`(n)) and infinitely many n (and no matter
how the advice string is chosen) we have that
|Pr
x
[A(x) = 1]− Pr
y
[A(y) = 1]| < (n),
where x and y are sampled from pn and qn, respectively.
This is in a way similar to computational hardness. Here the hard task is
telling the difference between the sequences generated by different sources. In
other words, two probability distributions are indistinguishable if any resource-
bounded observer is fooled when given inputs sampled from one distribution
rather than the other. Note that this may even hold if the two distributions
are not statistically close to each other.
Now we are ready to define pseudorandom generators we will later need.
Definition 6.3. A deterministic algorithm that computes a function
G : {0, 1}c logn → {0, 1}n
(for some constant c > 0) is called a (high-end) pseudorandom generator if
the following conditions hold:
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1. It runs in polynomial time with respect to n.
2. Let the probability distribution Gn be defined uniformly over the range
of G restricted to outputs of length n. Then the family of distributions
{Gn} is (n, n, 1/n)-indistinguishable from the uniform distribution.
An input to the pseudorandom generator is referred to as a random seed.
Here the length of the output as a function of the seed length s, known as
the stretch of the pseudorandom generator, is required to be the exponential
function 2s/c.
6.2 The Pseudorandom Generator
A pseudorandom generator, as we just defined, extends a truly random se-
quence of bits into an exponentially long sequence that looks random to any
efficient distinguisher. From the definition it is not at all clear whether such
an object could exist. In fact the existence of pseudorandom generators (even
much weaker than our definition) is not yet known. However, there are various
constructions of pseudorandom generators based on unproven (but seemingly
plausible) assumptions. The presumed assumption is typically chosen in line
with the same guideline, namely, a computational task being intractable. For
instance, the early constructions of [135] and [15] are based on the intractabil-
ity of certain number-theoretic problems, namely, integer factorization and
the discrete logarithm function. Yao [166] extends these ideas to obtain pseu-
dorandomness from one-way permutations. This is further generalized by [80]
who show that the existence of any one-way function is sufficient. However,
these ideas are mainly motivated by cryptographic applications and often re-
quire strong assumptions.
The prototypical pseudorandom generator for the applications in deran-
domization, which is of our interest, is due to Nisan and Wigderson[115]. They
provide a broad range of pseudorandom generators with different strengths
based on a variety of hardness assumptions. In rough terms, their generator
works by taking a hard function for a certain complexity class, evaluating
it in carefully chosen points (related to the choice of the random seed), and
outputting the resulting sequence. Then one can argue that an efficient distin-
guisher can be used to efficiently compute the hard function, contradicting the
assumption. Note that for certain complexity classes, hard functions are prov-
ably known. However, they typically give generators too weak to be applied
in typical derandomizations. Here we simply apply the Nisan-Wigderson con-
struction to obtain a pseudorandom generator which is robust against space-
efficient computations. This is shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 6.4. Assumption 1 implies the existence of a pseudorandom gen-
erator as in Definition 6.3. That is to say, suppose that there is a constant
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 > 0 and a Boolean function computable in time 2O(n) that has hardness
2n. Then there exists a function G : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n computable in
time polynomial in n whose output (when given uniformly random bits at
input) is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution for all algorithms in
DSPACE[n]/O(n).
Proof. [115] Let f be a function satisfying Assumption 1 for some fixed  > 0,
and recall that we intend to generate n pseudorandom bits from a truly random
seed of length ` which is only logarithmically long in n.
The idea of the construction is as follows: We evaluate the hard function
f in n carefully chosen points, each of the same length m, where m is to
be determined shortly. Each of these m-bit long inputs is obtained from a
particular subset of the ` bits provided by the random seed. This can be con-
veniently represented in a matrix form: Let D be an n× ` binary matrix, each
row of which having the same weight m. Now the pseudorandom generator G
is described as follows: The ith bit generated by G is the evaluation of f on
the projection of the `-bit long input sequence to those coordinates indicated
by the ith row of D. Note that because f is in E, the output sequence can be
computed in time polynomial in n, as long as m is logarithmically small.
As we will shortly see, it turns out that we need D to satisfy a certain
small-overlap property. Namely, we require the bitwise product of each pair
of the rows of D to have weight at most log n. A straightforward counting
argument shows that, for a logarithmically large value of m, the parameter
` can be kept logarithmically small as well. In particular, for the particular
choice of m := 2 log n, the matrix D exists with ` = O(log n). Moreover, rows
of the matrix can be constructed (in time polynomial in n) using a simple
greedy algorithm.
To show that our construction indeed gives us a pseudorandom generator,
suppose that there is an algorithm A working in DSPACE[n]/O(n) which is
able to distinguish the output of G from a truly random sequence with a bias
of at least 1/n. That is, for all large enough n it holds that
δ := |Pr
y
[Aα(n)(y) = 1]− Pr
x
[Aα(n)(G(x)) = 1]| ≥ 1/n,
where x and y are distributed uniformly in {0, 1}` and {0, 1}n, respectively,
and α(n) in the superscript denotes an advice string of linear length (that
only depends on n). The goal is to transform A into a space-efficient (and
non-uniform) algorithm that approximates f , obtaining a contradiction.
Without loss of generality, let the quantity inside the absolute value be non-
negative (the argument is similar for the negative case). Let the distribution
Di (for 0 ≤ i ≤ n) over {0, 1}n be defined by concatenation of the length-i
prefix of G(x), when x is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}`, with a
Boolean string of length n − i obtained uniformly at random. Define pi as
Prz[A
α(n)(z) = 1], where z is sampled from Di, and let δi := pi−1 − pi. Note
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that D0 is the uniform distribution and Dn is uniformly distributed over the
range of G. Hence, we have
∑n
i=1 δi = p0 − pn = δ ≥ 1/n, meaning that for
some i, δi ≥ 1/n2. Fix this i in the sequel.
Without loss of generality, assume that the ith bit of G(x) depends on the
first m bits of the random seed. Now consider the following randomized proce-
dure B: Given i−1 input bits u1, . . . , ui−1, choose a binary sequence ri, . . . , rn
uniformly at random and compute Aα(n)(u1, . . . , ui−1, ri, . . . , rn). If the out-
put was 1 return ri, otherwise, return the negation of ri. It is straightforward
to show that
(6.1) Pr
x,r
[B(G(x)i−11 ) = G(x)i] ≥
1
2
+ δi.
Here, G(x)i−11 and G(x)i are shorthands for the (i− 1)-bit long prefix of G(x)
and the ith bit of G(x), respectively, and the probability is taken over the
choice of x and the internal coins of B.
So far we have constructed a linear-time probabilistic procedure for guess-
ing the ith pseudorandom bit from the first i− 1 bits. By averaging, we note
that there is a particular choice of ri, . . . , rn, independent of x, that preserves
the bias given in (6.1). Furthermore, note that the function G(x)i we are try-
ing to guess, which is in fact f(x1, . . . , xm), does not depend on xm+1, . . . , x`.
Therefore, again by averaging we see that these bits can also be fixed. There-
fore, for a given sequence x1, . . . , xm, one can compute G(x)
i−1
1 , feed it to
B (having known the choices we have fixed), and guess G(x)i with the same
bias as in (6.1). The problem is of course that G(x)i−11 does not seem to be
easily computable. However, what we know is that each bit of this sequence
depends only on log n bits of x1, . . . , xm, followed by the construction of D.
Hence, having fixed xm+1, . . . , x`, we can trivially describe each bit of G(x)
i−1
1
by a Boolean formula (or a Boolean circuit) of exponential size (that is, of size
O(2logn) = O(n)). These i − 1 = O(n) Boolean formulae can be encoded as
an additional advice string of length O(n2) (note that their descriptions only
depend on n), implying that G(x)i−11 can be computed in linear space using
O(n2) bits of advice.
All the choices we have fixed so far (namely, i, ri, . . . , rn, xm+1, . . . , x`) only
depend on n and can be absorbed into the advice string as well2. Combined
with the bit-guessing algorithm we just described, this gives us a linear-space
algorithm that needs an advice of quadratic length and correctly computes
f(x1, . . . , xm) on at least a
1
2 + δi fraction of inputs, which is off from 1/2
by a bias of at least 1/n2. But this is not possible by the hardness of f ,
which is assumed to be at least 2m = n2. Thus, G must be a pseudorandom
generator.
2Alternatively, one can avoid using this additional advice by enumerating over all possible
choices and taking a majority vote. However, this does not decrease the total advice length
by much.
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The above proof uses a function that is completely unpredictable for every
efficient algorithm. Impagliazzo and Wigderson [85] improve the construction
to show that this requirement can be relaxed to one that only requires a worst
case hardness, meaning that the function computed by any efficient (non-
uniform) algorithm needs to differ from the hard function on at least one input.
In our application, this translates into the following hardness assumption:
Assumption 2. There is a constant  > 0 and a function f in E such that
every algorithm in DSPACE[S(n)]/O(S(n)) that correctly computes f requires
S(n) = Ω(2n).
The idea of their result (which was later reproved in [146] using a coding-
theoretic argument) is to amplify the given hardness, that is, to transform
a worst-case hard function in E to another function in E which is hard on
average. In our setting, this gives us the following (since the proof essentially
carries over without change, we only sketch the idea):
Theorem 6.5. Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1 and hence, the existence
of pseudorandom generators.
Proof Idea. [146] Let a function f be hard in worst case. Consider the truth
table of f as a string x of length N := 2n. The main ingredient of the proof is a
linear code C with dimension N and length polynomial in N , which is obtained
by concatenation of a Reed-Muller code with the Hadamard code. The code
is list-decodable up to a fraction 12 −  of errors, for arbitrary  > 0. Moreover,
decoding can be done in sub-linear time, that is, by querying the received word
only at a small number of (randomly chosen) positions. Then the truth table
of the transformed function g can be simply defined as the encoding of x with
C. Hence g can be evaluated at any point in time polynomial in N , which
shows that g ∈ E. Further, suppose that an algorithm A can space-efficiently
compute g correctly in a fraction of points non-negligibly bounded away from
1/2 (possibly using an advice string). Then the function computed by A can
be seen as a corrupted version of the codeword g and can be efficiently recovered
using the list-decoding algorithm. From this, one can obtain a space-efficient
algorithm for computing f , contradicting the hardness of f . Hence g has to
be hard on average.
While the above result seems to require hardness against non-uniform algo-
rithms (as phrased in Assumption 2), we will see that the hardness assumption
can be further relaxed to the following, which only requires hardness against
uniform algorithms:
Assumption 3. The complexity class E is not contained in DSPACE[2o(n)].
Remark. A result by Hopcroft et al. [83] shows a deterministic simulation of
time by space. Namely, they prove that
DTIME[t(n)] ⊆ DSPACE[t(n)/ log t(n)].
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However, this result is not strong enough to influence the hardness assumption
above. To violate the assumption, a much more space-efficient simulation in
the form
DTIME[t(n)] ⊆ DSPACE[t(n)o(1)]
is required.
Before we show the equivalence of the two assumptions (namely, Assump-
tion 2 and Assumption 3), we address the natural question of how to construct
an explicit function to satisfy the required hardness assumption (after all,
evaluation of such a function is needed as part of the pseudorandom generator
construction). One possible candidate (which is a canonical hard function for
E) is proposed in the following lemma:
Lemma 6.6. Let LE be the set (encoded in binary)
{〈M,x, t, i〉 |M is a Turing machine, where given
input x at time t the ith bit of its configuration is 1},
and let the Boolean function fE be its characteristic function. Then if As-
sumption 3 is true, it is satisfied by fE.
Proof. First we show that LE is complete for E under Turing reductions
bounded in linear space. The language being in E directly follows from the
efficient constructions of universal Turing machines. Namely, given a properly-
encoded input 〈M,x, t, i〉, one can simply simulate the Turing machine M on
x for t steps and decide according to the configuration obtained at time t.
This indeed takes exponential time. Now let L be any language in E which is
computable by a Turing machine M in time 2cn, for some constant c > 0. For
a given x of length n, using an oracle for solving fE, one can query the oracle
with inputs of the form 〈M,x, 2cn, i〉 (where the precise choice of i depends on
the particular encoding of the configurations) to find out whether M is in an
accepting state, and hence decide L. This can obviously be done in space lin-
ear in n, which concludes the completeness of LE. Now if Assumption 3 is true
and is not satisfied by fE, this completeness result allows one to compute all
problems in E in sub-exponential time, which contradicts the assumption.
The following lemma shows that this seemingly weaker assumption is in
fact sufficient for our pseudorandom generator:
Lemma 6.7. Assumptions 2 and 3 are equivalent.
Proof. This argument is based on [108, Section 5.3]. First we observe that,
given a black box C that receives n input bits and outputs a single bit, it
can be verified in linear space whether C computes the restriction of fE to
inputs of length n. To see this, consider an input of the form 〈M,x, t, i〉, as in
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the statement of Lemma 6.6. The correctness of C can be explicitly checked
when the time parameter t is zero (that is, C has to agree with the initial
configuration of M). Moreover, for every time step t > 0, the answer given
by C has to be consistent with that of the previous time step (namely, the
transition made at the location of the head should be legal and every other
position of the tape should remain unchanged). Thus, on can verify C simply
by enumerating all possible inputs and verifying whether the answer given
by C remains consistent across subsequent time steps. This can obviously be
done in linear space.
Now suppose that Assumption 3 is true and hence, by Lemma 6.6, is
satisfied by fE. That is, there is a constant  > 0 such that every algorithm
for computing fE requires space O(2
n). Moreover, assume that there is an
algorithm A working in DSPACE[S(n)]/O(S(n)) that computes fE. Using
the verification procedure described above, one can (uniformly) simulate A
in space O(S(n)) by enumerating all choices of the advice string and finding
the one that makes the algorithm work correctly. Altogether this requires
space O(S(n)). Combined with the hardness assumption, we conclude that
S(n) = Ω(2n). The converse direction is obvious.
Putting everything together, we obtain a very strong pseudorandom gen-
erator as follows:
Corollary 6.8. Assumption 3 implies the existence of pseudorandom genera-
tors whose output of length n is (n, n, 1/n)-indistinguishable from the uniform
distribution.
6.3 Derandomized Code Construction
As mentioned before, the bound given by Gilbert and Varshamov[68, 157]
states that, for a q-ary alphabet, large enough n, and for any value of 0 ≤ δ ≤
(q − 1)/q, there are codes with length n, relative distance at least δ and rate
r ≥ 1 − hq(δ), where hq is the q-ary entropy function. Moreover, a random
linear code (having each entry of its generator matrix chosen uniformly at
random) achieves this bound. In fact, for all 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, in the family of linear
codes with length n and (designed) dimension nr, all but only a sub-constant
fraction of the codes achieve the bound when n grows to infinity. However,
the number of codes in the family is exponentially large (qnr) and we do not
have an a priori indication on which codes in the family are good. Putting it
differently, a randomized algorithm that merely outputs a random generator
matrix succeeds in producing a code on the GV bound with probability 1−o(1).
However, the number of random bits needed by the algorithm is nk log q. For
simplicity, in the sequel we only focus on binary codes, for which no explicit
construction approaching the GV bound is known.
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The randomized procedure above can be considerably derandomized by
considering a more restricted family of codes. Namely, fix a length n and
a basis for the finite field Fm, where m := 2
n/2. Then over such a basis
there is a natural isomorphism between the elements of Fm and the elements
of the vector space F
n/2
2 . Now for each α ∈ Fm, define the code Cα as the
set {〈x, αx〉 | x ∈ Fm}, where the elements are encoded in binary3. This
binary code has rate 1/2. Further, it is well known that Cα achieves the
GV bound for all but 1 − o(1) fraction of the choices of α. Hence in this
family a randomized construction can obtain very good codes using only n/2
random bits. Here we see how the pseudorandom generator constructed in
the last section can dramatically reduce the amount of randomness needed in
all code constructions. Our observation is based on the composition of the
following facts:
1. Random codes achieve the Gilbert-Varshamov bound: It is well known
that a simple randomized algorithm that chooses the entries of a gen-
erator matrix uniformly at random obtains a linear code satisfying the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound with overwhelming probability [157].
2. Finding the minimum distance of a (linear) code can be performed in
linear space: One can simply enumerate all the codewords to find the
minimum weight codeword, and hence, the distance of the code. This
only requires linear amount of memory with respect to the block length.
3. Provided a hardness condition, namely that sub-exponential space algo-
rithms cannot compute all the problems in E, every linear space algorithm
can be fooled by an explicit pseudorandom generator: This is what we
obtained in Corollary 6.8.
Now we formally propose a general framework that can be employed to
derandomize a wide range of combinatorial constructions.
Lemma 6.9. Let S be a family of combinatorial objects of (binary-encoded)
length n, in which an  fraction of the objects satisfy a property P . Moreover,
suppose that the family is efficiently samplable, that is, there is a polynomial-
time algorithm (in n) that, for a given i, generates the ith member of the
family. Further assume that the property P is verifiable in polynomial space.
Then for every constant k > 0, under Assumption 3, there is a constant ` and
an efficiently samplable subset of S of size at most n` in which at least an
− n−k fraction of the objects satisfy P .
Proof. Let A be the composition of the sampling algorithm with the verifier for
P . By assumption, A needs space ns, for some constant s. Furthermore, when
the input of A is chosen randomly, it outputs 1 with probability at least .
3These codes are attributed to J. M. Wozencraft (see [106]).
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Suppose that the pseudorandom generator of Corollary 6.8 transforms c log n
truly random bits into n pseudorandom bits, for some constant c > 0. Now
it is just enough to apply the pseudorandom generator on c ·max{s, k} · log n
random bits and feed n of the resulting pseudorandom bits to A. By this con-
struction, when the input of the pseudorandom generator is chosen uniformly
at random, A must still output 1 with probability  − n−k as otherwise the
pseudorandomness assumption would be violated. Now the combination of
the pseudorandom generator and A gives the efficiently samplable family of
the objects we want, for ` := c ·max{s, k}, as the random seed runs over all
the possibilities.
As the distance of a code is obviously computable in linear space by enu-
meration of all the codewords, the above lemma immediately implies the exis-
tence of a (constructible) polynomially large family of codes in which at least
1− n−k of the codes achieve the GV bound, for arbitrary k.
Remark. As shown in the original work of Nisan and Wigderson [115] (fol-
lowed by the hardness amplification of Impagliazzo and Wigderson [85]) all
randomized polynomial-time algorithms (namely, the complexity class BPP)
can be fully derandomized under the assumption that E cannot be computed
by Boolean circuits of sub-exponential size. This assumption is also sufficient
to derandomize probabilistic constructions that allow a (possibly non-uniform)
polynomial-time verification procedure for deciding whether a particular ob-
ject has the desirable properties. For the case of good error-correcting codes,
this could work if we knew of a procedure for computing the minimum dis-
tance of a linear code using circuits of size polynomial in the length of the
code. However, it turns out that (the decision version of) this problem is
NP-complete [156], and even the approximation version remains NP-complete
[52]. This makes such a possibility unlikely.
However, a key observation, due to Klivans and van Melkebeek [92], shows
that the Nisan-Wigderson construction (as well as the Impagliazzo-Wigderson
amplification) can be relativized. Namely, starting from a hardness assump-
tion for a certain family of oracle circuits (i.e., Boolean circuits that can use
special gates to compute certain Boolean functions as black box ) one can ob-
tain pseudorandom generators secure against oracle circuits of the same fam-
ily. In particular, this implies that any probabilistic construction that allows
polynomial time verification using NP oracles (including the construction of
good error-correcting codes) can be derandomized by assuming that E cannot
be computed by sub-exponential sized Boolean circuits that use NP oracle
gates. However, the result given by Lemma 6.9 can be used to derandomize a
more general family of probabilistic constructions, though it needs a slightly
stronger hardness assumption which is still plausible.
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“To achieve great things, two
things are needed; a plan, and
not quite enough time.”
— Leonard Bernstein
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we investigated the role of objects studied at the core of theoret-
ical computer science–namely, randomness extractors, condensers and pseudo-
random generators–in efficient construction of combinatorial objects suitable
for more practical applications. The applications being considered all share a
coding-theoretic flavor and include:
1. Wiretap coding schemes, where the goal is to provide information-theo-
retic secrecy in a communication channel that is partially observable by
an adversary (Chapter 3);
2. Combinatorial group testing schemes, that allow for efficient identifi-
cation of sparse binary vectors using potentially unreliable disjunctive
measurements (Chapter 4);
3. Capacity achieving codes, which provide optimally efficient and reli-
able transmission of information over unreliable discrete communication
channels (Chapter 5);
4. Codes on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, which are error-correcting codes
whose rate-distance trade-off matches what achieved by probabilistic
constructions (Chapter 6).
We conclude the thesis by a brief and informal discussion of the obtained
results, open problems and possible directions for future research.
Wiretap Protocols
In Chapter 3 we constructed rate-optimal wiretap schemes from optimal affine
extractors. The combinatorial structure of affine extractors guarantees almost
perfect privacy even in presence of linear manipulation of information. This
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observation was the key for our constructions of information-theoretically opti-
mal schemes in presence of noisy channels, active intruders, and linear network
coding.
Despite being sufficiently general for a wide range of practical applica-
tions, it makes sense to consider different types of intermediate processing.
We showed in Section 3.7.3 that, at the cost of giving up zero leakage, it
is possible to use seeded extractors to provide secrecy in presence of arbi-
trary forms of transformations. However, in order to attain zero leakage, it
becomes inevitable to construct seedless, invertible extractors for a class of
random sources that capture the nature of post-processing being allowed.
For example, suppose that the encoded information is transmitted through
a packet network towards a destination, where information is arbitrarily ma-
nipulated by intermediate routers, but is routed from the source to the desti-
nation through k ≥ 2 separated paths. In this case, the intruder may learn a
limited amount of information from each of the k components of the network.
Similar arguments as what presented in Chapter 3 can now be used to show
that the object needed for ensuring secrecy in this “route-disjoint” setting is
invertible, k-source extractors. Shaltiel [132] demonstrates that his method
for boosting the output size of extractors using output-length optimal seeded
extractors (that is the basis of our technique for making seedless extractors
invertible) can be extended to the case of two-source extractors as well.
On the other hand, if the route-disjointness condition that is assumed in
the above example is not available, zero leakage can no longer be guaranteed
without imposing further restrictions (since, as discussed in Section 3.7.3,
this would require seedless extractors for general sources, which do not ex-
ist). However, assume that the intermediate manipulations are carried out
by computationally bounded devices (a reasonable assumption to model the
real world). A natural candidate for modeling resource-bounded computation
is the notion of small-sized Boolean circuits. The secrecy problem for this
class of transformations leads to invertible extractors for the following class of
sources:
For an arbitrary Boolean function C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} that is com-
putable by Boolean circuits of bounded size, the source is uniformly
distributed on the set of inputs x ∈ {0, 1}n such that C(x) = 0
(assuming that this set has a sufficiently large size).
In a recent work of Shaltiel [133], this type of extractors have been studied
under the notion of “extractors for recognizable sources” (a notion that can
be specialized to different sub-classes depending on the bounded model of
computation being considered.
On the other hand, Trevisan and Vadhan [153] introduce the related notion
of extractors for samplable sources, where a samplable source is defined as the
image of a small-sized circuit (having multiple outputs) when provided with a
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uniformly random input. They proceed to show explicit constructions of such
extractors assuming suitable computational hardness assumptions (which turn
out to be to some extent necessary for such extractors to be constructible). It
is straightforward to see that their techniques can be readily extended to con-
struction of explicit extractors for sources recognizable by small-sized circuits
(using even weaker hardness assumptions). However, the technique works
when the source entropy is assured to be substantially large, and even so,
is unable to produce a nearly optimal output length. To this date, explicit
construction of better extractors, under mild computational assumptions, for
sources that are samplable (or recognizable) by small-sized circuits remains
an important open problem.
Observe that the technique of using extractors for construction of wire-
tap protocols as presented in Chapter 3 achieves optimal rates only if the
wiretap channel (i.e., the channel that delivers intruder’s information) is of
erasure nature. That is, we have so far assumed that, after some possible
post-processing of the encoded information, the intruder observes an arbitrar-
ily chosen, but bounded, subset of the bits being transmitted and remains
unaware of the rest. There are different natural choices of the wiretap channel
that can be considered as well. For example, suppose that the intruder ob-
serves a noisy version of the entire sequence being transmitted (e.g., when a
fraction of the encoded bits get randomly flipped before being delivered to the
intruder). An interesting question is to see whether invertible extractors (or
a suitable related notion) can be used to construct information-theoretically
optimal schemes for such variations as well.
Group Testing
Non-adaptive group testing schemes are fundamental combinatorial objects of
both theoretical and practical interest. As we showed in Chapter 4, strong
condensers can be used as building blocks in construction of noise-resilient
group testing and threshold group testing schemes.
The factors that greatly influence the quality of our constructions are
the seed length and output length of the condenser being used. As we saw,
in order to obtain an asymptotically optimal number of measurements, we
need explicit constructions of extractors and lossless condensers that achieve
a logarithmic seed length, and output length that is different from the source
entropy by small additive terms. While, as we saw, there are very good existing
constructions of both extractors and lossless condensers that can be used, they
are still sub-optimal in the above sense. Thus, any improvement on the state
of the art in explicit construction of extractors and lossless condensers will
immediately improve the qualities of our explicit constructions.
Moreover, our constructions of noise-resilient schemes with sublinear de-
coding time demonstrates a novel application for list-decodable extractors and
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condensers. This motivates further investigation of these objects for improve-
ment of their qualities.
In Section 4.3, we introduced the combinatorial notion of (d, e;u)-regular
matrices, that is used as an intermediate tool towards obtaining threshold
testing designs. Even though our construction, assuming an optimal lossless
condenser, matches the probabilistic upper bound for regular matrices, the
number of measurements in the resulting threshold testing scheme will be
larger than the probabilistic upper bound by a factor of Ω(d log n). Thus,
an outstanding question is coming up with a direct construction of disjunct
matrices that match the probabilistic upper bound.
Despite this, the notion of regular matrices may be of independent interest,
and an interesting question is to obtain (nontrivial) concrete lower bounds on
the number of rows of such matrices in terms of the parameters d, e, u.
Moreover, in our constructions we have assumed the threshold u to be a
fixed constant, allowing the constants hidden in asymptotic notions to have
a poor dependence on u. An outstanding question is whether the number
of measurements can be reasonably controlled when u becomes large; e.g.,
u = Ω(d).
Another interesting problem is decoding in the threshold model. While
our constructions can combinatorially guarantee identification of sparse vec-
tors, for applications it is important to have an efficient reconstruction algo-
rithm as well. Contrary to the case of strongly disjunct matrices that allow
a straightforward decoding procedure (cf. [27]), it is not clear whether in
general our notion of disjunct matrices allow efficient decoding, and thus it
becomes important to look for constructions that are equipped with efficient
reconstruction algorithms.
Finally, for clarity of the exposition, in this presentation we have only
focused on asymptotic trade-offs, and it would be nice to obtain good, non-
asymptotic, estimates on the obtained bounds that are useful for applications.
Capacity Achieving Codes
The general construction of capacity-achieving codes presented in Chapter 5
can be used to obtain a polynomial-sized ensemble of codes of any given block
length n, provided that nearly optimal linear extractors or lossless condensers
are available. In particular, this would require a logarithmic seed length and
an output length which is different from the input entropy by an arbitrarily
small constant fraction of the entropy. Both extractors and lossless condensers
constructed by Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan [78] achieve this goal, and
as we saw in Chapter 2, their lossless condenser can be easily made linear.
However, to the best of our knowledge, to this date no explicit construction of
a linear extractor with logarithmic seed length that extracts even a constant
fraction of the source entropy is known.
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Another interesting problem concerns the duality principle presented in
Section 5.5. As we showed, linear affine extractors and lossless condensers are
dual objects. It would be interesting to see whether a more general duality
principle exist between extractors and lossless condensers. It is not hard to
use basic Fourier analysis to slightly generalize our result to linear extractors
and lossless condensers for more general (not necessarily affine) sources. How-
ever, since condensers for general sources are allowed to have a positive, but
negligible error (which is not the case for linear affine condensers), controlling
the error to a reasonable level becomes a tricky task, and forms an interesting
problem for future research.
The Gilbert-Varshamov Bound
As we saw in Chapter 6, a suitable computational assumption implies a deter-
ministic polynomial-time algorithm for explicit construction of polynomially
many linear codes of a given length n, almost all of which attaining the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound. That is, a randomly chosen code from such a short list
essentially behaves like a fully random code and in particular, is expected to
attain the same rate-distance tradeoff.
An important question that remains unanswered is whether a single code of
length n attaining the Gilbert-Varshamov bound can be efficiently constructed
from a list of poly(n) codes in which an overwhelming fraction attain the
bound. In effect, we are looking for an efficient code product to combine a
polynomially long list of codes (that may contain a few unsatisfactory codes)
into a single code that possesses the qualities of the overwhelming majority of
the codes in the ensemble. Since the computational problem of determining
(or even approximating) the minimum distance of a linear code is known to
be intractable, such a product cannot be constructed by simply examining the
individual codes. It is also interesting to consider impossibility results, that is,
models under which such a code product may become as difficult to construct
as finding a good code “from scratch”.
Finally, a challenging problem which still remains open is explicit con-
struction of codes (or even small ensembles of codes) that attain the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound without relying on unproven assumptions. For sufficiently
large alphabets (i.e., of size 49 or higher), geometric Goppa codes are known
to even surpass the GV bound [154]. However, for smaller alphabets, or rates
close to zero over constant-sized alphabets, no explicit construction attaining
the GV bound is known. It also remains unclear whether in such cases the GV
bound is optimal; that is, whether there are families of codes, not necessarily
explicit, that beat the bound.
169
Andante rit.3 3
3
rit.3 3
3
crescendo
Alexander Scriabin (1872–1915): Piano Sonata No. 2 in G sharp minor
(Op. 19, “Sonata-Fantasy”).
“A classic is a book that has
never finished saying what it has
to say.”
— Italo Calvino
Appendix A
A Primer on Coding Theory
In this appendix, we briefly overview the essential notions of coding theory
that we have used in the thesis. For an extensive treatment of the theory of
error-correcting codes (an in particular, the facts collected in this appendix),
we refer the reader to the books by MacWilliams and Sloane [103], van Lint
[98], and Roth [127] on the topic.
A.1 Basics
Let Σ be a finite alphabet of size q > 1. A code C of length n over Σ is
a non-empty subset of Σn. Each element of C is called a codeword and |C|
defines the size of the code. The rate of the C is defined as logq |C|/n. An
important choice for the alphabet is Σ = {0, 1}, which results in a binary code.
Typically, we assume that q is a prime power and take Σ to be the finite field
Fq.
The Hamming distance between vectors w := (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Σn and w′ :=
(w′1, . . . , w′n) ∈ Σn is defined as the number of positions at which w and w′
differ. Namely,
dist(w,w′) := |{i ∈ [n] : wi 6= w′i}|.
The Hamming weight of a vector w ∈ Fnq (denoted by wgt(w)) is the number
of its nonzero coordinates; i.e.,
wgt(w) := |{i ∈ [n] : wi 6= 0}|.
Therefore, when w,w′ ∈ Fnq , we have
dist(w,w′) = wgt(w − w′).
The minimum distance of a code C ⊆ Σn is the quantity
dist(C) := min
w,w′∈C
dist(w,w′),
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and the relative distance of the code is defined as dist(C)/n. A family of codes
of growing block lengths n is called asymptotically good if, for large enough
n, it achieves a positive constant rate (i.e., independent of n) and a positive
constant relative distance.
A code C ∈ Fnq is called linear if it is a vector subspace of Fnq . In this case,
the dimension of the code is defined as its dimension as a subspace, and the
rate would be given by the dimension divided by n. A code C with minimum
distance d is denoted by the shorthand (n, logq |C|, d)q, and when C is linear
with dimension k, by [n, k, d]q. The subscript q is omitted for binary codes.
Any linear code must include the all-zeros word 0n. Moreover, due to the
linear structure of such codes, the minimum distance of a linear code is equal
to the minimum Hamming weight of its nonzero codewords.
A generator matrix G for a linear [n, k, d]q-code C is a k×n matrix of rank
k over Fq such that
C = {xG : x ∈ Fkq}.
Moreover, a parity check matrix H for C is an r × n matrix over Fq of rank
n− k, for some r ≥ n− k, such that1
C = {x ∈ Fnq : Hx> = 0}.
Any two such matrices are orthogonal to one another, in that we must have
GH> = 0. It is easy to verify that, if C has minimum distance d, then every
choice of up to d − 1 columns of H are linearly independent, and there is a
set of d columns of H that are dependent (and the dependency is given by a
codeword of minimum weight).
The dual of a linear code C of length n over Fq (denoted by C>) is defined
as the dual vector space of the code; i.e., the set of vectors in Fnq that are all
orthogonal to every codeword in C:
C⊥ := {c ∈ Fnq : (∀w ∈ C) c · w> = 0}.
The dual of a k-dimensional code has dimension n − k, and (C⊥)⊥ = C.
Moreover, a generator matrix for the code C is a parity check matrix for C⊥
and vice versa.
An encoder for a code C with qk codewords is a function E : Σk → Σn whose
image is the code C. In particular, this means that E must be injective (one-
to-one). Moreover, any generator matrix for a linear code defines the encoder
E(x) := xG. The input x is referred to as the message. We will consider
a code explicit if it is equipped with a polynomial-time computable encoder.
For linear codes, this is equivalent to saying that there is a deterministic
polynomial time algorithm (in the length n) that outputs a generator, or
parity check, matrix for the code2.
1Here we consider vectors as row vectors, and denote column vectors (e.g., x>) as trans-
pose of row vectors.
2There are more strict possibilities for considering a code explicit; e.g., one may require
each entry of a generator matrix to be computable in logarithmic space.
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Given a message x ∈ Σk, assume that an encoding of x is obtained using an
encoder E; i.e., y := E(x) ∈ Σn. Consider a communication channel through
which the encoded sequence y is communicated. The output of the channel
y˜ ∈ Σn is delivered to a receiver, whose goal is to reconstruct x from y˜. Ideally,
if the channel is perfect, we will y˜ = y and, since E(x) is injective, deducing
x amounts to inverting the function E, which is an easy task for linear codes
(in general, this can be done using Gaussian elimination). However, consider
a closest distance decoder D : Σn → Σk that, given y˜, outputs an x ∈ Σk
for which dist(E(x), y˜) is minimized. It is easy to see that, even if we allow
the channel to arbitrarily alter up to t := b(d − 1)/2c of the symbols in the
transmitted sequence y (in symbols, if dist(y, y˜) ≤ t), then we can still ensure
that x is uniquely deducible from y˜; in particular, we must have D(y˜) = x.
For a linear code over Fq with parity check matrix H, a syndrome corre-
sponding to a sequence y˜ ∈ Fnq is the vector Hy˜>. Thus, y˜ is a codeword if
and only if its corresponding syndrome is the zero vector. Therefore, in the
channel model above, if the syndrome corresponding to the received word y˜ is
nonzero, we can be certain that y˜ 6= y. The converse is not necessarily true.
However, it is a simple exercise to see that if y˜ and y˜′ ∈ Fnq are both such that
y˜ 6= y˜′ and moreover dist(y, y˜) ≤ t and dist(y, y˜) ≤ t, then the corresponding
syndromes must be different; i.e., Hy˜> 6= Hy˜′>. Therefore, provided that
the number of errors is no more than the “unique-decoding threshold” t, it is
“combinatorially” possible to uniquely reconstruct x from the syndrome cor-
responding to the received word. This task is known as syndrome decoding .
However, ideally it is desirable to have an efficient algorithm for syndrome
decoding as well that runs in polynomial time in the length of the code. In
general, syndrome decoding for a linear code defined by its parity check ma-
trix is NP-hard (see [12]). However, a variety of explicit code constructions
are equipped with efficient syndrome decoding algorithms.
As discussed above, a code with minimum distance d can tolerate up to
t := b(d − 1)/2c errors. Moreover, if the number of errors can potentially be
larger than t, then a confusion becomes unavoidable and unique decoding can
no longer be guaranteed. However, the notion list decoding allows to control
the “amount of confusion” when the number of errors is more than t. Namely,
for a radius ρ and integer ` (referred to as the list size), a code C ⊆ [q]n is
called (ρ, `) list-decodable if the number of codewords within a distance ρn
of any vector in [q]n is at most `. In this view, unique decoding corresponds
to the case ` = 1, and a code with minimum distance d is ( 1nb(d − 1)/2c, 1)
list-decodable. However, for many theoretical and practical purposes, a small
(but possibly much larger than 1) list size may be sufficient.
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A.2 Bounds on codes
For positive integers n, d, q, denote by Aq(n, d) the maximum size of a code
with length n and minimum distance d over a q-ary alphabet, and define
αq(δ) := lim
n→∞
logq A(n, δn)
n
as the “highest” rate a code with relative distance δ can asymptotically attain.
The exact form of the function αq(·) is not known for any q; however, certain
lower and upper bounds for this quantity exist. In this section, we briefly
review some important bounds on αq(δ).
The Gilbert-Varshamov bound
Using the probabilistic method, it can be shown that a random linear code
(constructed by picking the entries of its generator, or parity check, matrix
uniformly and independently at random) with overwhelming probability at-
tains a dimension-distance tradeoff given by
k ≥ n(1− hq(d/n)),
where hq(·) is the q-ary entropy function defined as
(A.1) hq(x) := x logq(q − 1)− x logq(x)− (1− x) logq(1− x).
Thus we get the lower bound
αq(δ) ≥ 1− hq(δ)
on the function αq(·), known as the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
The Singleton bound
On the negative side, the Singleton bound states that the minimum distance
d of any q-ary code with qk or more codewords must satisfy d ≤ n − k + 1.
Codes that attain this bound with equality are known as maximum distance
separable (MDS) codes. Therefore we get that, regardless of the alphabet size,
one must have
αq(δ) ≤ 1− δ.
Lower bounds for fixed alphabet size
When the alphabet size q is fixed, there are numerous lower bounds known
for the function αq(·). Here we list several such bounds.
• Hamming (sphere packing) bound: αq(δ) ≤ 1− hq(δ/2).
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Figure A.1: Bounds on binary codes: (1) Singleton bound, (2) Hamming
bound, (3) Plotkin bound, (4) MRRW bound, (5) Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
• Plotkin bound: αq(δ) ≤ max{0, 1− δ(q/(q − 1))}.
• McEliece, Rodemich, Ramsey, and Welch (MRRW) bound:
α2(δ) ≤ h2
(1
2
−
√
δ(1− δ)).
For the binary alphabet, these bounds are depicted in Figure A.1.
The Johnson Bound on List Decoding
Intuitively, it is natural to expect that a code with large minimum distance
must remain a good list-decodable code when the list-decoding radius exceeds
half the minimum distance. The Johnson bound makes this intuition rigorous.
Below we quote a strengthened version of the bound.
Theorem A.1. (cf. [74, Section 3.3]) Let C be a q-ary code of length n, and
relative distance δ ≥ (1 − 1/q)(1 − δ′) for some δ′ ∈ (0, 1). Then for any
γ >
√
δ′, C is ((1− 1/q)(1− γ), `) list-decodable for
` = min{n(q − 1), 1− δ
′
γ2 − δ′ }.
Moreover, the code C is ((1− 1/q)(1−√δ′), 2n(q− 1)− 1) list-decodable.
As an immediate corollary, we get that any binary code with relative dis-
tance at least 12 −  is (12 −
√
, 12) list-decodable.
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A.3 Reed-Solomon codes
Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be a vector consisting of n distinct elements of Fq (assum-
ing q ≥ n). The evaluation vector of a polynomial f : Fq → Fq with respect
to p is the vector f(p) := (f(p1), . . . , f(pn)) ∈ Fnq .
A Reed-Solomon code of length n and dimension k over Fq is the set of
evaluation vectors of all polynomials of degree at most k − 1 over Fq with
respect to a particular choice of p. The dimension of this code is equal to k. A
direct corollary of Euclidean division algorithm states that, over any field, the
number of zeros of any nonzero polynomial is less than or equal to its degree.
Thus, we get that the minimum distance of a Reed-Solomon code is at least
n − k + 1, and because of the Singleton bound, is in fact equal to n − k + 1.
Hence we see that a Reed-Solomon code is MDS. A generator matrix for a
Reed-Solomon code is given by the Vandermonde matrix
G :=

1 1 . . . 1
p1 p2 . . . pn
p21 p
2
2 . . . p
2
n
...
...
. . .
...
pk−11 p
k−1
2 . . . p
k−1
n
 .
A.4 The Hadamard Code
The Hadamard code of dimension n is a linear binary code of length 2n whose
generator matrix can be obtained by arranging all binary sequences of length
n as its columns. Each codeword of the Hadamard code can thus be seen as
the truth table of a linear form
`(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
αixi
over the binary field. Therefore, each nonzero codeword must have weight
exactly 2n−1, implying that the relative distance of the Hadamard code is 12 .
A.5 Concatenated Codes
Concatenation is a classical operation on codes that is mainly used for reducing
the alphabet size of a code. Suppose that C1 (called the outer code) is an
(n1, k1, d1)Q-code and C2 (called the inner code) is a (n2, k2, d2)q-code, where
Q = qk2 . The concatenation of C1 and C2, that we denote by C1  C2 is an
(n, k, d)q-code that can be conveniently defined by its encoder mapping as
follows.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xk1) ∈ [Q]k1 be the message given to the encoder, and
C(x) = (c1, . . . , cn1) ∈ C1 be its encoding under C1. Each ci is thus an element
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of [qk2 ] and can thus be seen as a q-ary string of length k2. Denote by c
′
i ∈ [q]n2
be the encoding of this string under C2. Then the encoding of x by the
concatenated code C1  C2 is the q-ary string of length n1n2
(c′′1, . . . , c
′′
n1)
consisting of the string concatenation of symbol-wise encodings of C(x) using
C2.
Immediately from the above definition, one can see that n = n1n2, and k =
k1k2. Moreover, it is straightforward to observe that the minimum distance
of the concatenated code satisfies d ≥ d1d2. When C1 and C2 are linear codes,
the so is C1  C2.
As an example, let C1 be a Reed-Solomon code of length n1 := 2k2 and
dimension k1 := 2δn1 over FQ, where Q := 2
k2 . Thus the relative distance of
C1 equals 1− 2δ. As the inner code C2, take the Hadamard code of dimension
k2 and length Q. The concatenated code C := C1  C2 will thus have length
n := Qn1 = 2
2k2 , dimension k := δk22
k2+1, and relative distance at least
1
2 − δ. Therefore, we obtain a binary [n, k, d] code where d ≥ (12 − δ)n, and
n ≤ (k/δ)2. By the Johnson bound (Theorem A.1), this code must be (12−δ, `)
list-decodable with list size at most 1/(2δ).
We remark that binary codes with relative minimum distance 12−δ and rate
Ω(δ3 log(1/δ)) (which only depends on the parameter δ) can be obtained by
concatenating Geometric Goppa codes on the Tsfasman-Vla˘dut¸-Zink bound
(see Section 4.3.2) with the Hadamard code. The Gilbert-Varshamov bound
implies that binary codes with relative distance 12 − δ and rate Ω(δ2) exist,
and on the other hand, we know by the MRRW bound that O(δ2 log(1/δ)) is
the best rate one can hope for.
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